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Explanation in Human-AI Systems 
 
Executive Summary 
 This is an integrative review that address the question, "What makes for a good 
explanation?" with reference to AI systems. Pertinent literatures are vast. Thus, this review is 
necessarily selective. That said, most of the key concepts and issues are exressed in this Report. 
The Report encapsulates the history of computer science efforts to create systems that explain 
and instruct (intelligent tutoring systems and expert systems). The Report expresses the 
explainability issues and challenges in modern AI, and presents capsule views of the leading 
psychological theories of explanation. Certain articles stand out by virtue of their particular 
relevance to XAI, and their methods, results, and key points are highlighted.  
 It is recommended that AI/XAI researchers be encouraged to include in their research 
reports fuller details on their empirical or experimental methods, in the fashion of experimental 
psychology research reports: details on Participants, Instructions, Procedures, Tasks, Dependent 
Variables (operational definitions of the measures and metrics), Independent Variables 
(conditions), and Control Conditions. 
 In the papers reviewed in this Report one can find methodological guidance for the 
evaluation of XAI systems. But the Report highlights some noteworthy considerations: The 
differences between global and local explanations, the need to evaluate the performance of the 
human-machine work system (and not just the performance of the AI or the performance of the 
users), the need to recognize that experiment procedures tacitly impose on the user the burden of 
self-explanation. 
 Corrective/contrastive user tasks support self-explanation or explanation-as-exploration. 
Tasks that involve human-AI interactivity and co-adaptation, such as bug or oddball detection, 
hold promise for XAI evaluation since they too conform to the notions of "explanation-as-
exploration" and explanation as a co-adaptive dialog process. Tasks that involve predicting the 
AI's determinations, combined with post-experimental interviews, hold promise for the study of 
mental models in the XAI context. 
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Preface 
This Report is an expansion of a previous Report on the DARPA XAI Program, which was titled 
"Literature Review and Integration of Key Ideas for Explainable AI," and was dated February 
2018. This new version integrates nearly 200 additional references that have been discovered. 
This Report includes a new section titled "Review of Human Evaluation of XAI Systems." This 
section focuses on reports—many of them recent—on projects in which human-machine AI or 
XAI systems underwent some sort of empirical evaluation. This new section is particularly 
relevant to the empirical and experimental activities in the DARPA XAI Program. 
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1. Purpose, Scope, and Organization 
 
The purpose of this document is to distill from existing scientific literatures the resent key ideas 
that pertain to the DARPA XAI Program.  
 
Importance of the Topic 
 
For decision makers who rely upon analytics and data science, explainability is a real issue. If the 
computational system relies on a simple decision model such as logistic regression, they can 
understand it and convince executives who have to sign off on a system because it seems 
reasonable and fair. They can justify the analytical results to shareholders, regulators, etc. But for 
"Deep Nets" and "Machine Learning" systems, they can no longer do this. There is a need to find 
ways to explain the system to the decision maker so that they know that their decisions are going 
to be reasonable, and simply invoking a neurological metaphor might not be sufficient. The goals 
of explanation involve persuasion, but that comes only as a consequence of understanding the 
hot the AI works, the mistakes the system can make, and the safety measures surrounding it. 
 
... current efforts face unprecedented difficulties: contemporary models are more 
complex and less interpretable than ever; [AI systems are] used for a wider array 
of tasks, and are more pervasive in everyday life than in the past; and [AI is] 
increasingly allowed to make (and take) more autonomous decisions (and 
actions). Justifying these decisions will only become more crucial, and there is 
little doubt that this field will continue to rise in prominence and produce exciting 
and much needed work in the future (Biran and Cotton, 2017, p. 4). 
 
This quotation brings into relief the importance of XAI. Governments and the general public are 
expressing concern about the emerging "black box society." A proposed regulation before the 
European Union (Goodman and Flaxman, 2016) prohibits "automatic processing" unless user's 
rights are safeguarded. Users have a "right to an explanation" concerning algorithm-created 
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decisions that are based on personal information. Future laws may restrict AI, which represents a 
challenge to industry. 
 
The importance of explanation, and especially explanation in AI, has been emphasized in 
numerous popular press outlets over the past decades, with considerable discussion of the 
explainability of Deep Nets and Machine Learning systems in both the technical literature and 
the recent popular press (Alang, 2017; Bornstein, 2016; Champlin, Bell, and Schocken, 2017; 
Clancey, 1986a; Cooper, 2004; Core, et al., 2006; Harford, 2014; Hawkins, 2017; Kim, 2018; 
Kuang, 2017; Marcus, 2017; Monroe, 2018; Pavlus, 2017; Nott, 2017; Pinker, 2017; Schwiep, 
2017; Sheh and Monteath, 2018; Voosen, 2017; Wang, et al., 2019; Weinberger, 2017).  
 
Reporting and opinion pieces in the past several years have discussed social justice, equity, and 
fairness issues that are implicated by "inscrutable" AI (Adler, et al., 2018; Amodei, et al., 2016; 
Belotti and Edwards, 2001; Bostrom andYudkowsky, 2014; Dwork, et al., 2012; Fallon and 
Blaha, 2018; Hajian, et al., 2015; Hayes and Shah, 2017; Joseph, et al., 2016a,b; Kroll, et al., 
2016; Lum and Isaac, 2016; Otte, 2013; Sweeney, 2013; Tate, et al., 2016; Varsheny and 
Alemzadeh, 2017; Wachter, Mittelstadt, and Russell, 2017). 
 
One of the clearest statements about explainability issues was provided by Ed Felton (Felton, 
2017). He identified four social issues: confidentiality, complexity, unreasonableness, and 
injustice. For example, sometimes an algorithm is confidential, or a trade secret, or it would be a 
security risk to reveal it. This barrier to explanation is known to create inequity in automated 
decision processes including loans, hiring, insurance, prison sentencing/release, and because the 
algorithms are legally secret, it is difficult for outsiders to identify the biases. Alternately, 
sometimes algorithms are well understood but are highly complex, so that a clear understanding 
by a layperson is not possible. This is an area where XAI approaches might be helpful, as they 
may be able to deliberately create alternative algorithms that are easier to explain. A third 
challenge described by Felton is unreasonableness—algorithms that use rationally justifiable 
information to make decisions that are nevertheless not reasonable or are discriminatory or 
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unfair. Finally, he identified injustice as a challenge: we may understand the ways an algorithm 
is working, but want an explanation for how they are consistent with a legal or moral code. 
 
Scope of This Review 
 
A thorough analysis of the subject of explanation would have to cover literatures spanning the 
entire history of Western philosophy from Aristotle onward. While this Report does call out key 
concepts mined from the diverse literatures and disciplines, the focus is on explanation in the 
context of AI systems. An explanation facility for intelligent systems can play a role in situations 
where the system provides information and explanations in order to help the user make decisions 
and take actions. The focus of this Report is on contexts in which the AI makes a determination 
or reaches conclusions that then have to be explained to the user. AI approaches that pertain to 
Explainable AI include rule-based systems (e.g., Mycin), which also make determinations or 
reach conclusions based on predicate calculus. However, the specific focus of the XAI Program 
is Deep Net (DN) and Machine Learning (ML) systems.  
 
Some of the articles cited in this Report could be sufficiently integrated by identifying their key 
ideas, methods, or findings. Many articles were read in detail, by at least one of the TA-2 Team's 
researchers. The goal was to create a compendium rather than an annotated bibliography. In 
other words, this Report does not exhaustively summarize each individual publication. Rather, it 
synthesizes across publications in order to highlight key concepts. That said, certain articles do 
stand out by virtue of their particular relevance to XAI. The key points of those articles are 
highlighted across the sections of this Report. 
 
Organization of This Review 
 
We look at the pertinent literatures from three primary perspectives: key concepts, research, and 
history. We start in Section 2 by looking at the pertinent literatures from the perspective of the 
traditional disciplines (i.e., computer science, philosophy, psychology, human factors). Next, we 
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express the key research findings and ideas on topics that are pertinent to explanation, such as 
causal reasoning, abduction, and concept formation (Section 3). The research that pertains 
specifically to XAI is encapsulated in Section 4). In Section 5 presents an historical perspective 
on approaches to explanation in AI—the trends and the methods as they developed over time. 
The key ideas and research findings (Sections 2 through 5) are distilled in Section 6, in the form 
of a glossary of ideas that seem most pertinent to XAI. Next, in Section 7 we point to the reports 
of research that specifically addresses the topic of explanation in AI applications. Section 8 is 
new (compared to the February 2018 release of this XAI literature review). This Section focuses 
on reports in which AI explanation systems were evaluated in research with human participants. 
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2. Disciplinary Perspectives 
 
Various academic disciplines have addressed the issue of explanation. In this Section we 
describe these perspectives.  
 
Philosophy of Science 
 
There has been considerable interest in philosophy in the role of explanation, especially in 
science. The discussions have involved conceiving of explanation:  
(1) From a logic point of view, as a type of deductive inference (hypothetical-deductive 
reasoning),  
(2) From a mechanistic point of view, as a form of causal reasoning about mechanisms,  
(3) From a statistical point of view, as a form of statistical inference, and  
(4) From a relativist/pragmatist view.  
Additional discussions focused on the relation of explanation to prediction, explanation in the 
physical sciences (e.g., the conundrums of quantum physics), teleological questions in the 
analysis of biological sciences, and the matter of reductionism (i.e., could the principles of 
chemistry be explained in terms of theories from physics). Common arguments include 
discussions of modality, causality, and contrastive reasoning modes. There is a consensus that 
explanations relate events to theories, that is, explanations explain particular events or 
phenomena by reference to theories (see Van Fraassen, 1977).  
 
Key references in philosophy of science are Feigl, et al. (1962), Hospers (1946), Kaplan (1964, 
Chapter IX), Putnam (1978, Lectures II and IV), and Strevens (2004). Useful summaries are 
presented in Wikipedia [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Explanation] and in the Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy [https://plato.stanford.edu].  
 
Johnson and Johnson (1992) pointed out that accounts of scientific explanation are inadequate 
for the analysis of explanation, broadly. That said, some of the ideas from philosophy are 
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pertinent to XAI, and those are called out in this Report (see Section 4). Overton (2013) and 
Miller (2017) provide excellent reviews of theories of explanation in the Philosophy of Science. 
 
Other relevant scholarship in this domain: 
(Brodbeck, 1962; Dunbar, 1995; Eberle, Kaplan, and Montague, 1961; Feigl and Maxwell, 1962; 
Ginet, 2008; Giordano and Schwind, 2004; Eberle, Kaplan, and Montague, 1961; Hankinson, 
2001; Harman, 1965; Hempel and Oppenheim, 1948; Hospers, 1946; Hume, 1748; James, 2003, 
2003; Kaplan, 1964; Kim, Khanna and Koyejo, 2016; Kment, 2014; Langley, 1987; Lulia 
Nastasia and Rakow, 2010; Machamer, Darden, and Craver, 2000; Marr and Poggio, 1976; 
Maxwell, 1974; Maze, 1954; Meissner, 1960; Rozeboom, 1956; Rozenblit and Keil, 2002; 
Scriven, 1958; Simon, 1992; Smith, 2014; Strevens, 2004; Thagard, 1989; Thorpe, 1974; Van 
Der Linden, Leiserowitz, Rosenthal, and Maibach, 2017; Wilkenfeld, 2014, 2016) 
 
Psychology of Science 
 
Research on the psychology of science has investigated scientific reasoning and scientific 
explanation empirically. Although the work references explanation and explanatory coherence, 
its concern is broader—with the cognition of scientists and their reasoning strategies, such as 
hypothesis formation and exploration. Scholars such as Trout (2002) and Reiss (2012) have 
discussed scientific explanation in philosophy, and Salmon (2006) provided a comprehensive 
retrospective review of scholarship on scientific explanation, citing Hempel and Oppenheim 
(1948) as having seminal “epoch-making significance." Subsequent research in psychology and 
cognitive science on scientific reasoning includes research reports by Klahr and Dunbar, (1988) 
Dunbar (1996), Langley, et al. (1987), and Grotzner (2003). Within economic disciplines, the 
“Explanation Paradox” (Reiss, 2012) has fueled debated on the explanatory role of economic 
models, focusing on whether a model must be accurate in order to be explanatory. 
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Psychology of Explanation 
 
There is a large body of scholarship and research on the psychology of explanation. Much of the 
research focuses on the role of mental models, including the role of mental models in the 
understanding of computer systems (e.g., Besnard, Greathead, and Baxter, 2004; Borgman, 
1986). Although much of the research is based in educational psychology (learning, and 
explanation to school children), useful hypotheses and taxonomies of explanation have been 
created. For example, Vasilyeva, Wilkenfeld, and Lombrozo, (2016) demonstrated how the 
learner's goals determine what counts as a good explanation. 
 
Key theoretical, review, and empirical articles include: 
(Byrne, 1992; Chin-Parker and Bradner, 2010; Craik, 1967; Ebel, 1974; Fernbach, Sloman, 
Louis, and Shube, 2012; Geldard, 1939; George, 1953; Giffin, Wilkenfeld and Lombrozo, 2017; 
Gopnik, 2000; Kass and Leake, 1987; Keil, 2006; Keil, Rozenblit, and Mills, 2004; Koehler, 
1991; Kuhn, 2001; Leddo, Abelson, and Gross, 1984; Lombrozo, 2006, 2009a, 2011, 2016; 
Lombrozo and Carey, 2006; Lombrozo and Gwynne, 2014a; Lombrozo, Sloman, Strevens, 
Trout, and Skolnick Weisberg, 2008; Malle, 1999,2004, 2011; Manicas and Secord, 1983; 
McClure, 2002; McClure and Hilton, 1997, 1998; McClure, Sutton, and Hilton, 2003; Malle, 
1999, 2004, 2011; Rey, 2012; Royce, 1963; Sloman, 1994; Swartout, 1987; Vasilyeva, 
Wilkenfeld, and Lombrozo, 2016; Vasilyeva and Lombrozo, 2015) 
 
Social Psychology 
 
One focus of explanation has been on social interaction, which often links to how an individual 
creates an explanation of another person's beliefs or behaviors. This includes contexts such as 
learning and teaching (Lombrozo, 2016); lay explanations of social behavior (e.g., Antaki, 1989; 
Axelrod, 2015), argumentation (Antaki and Leudar, 1992), and social attribution (Hilton, 2017; 
Slugoski, Lalljee, Lamb, and Ginsburg, 1993). 
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Psycholinguistics 
 
Language has always been an necessary part of explanatory reasoning. To a large extent, first 
generation explainable AI systems of the 1970 and 1980s had the goal of verbalizing internal 
goal and strategy states using production rule systems and other logics (see Clancey, 1986). 
Lingual descriptions of complex systems remain a topic of interest (see Hendricks et al., 2016). 
In fact, some have argued that explanation is necessarily lingual and conversational (Hinton, 
1990; Walton, 2004, 2007, 2011). Among the most important concepts—especially in relation to 
automated language production—is the notion of "common ground" (Clark et al., 1991), because 
the language used for explanation needs to refer to the understanding that is shared by the 
explainer and explainee. Also important are Grice’s (1975) conversational maxims (quality, 
quantity, relation, and manner), which dictate norms and expectations for communication. For 
example, the maxims suggest that choosing what should not be explained is critical; if something 
that is understood is explained, it might incorrectly signal to the explainee that they might not 
understand the concept. There are also connections between linguistic theory and social contexts 
(Antaki 1989; Antaki and Leudar, 1992; Slugoski, Lalljee, Lamb, and Ginsburg, 1993). Graesser 
and colleagues have contributed substantially to work on intelligent tutoring systems, with 
language capabilities that are closely linked to findings from basic psycholinguistic research 
(Graesser and Franklin, 1990; Graesser, Gordon, and Brainerd, 1992; Graesser, Lang, and 
Roberts, 1991). Walton (2004, 2007, 2011) has discussed dialectical (dialog-based) theories of 
explanation. 
 
Additional pertinent references are:  
(Blokpoel et al., 2012; Cardona-Rivera, Price, Winer, and Young, 2016; Core, et al., 2006; 
Gkatzia, Lemon, and Rieser, 2016; Grice, 1975; Rips, Brem, and Bailenson, 1999; Searle, 1985; 
Slugoski ) 
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Team Science 
 
The literature on coordination (i.e., how individuals work together to solve common problems) is 
relevant in several ways. Importantly, Ford (1990) and Brézillon (1994) were among the first to 
argue that explanation in intelligent systems involves cooperative problem solving—a 
coordination problem. The literature on coordination is broad, and much of it is not relevant to 
the XAI problem, but schemes put forward by Klein, Feltovich, Bradshaw, and Woods (2005) 
and Johnson et al. (2014) are especially relevant to human coordination with AI systems.  
 
Klein et al. and Johnson et al. build on Clark’s (1996) linguistic concept of common ground as a 
framework for understanding team coordination. The central process is ensuring that the team 
members’ actions are interpredictable. Interpredictability assumes that all the team members sign 
on to a “basic compact” to facilitate coordination and to prevent its breakdown. That usually 
requires the team members to align multiple goals, and to establish and sustain common 
ground—the knowledge, beliefs and assumptions shared among the team members. These may 
include: the roles and functions of each participant, the skills and competencies of each 
participant, the routines that the team is capable of executing, the goals of the participants, their 
degree of commitment to the team goals, and the stance of each participant (e.g., perception of 
time pressure, level of fatigue, competing priorities). 
 
To support common ground, teams engage in the following activities: structuring the preparation 
to calibrate knowledge and establish routines, sustaining common ground using clarifications and 
reminders, balancing the task work and the team work, updating each other about changes that 
may not have been noticed by everyone, monitoring one another to detect signs of common 
ground breakdown, detecting anomalies that might signal a potential loss of common ground, 
and repairing common ground once it has been lost. Typically, one or more team members will 
relax their own shorter-term goals in order to permit more global and long-term team goals to be 
addressed. 
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Klein, et al. and Johnson, et al. laid out some “rules for team players," which extends the 
common ground concepts by applying them to all of the agents (both human and machine) in 
sociotechnical work systems:  
1. An intelligent agent needs to explicitly sign on to a Basic Compact and work to build and 
sustain common ground. 
2. An intelligent agent needs to model the other agents' intentions and actions; if another 
participant is struggling, the intelligent agent will need to adapt. 
3. An intelligent agent needs to be predictable. Predictability is essential to coordination. 
4. The intelligent agent needs to be directable. 
5. An intelligent agent needs to signal its status and intentions to its teammates. 
6. An intelligent agent needs to observe and interpret the signals of the status and intentions of 
its teammates. 
7. An intelligent agent needs to be able to engage in goal negotiations. 
8. An intelligent agent is not autonomous. It must engage in collaborative sensemaking, 
problem solving, replanning, and task execution. 
9.  An intelligent agent must participate in the team’s activities that manage attention. 
10. An intelligent agent must participate in efforts to control coordination costs. 
 
For XAI we would highlight the assertion that machines—if they are to act as team players—
must make themselves observable and understandable. 
 
Additional pertinent papers include: (Brézillon and Pomerol, 1997, 1997; Galinsky, Maddux, 
Gilin, and White, 2008; Karsenty and Brezillon, 1995; Khemlani and Johnson-Laird, 2010; 
Linegang, Stoner, et al., 2006; Llinas et al., 1998). 
  
Other Human Factors, Cognitive Systems Engineering and Decision Aids 
 
Some human factors research has examined the role of explanation in decision support systems. 
Research includes empirical and theoretical studies of how humans use technology, especially in 
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relation to explanations. A recent discussion by Abdul, et al. (2018) proposed a research agenda 
on XAI from the human factors perspective; a number of researchers who have discussed 
human-centered frameworks for explanation. A number of general discussions on developing 
systems from a human factors perspective are relevant (e.g., Conant and Ashby, 1970; Bellotti, et 
al., 2002; Landauer, 1988; Lazar, Feng, and Hochheiser, 2017; Rasmussen, 1983). 
 
Within human factors community, human interaction with AI systems (and automation broadly) 
is often examined from only one of a few perspectives. These include system transparency 
(Lyons, 2013; Mercado, Rupp, Chen, Barnes, Barber, and Procci, 2016) and monolithic trust 
states (Hoffman, 2013; Hoffman, et al., 2013; Balfe, Sharples, and Wilson, 2018; Fallon and 
Blaha, 2018). 
 
Other relevant research on human-automation teaming, communication, and explanation cover a 
range of topics (Ballas, 2007; Bisantz, Finger, Seong, and Llinas, 1999; Blokpoel et al., 2012; 
Cahour and Forzy, 2009; Clarke and Smyth, 1993; Davies, 2011; Dunbar, 1995; Frank et al., 
2016; Groce et al., 2014; Hoffman, 2013, 2017b; Johnson and Johnson, 1993; Kilgore and 
Voshell, 2014, 2014; Klein and Hoffman, 2008; Klein, Moon, and Hoffman, 2006a; 2006b; 
Lyons, 2013; McBride, Rogers, and Fisk, 2014; Miller, 1988; Muir, 1994; Muramatsu and Pratt, 
2001; Pirolli and Card, 1999, 2005, Prietula et al., 2000, 2000; Roth, Butterworth, and Loftus, 
1985; Sebok and Wickens, 2017; Strauch, 2017; Tullio et al., 2007; Vermeulen, Luyten, van den 
Hoven, and Coninx, 2013; Wallace and Freuder, 2001; Wille, 1997; Wright, Chen, Barnes, and 
Hancock, 2016; Yates, Veinott, and Patalano, 2003). 
 
Conclusions Concerning the Disciplinary Perspectives 
 
Goodman and Flaxman (2016) ranked information processing methods in terms of their human 
interpretability, ranging from simple linear models, to non-parametric methods, to ensemble 
methods, to neural nets and deep learning. The latter type of method is described as "the biggest 
challenge" (p. 6). The challenge of explainable AI entrains concepts of representation, modeling, 
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language understanding, and learning. Broad success of XAI is tantamount to the full realization 
of the aspirations of AI. 
 
While explainable AI is only now gaining widespread visibility, the ML literature 
and that of allied fields contain a long, continuous history of work on explanation 
and can provide a pool of ideas for researchers currently tackling the task of 
explanation (Biran and Cotton, 2017, p. 4). 
 
Looking across the disciplinary literatures, a number of taxonomies have been put forward, to 
classify types of explanations, qualities of good explanations, functions of explanation, and goals 
of explanation. Listing all of these in a discipline-by-discipline structure would be unhelpful, 
primarily because there is essential overlap. It is possible to avoid needless repetition by 
synthesizing the various schemes and taxonomies. The purpose of this Report is to synthesize 
that material, and then carry that synthesis forward, to formulate challenges and possibilities for 
XAI.  
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3. Findings From Research on Pertinent Topics  
 
Previous Reviews of the Literature 
 
The state of explanation in artificial intelligence systems has been reviewed extensively. It is 
generally agreed that "Enhancing the explanatory power of intelligent systems can result in 
systems that are easier to use, and result in improvements in decision-making and problem-
solving performance" (Nakatsu, 2004, p. 575). 
 
(Alonso, Castiello, and Mencar, 2018; Biran and Cotton, 2017; Brézillon, 1994; Brézillon and 
Pomerol, 1997; Buchanan and Shortliffe, 1984; Chakraborty et al., 2017; Clancey, 1986; Core et 
al., 2006; Craven and Shavlik, 1996; Doran, Shulz, and Besold, 2017; Doshi-Velez and Kim, 
2017ab; Doyle, Tsymbal, and Cunningham, 2003; Ellis, 1989; Fox, Long, and Magazzeni, 2017; 
Gilpin, et al., 2018; Hoffman and Klein, 2017; Hoffman, Mueller, and Klein, 2017, 2018; Kass 
and Finin, 1988; Lacave and Díez, 2002; Lipton, 2016; Miller, 2017; Miller, Howe, and 
Sonenberg, 2017; Molnar, 2018; Moore and Swartout, 1988; Moulin, Irandoust, Bélanger, and 
Desbordes, 2002; Nakatsu, 2004; Sørmo, Cassens, and Aamodt, 2005; Swartout, 1987; Swartout 
and Moore, 1993; Weston et al., 2015; Wick and Thompson, 1992).  
 
A number of researchers have proposed prescriptions on how to make explanations, or 
taxonomies of explanation, or descriptions of properties of explanation, either as the main thesis 
of a paper or as preliminary or synthesized discussion (Byrne, 1991; Felton, 2017; Kass and 
Leake, 1987; Kulesza et al., 2015; Rosenthal et al., 2016; Sørmo, Cassens, and Aamodt, 2005; 
Swartout and Moore, 1983; Van Der Linden, 2002; Wallis and Shortliffe, 1981; Wick and 
Thompson, 1992; Zhang et al., 2016). 
 
Fairness, Transparency, Safety, Accountability, and Ethics 
 
One aspect of explainable systems is related to ethical issues (Bostrom and Yudkowsky, 2014). 
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These are generally related to how modern AI systems impact society and technical-social 
systems. Felton (2017) identified four social and ethical aspects of transparent algorithms, and 
research has focused on many of the social and ethical aspects of algorithms. These include: 
• Transparency (Bansal, Farhadi, and Parikh, 2014; Fallon and Blaha, 2018; Hayes and 
Shah, 2017; Wachter, Mittelstadt, and Russel, 2017), 
• Accountability (Adler, et al., 2018; Belotti and Edwards, 2001; Kroll et al, 2016), 
• Safety and privacy (Amodei, Olah, Steinhardt, Christiano, Schulman, and Mané, 2016, 
Hajian, et al., 2015; Lum and Isaac, 2016; Otte, 2013; Verheny and Alemzadeh, 2017), 
• Fairness and bias (Dwork, Hardt, Pitassi, Reingold, and Zemel, 2012; Hajian, et al., 2015, 
Joseph et al., 2016ab; Sweeney, 2013), and licensure (Tate, et al., 2016).  
 
Trust 
 
Numerous studies have linked trust to explanation in the context of AI systems use. Hoffman, 
Mueller and Litman (2018) provide a review on this topic. Various forms on intelligent systems 
are trusted more if their recommendations are explained. (See also Antifakos et al., 2005; 
Dourish, 1995; Suermondt and Cooper, 1992; Tullio et al., 2007).  
 
Causal Reasoning and Abductive Inference  
 
In the fields of AI and philosophy of science, problem diagnosis, causal explanation, scientific 
discovery, and explanation are regarded as highly related or even overlapping (e.g., Darden, 
Machamer, and Crave, 2000; Overton, 2013; Shank, 1986). The literatures in psychology, 
education and philosophy make it clear that explanation, as a cognitive process, is closely related 
to, and perhaps even the same as causal reasoning, since explanations often refer to causation or 
causal mechanisms, and causal analyses are believed to have explanatory value (Cohen, 2008; 
Halpern and Pearl, 2005a,b; Krull and Anderson, 1997; Pearl, 1988; Pearl and Mackenzie, 2018; 
Trout, 2002). Explanations relate the event being explained to principles and invoke causal 
relations and mechanisms (Lombrozo, 2012). Researchers generally regard explanation as the 
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process of generating a mechanistic or causal analysis of why something happened or how 
something works.  
 
Relevant research on causal reasoning relevant to explanation includes: 
Ahn (1998); Ahn et al. (1995); Ahn and Kalish (2000); Chater and Oaksford, (2006); Cheng 
(1997, 2000); Einhorn and Hogarth (1986); Eiter and Lukasiewicz (2002, 2006); Feltovich, 
Hoffman, Woods, and Roesler (2004); Graesser, Baggett, and Williams (1996); Halpern and 
Pearl (2005a,b); Heckerman and Shachter (1994); Hesslow (1988). Hilton (1990, 2005); Hilton, 
McClure, and Sutton (2010); Klein, Rasmussen, Lin, Hoffman, and Case(2014); Krull and 
Anderson (1997); Lombrozo (2007, 2010, 2010); McGill (1991); Rasmussen, Nixon, and Warner 
(1990); Samurçay and Hoc (1996); Selfridge, Daniell, and Simmons, D. (1985); Woodward, 
(2005); Zwaan, Langston, and Graesser (1995); Zwaan, Magliano, and Graesser (1995). 
 
The scholarship in psychology, education and philosophy makes it clear that explanation, as a 
cognitive process, is closely related to abductive inference that is, “inference to the best 
explanation" (Harman, 1965; Overton, 2012, 2013). The literatures in psychology, education and 
philosophy make it clear that explanation, as a cognitive process, is also closely related to 
retrospection since explanations are often focused on understanding past events (Douven, 2011; 
Lombrozo, 2012; Shank, 1998; Wilkenfeld and Lombrozo, 2015; Lombrozo and Gwynne, 
2014a). 
 
Causal and Mechanistic Reasoning about Events and Concepts 
 
Some research has specifically investigated reasoning about events, entities, and categories. 
Although correlation is a good signal for causal reasoning, when asked to provide explanations 
for events people prefer mechanistic and causal accounts rather than ones based purely on 
correlations (Ahn, 1998; Anh and Kalish, 2000; Ahn, Kalish, Medin, and Gelman, 1995; Bechtel 
and Abrahamsen, 2005; Croskerry, 2009; De Kleer and Brown, 2014; Glennan, 2002; Hegarty, 
2004; Hoffman, Klein, and Miller, 2011; Klein, et al., 2014; Szpunar, Sprenng, and Schachter, 
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2014). Similarly, Murphy and Medin (1985) showed that a conceptual coherence is often 
governed by an underlying theory—a causal mechanism of understanding; a point echoed by 
Lombrozo (2009b), in which she argued that explanations and concept formation are closely 
related. 
 
Analogy 
 
Explanations often take the form of analogical comparisons. The psychology of analogical 
reasoning has long been studied in cognitive science, and the literature of reports and books is 
extensive. A traditional focus for research has been on the problem of how analogies are 
spontaneously noticed. With regard to theory, analogy is generally regarded in terms of the 
mapping of parts, concepts, and relations (cf. Falkenhainer, 1980; Falkenhainer, Forbus and 
Gentner, 1993; Gentner and Stevens, 1983). The nature and structure of analogy has long been 
considered in the philosophy of science, including the relations of analogy to scientific 
explanation and reasoning, and the relation of analogy to models and scientific metaphors. 
Indeed, the very concept of a “neural net” can be understood as an analogy or metaphor. 
 
In computer science and philosophy of science as well as psychology, there has been 
considerable work on analogical reasoning. Computational systems for coherent structure 
mapping have been developed and evaluated. Schemes for assessing the quality of analogs have 
been proposed and empirically evaluated. Ways in which people engage (or fail to engage) in 
analogy-based transfer during problem solving have been studied in the psychology laboratory. 
Key references are Clausner (1994), Eliot (1986), Gentner, Holyoak and Kokinov (2001), 
Gentner and Schumacher (1986), Hoffman (1989, 1998), Hoffman, Eskridge and Shelly (2009), 
Spiro, et al. (19898), and Thagard (1989). While analogs are often used in explanations, and may 
have some use in the creation of global explanations for how AI systems operate, we focus here 
on the qualities and functions of explanations, broadly. 
 
Additional relevant research includes: 
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(Clement, 1988; Eliot, 1986; Falkenhainer, Forbus, and Gentner, 1989; Forbus, Gentner, and 
Law, 1995; Gentner, Holyoak, and Kokinov, 2001; Hoffman, 1995; Spiro, Feltovich, Coulson, 
and Anderson, 1988) 
 
Understanding Explanations 
 
Although research on explanation is typically focused on the person (or system) producing the 
explanation, a critical aspect of this is whether the offered explanation has an impact on the 
individual who is the recipient or beneficiary of the explanation: Does the explainee understand 
the system, concepts, or knowledge? Research and scholarship in this area ranges from work on 
understanding in general (e.g., Rosenberg, 1981; Keil, 2006; Smith, 2014), to experimental 
philosophy examining the distinction between knowing and understanding and what it means to 
understand (Wilkenfeld, 2016; Wilkenfeld et al. 2016ab), to applied research on education and 
learning examining factors that influence understanding (e.g., Chi et al., 1994); Feltovich et al., 
2001) 
 
Additional research related to how explanations are understood includes:  
(Ahn, Kalish, Medin, and Gelman (1995); Chi, Leeuw, Chiu, and LaVancher(1994); Feltovich, 
Coulson, and Spiro (2001); Keil (2006); Smith (2014); Rosenberg (1981); Wilkenfeld (2016); 
Wilkenfeld, Plunkett, and Lombrozo, (2016a,b). 
 
Failures and Limitations in Understanding 
 
An important area of research concerns the ways in which people fail to learn in general, and 
either fail to understand or are actually misled by explanations. This research has similarities to 
the heuristics-and-biases literature in the field of judgment and decision making, insofar as it 
focuses on the limitations and difficulties of understanding (see Fernbach et al., 2013; Tworek 
and Cimpian, 2016). One branch of this research is centered on teaching and learning (see Bjork 
and Bjork, 2014; Bjork, Dunlosky, and Kornell, 2013), with special focus on how learners are 
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often miscalibrated about their own judgments of learning and their expectations for what makes 
learning effective (i.e., metacognition). Feltovich et al. (2001) and Mueller and Tan (2017) 
focused on how beliefs (including incorrect beliefs) are mutually-supportive thus resist change, 
sometimes via so-called "knowledge shields." These are arguments that learners make that 
enable them to preserve their reductive understandings. Other research has focused more directly 
on explanation, especially depth and detail that can be distracting (Goetz, and Sadoski, 1995), or 
the "illusion of explanatory depth" in which people feel they sufficiently understand something, 
and overestimate how well they understand (e.g., Rozenblit and Keil, 2002; Van Der Linden et 
al., 2017).  
 
Comprehension of Complex Systems 
 
Especially in the field of instructional design, the explanation and understanding of complex 
systems (e.g., electronic systems; biological systems) has been a focus of research. The ways in 
which people tend to form simplistic or reductive mental models has been revealed, and this 
includes a rostering of the knowledge shields. A focus for instructional design has ben to develop 
methods to get people to recognize when their understandings are reductive, and recognize when 
they are employing a knowledge shield that prevents them from developing richer mental 
models.  
 
(Hilton, 1986, 1996; Prietula, Feltovich, and Marchak, 2000; Schaffernicht and Groesser, 2011; 
Tullio, Dey, Chalecki, and Fogarty, 2007) 
 
Counterfactual and Contrastive Reasoning 
 
Counterfactual reasoning is a central notion in some theories of explanation. Explanations should 
provide information about when, why and how effects or outcomes might change or be different 
(e.g., Woodward, 2003). Both causal understanding and the understanding of concepts often 
involve asking hypothetical counterfactual questions. Questions of the counterfactual form 
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“What if?” and “What would happen if?” and questions in the contrastive form “You says it is X 
but why is it not Y?” represent the attempt of learners to explore the range of variation of 
categories and concepts, and the causal structure of events. It has long been argued in 
psychology that the development of schemas, concepts, prototypes, or categories hinges on 
experience with instances that are typical but also instances that are atypical. Individuals need to 
experience the range of variation on instances in order to develop robust categories or concepts. 
It has long been understood in the field of Expertise Studies that genuine expertise is achieved 
only after long practice and experience with rare, challenging or especially difficult cases or 
situations (Hoffman, et al., 2014). 
 
Additional relevant research includes: Byrne (1997; 2017); Byrne and McEleney (2000); 
Kahneman and Varey (1990); Halpern and Pearl (2005a,b), Hilton, McClure and Slugoski 
(2005); Hitchcock (2003); Hitchcock and Woodward (2003); Hoffman, et al., (2014); Khemlani 
and Johnson-Laird (2010); Kim, Khanna, and Koyejo (2016); Lipton, (1990); Mandel (2003a,b), 
McCloy and Byrne (2000); and Thompson and Byrne (2002). Mandel et al (2011) and Mandel 
(2015) provides reviews of scholarship on counterfactual reasoning. 
 
Individual Differences and Motivation 
 
A small body of research has taken an individual differences approach to understanding the 
effectiveness of explanations. Researchers have looked for systematic factors (such as a 
personality trait) that differ across people and explains their ability to understand an explanation. 
For example, Fernbach et al. (2013) showed that the score on the Cognitive Reflection Test 
(CRT)—a brief assessment of mathematical problems with a hidden twist—predicts 
susceptibility to biases in explanatory depth.  
 
Individual differences research relevant to explanation includes: Fernbach, Sloman, St. Louis, 
and Shube (2013); Gopnik (2000); Keil (2006); Klein et al. (2014); Lipton (2000); Litman and 
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Sylvia, (2006); Lombrozo and Rutstein,(2004); Maheswaran and Chaiken (1991); Rozenblit and 
Keil (2002); and Singh, Molloy, and Parasuraman (1993b). 
 
Learning and Concept Formation 
 
Explanation and understanding are intrinsically linked to learning—certain forms of learning can 
be thought of as the act of attaining an understanding; teaching frequently involves explaining. 
The process of explanation sometimes helps learners develop new concepts or conceptual 
categories, or revise their understanding of concepts they already know (Lombrozo, 2009b; 
Murphy and Medin, 1985). A body of research has explored these connections in some detail, 
examining how explanations (especially causal and mechanistic explanations) can help support 
faster learning and better understanding of complex concepts. A number of other researchers 
have discussed aspects of learning relevant to explanation. 
 
(Andriessen, 2002; Bjork et al., 2013; Doumas and Hummel, 2005; Falkenhainer, 1990; Facione 
and Gittens, 2015; Lombrozo, 2016; Rehder, 2003; Selfridge, Daniell, and Simmons, 1985; 
Williams, Lombrozo, and Rehder, 2012; Williams and Lombrozo, 2013; Feltovich, Coulson, and 
Spiro, 2001). 
 
Mental Models 
 
The understanding that people achieve of computer systems (and other kinds of complex 
systems) is widely described as involving representations called “mental models” (sometimes 
called “cognitive maps”). These are believed to be partial abstractions that rely on domain 
concepts and principles. Mental models are often described as being inductive or abductive 
inferences. Because the notion of a mental model is so central to many conceptions of 
explanation, there is considerable relevant work both on explanation and on mental models in 
general. 
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(e.g., Axelrod, 2015; Besnard, Greathead, and Baxter, 2004; Byrne, 2002; Chunpir and Ludwig, 
2017; De Kleer and Brown, 2014; Erlich, 1996; Friedman, forbus, and Sherin, 2018; Friedman 
and Nissenbaum, 1996; Gary and Wood, 2011; Gentner and Stevens, 1983; Gigerenzer, 1993; 
Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, and Kleinbölting, 1991; Halasz, and Moran, 1983; Hegarty, 2004; 
Hegarty, Just, and Morrison, 1987; Heller, 1994; Hilton, 1986, 1996; Hilton and Erb, 1996; 
Jamieson, 1996; Johnson-Laird, 1980, 1983; Kieras and Bovair, 1984; Klein and Hoffman, 
2008a, 2008b; Klein, Phillips, Rall, and Peluso, 2007; Kulesza et al., 2012; Lewis, 1986; 
Mandel, 2011; Moray, 1987b, 1990, 1996, 1998; Moultin and Kosslyn, 2009; Phillips, Ososky, 
Grove, and Jentsch, 2011; Rouse and Morris, 1986; St-Cyr. and Burns, 2002; Wilkison, Fisk, and 
Rogers, 2007; Williams, Hollan, and Stevens, 1983; Wilson and Rutherford, 1989; Young, 2014; 
Zachary and Eggleston, 2002; Zhang and Wickens, 1987; Zovod, Rickert, and Brown, 2002 ) 
 
Especially pertinent to XAI are reports on attempts to elicit, represent and measure or evaluate 
mental models (Besnard, Greathead and Baxter 2004; Borgman, 1986; deGreef and Neerincx, 
1995; Dodge et al., 2018; Doyle, Radzicki, and Trees, 2008; Kim, et al., 2016; Klein and 
Hoffman, 2008; Muramatsu and Pratt, 2001; Schaffernicht and Groesser, 2011; Tullio et al., 
2007). Unfortunately, most studies provide little or no detail concerning the exact elicitation and 
representation methods used (an exception being the Doyle et al. study), but generally speaking, 
researchers rely on one of two methods: either interviews (semi-structured or structured survey) 
or some sort of diagram creation task (e.g., influence diagrams, flow diagrams, etc.). Muramatsu 
and Pratt (2001) utilized a method that might be particularly applicable to XAI. Specifically, they 
presented test cases to users (web search queries) and asked users to predict the results and then 
explain why they thought the predicted results would obtain. 
 
A study that is pertinent to XAI and that clearly illustrates a methodology for eliciting mental 
models, is Dodge et al. (2018). The researchers sought a general methodology for formulating 
human-understandable explanations of software agents. Their research was contextualized in the 
development of explanations of the AI competition bots the Starcraft competitions. The 
assumption was that the learners/game players would have to have confidence and appropriate 
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trust in the explanations, which would derive from knowing that the explanations came from an 
expert.  
 
The researchers sought explanations that came from a domain expert who was not also an expert 
in AI. The reason for this choice was that such a person would be more likely to provide 
explanations that would make sense to a game learner/player who is a layperson (that is, also not 
an expert in AI). The researchers studied the reasoning of shoutcasters, networked individuals 
who share their knowledge and reasoning. At Starcraft tournaments, shoutcasters provide 
running commentary on games, which is synched with a video of the game play. Their 
commentary is generally focused on the question of What is happening? and Why is it 
happening? and their goal is to answer these questions in anticipation of what the Their 
commentary is in the form of a dialog between pairs of shoutcasters. The researchers examined 
transcripts of 10 videos, involving the commentary of 16 shoutcasters. The researchers asserted 
that the participant shoutcasters were "expert explainers," though this was not empirically 
validated, nor were data provided on the participant's experience level. However, the 
shoutcasters provided data that was consistent in terms of the kinds of explanations that were 
provided. Specifically, they explained what was happening in game play, what might happen 
next, why certain things happened, and why certain other things did not happen.  
 
Shoutcasters have full observability of the game, whereas the bot agents have limited visibility 
into the game (e.g., some objects might not be visible to them). Given their "God's eye view," the 
shoutcasters can take the perspective of the bots to understand why they are doing what they are 
doing, and what they might do next. For example, if it seems that a fight was brewing, the 
shoutcasters would seek pertinent information, for example. Shoutcasters' commentary is 
generally focused on the questions of What is happening? and Why is it happening? and their 
goal is to answer these questions for a person who is viewing the game, in anticipation of what 
the viewer might wonder about. 
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The researchers asked the following questions of the transcribed shoutcaster dialogs: What 
information do the shoutcasters seek? How do they seek it? What questions do they try and 
answer and how do they form their answers, what game concepts do they rely upon when 
building their explanations? This research can be taken as a model for studying human-human 
explaining with respect to AI agents. 
 
Related to the use of diagramming tasks for the elicitation, representation and analysis of mental 
models, it is noteworthy that extensive research on Concept Mapping has proven the utility of the 
Concept Map generation task in allowing people to express their knowledge, and has proven the 
value of propositional analysis of Concept Maps in the evaluation of mental models. This 
includes the evaluation of mental models of complex systems. See for instance Cañas, et al., 
2003; Hoffman et al., 2017; Moon, et al., 2011; Novak, 1998. Also see the discussion of Concept 
Mapping in Section 5 of this Report.  
 
Prospective Reasoning and Planning 
 
Explanation often serves the function of enabling people to mentally project to possible futures 
states, outcomes, or events. Prospective (causal) reasoning is different from counterfactual 
reasoning: the latter focuses on how things might or might not have been different if aspects of 
the past had been different. The former focuses on things that might or might not happen in the 
future. In addition, prospection includes abstractions in the form of durative events (a cause can 
continue on into the future even after an effect has manifested). Because of the focus on the 
future, planning may be considered a form of prospective reasoning, and planning has been a 
focus of research on explanation. 
 
(Bidot, Biundo, Heinroth, Minker, Nothdurft, and Schattenerg, 2010; Chakraborti, Sreedharan, 
Zhang, and Kampbhampati, 2017; Fox, Long, and Magazzeni, 2017; Ghallab, Nau, and 
Traverso, 2004; Kim, Cacha, and Shah, 2013; Reidl and Young, 2010; Seegebarth, Müller, 
Schattenberg, and Biundo, 2012ab; Smith, 2012; and Sohrabi, Baier, and McIlraith, 2011). 
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With very few exceptions, most analyses of causal explanation are retrospective. That is, they 
deal with things that might or might not have happened in the past (this the "standard" form of 
the counterfactual). The goal of the reasoning is to explain what has already happened. (Axelrod, 
Mitchell, Russo, and Rennington, 1989: Klein and Crandall, 1995; Moore and Hoffman, 2011). 
 
Explanation as Dialog 
 
The notion that explanation is an "interactive construction" or dialog process—has been the 
subject of extensive discussion; there is a broad consensus across the pertinent disciplines 
spanning first generation systems (e.g., Kass and Finn, 1988; Moore and Swartout, 1988) and 
recent scholarship (Arioua, Buche and Croitoru, 2017; Arioua and Croitoru, 2015; Bansal, 2018; 
Bansal, Farhadi, and Parikh, 2014; Brezillon and Pomerol, 1997; Core, et al., 2006; Graesser and 
Franklin, 1990; Goguen et al., 1983; Graesser, Gordon, and Brainerd, 1992; Graesser, Lang, and 
Roberts, 1991; Sacks and Schegloff, 1974; Suthers, Woolf and Cornell, 1992; Walton, 2004, 
1007, 2011; Weiner, 1989). 
 
Self-Explanation 
 
Psychological research has demonstrated that deliberate self-explanation improves learning and 
understanding. This finding holds for both self-motivated self-explanation and also self-
explanation that is prompted or encouraged by an instructor. Self-explanation serves a 
particularly useful role in helping learners overcome the illusion of explanatory depth. Such 
reductive understanding can be corrected by asking for explanations. 
 
(Berry and Broadbent, 1987' Bjork et al., 2013; Calin-Jageman and Ratner, 2005; Chi, et al., 
1989, 1994; Chi and VanLehn, 1991; Fernbach, et al., 2012; Ford, Cañas, and Coffey, 1993; 
Jones and VanLehn, 1992; Mills and Keil, 2004; O’Reilly, Symons, and MacLatchy-Gaudet, 
1998; Rittle-Johnson, 2006; Rosenblit and Keil, 2002; VanLehn, Ball, and Kowalski, 1990). 
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Transfer and Generalization 
 
The attempt by experimentalists to demonstrate task-to-task transfer (both near and far transfer) 
in the academic laboratory environment has met with limited success (Baldwin and Ford, 1988; 
Sala and Gobet, 2017). What it is that transfers (e.g., concepts, principles, strategies) is not 
always entirely clear. It is often assumed that reasoning is limited when people focus on 
superficial features of problems, and that, in the ideal case, what transfers is higher level 
principles of problem "deep structure." Alternatively, it might be that what appears to a research 
to be a superficial concept might, in the minds of the research participants, be more complex. 
Additionally, "transfer" might be the wrong metaphor. Rather, the effect of learning and 
experience across multiple types of problems may be to expand the learner's repertoire of 
reasoning strategies (Lobato and Siebert, 2002). Nevertheless, it is generally acknowledged that 
understanding and training need to promote the transfer of concepts and principles, and good 
explanations should facilitate that (Lombrozo and Gwynne, 2014b; Rittle-Johnson, 2006; 
Williams and Lombrozo, 2010; Williams, Lombrozo, and Rehder, 2013). 
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4. Key Papers and Their Contributions that are Specifically Pertinent to XAI 
 
Looking across the disciplines surveyed in the previous Section, this Section summarizes those 
papers that are especially pertinent to XAI because they introduced the key concepts and they 
entrain the important challenges with a particular focus on the ways in which people understand 
complex computational systems. Section 8 of this Report provides details on a second set of key 
papers, those reporting some form of empirical evaluation of explanations. 
 
Table 4.1. Key Papers and Their Contributions. 
 
Berry and Broadbent (1987) 
Explored the effect of explanations on user's performance at a simulated decision task, 
deciding about which tests to perform for potential river pollutants, and thereby determine 
which factory was responsible for the pollution. The software system (based on probability 
calculations) provided its own recommendations and these were accompanied by human-
generated explanations. In one condition, a global explanation was provided to explain each 
computer-generated recommendation and in another condition the participants could ask about 
the "why" of the recommendations. and receive some further (local) explanation. Participants 
who were required to self explain (out loud) performed significantly better than participants 
who were required to verbalize but who had not received any form of explanation. Participants 
who received the additional “why” (local) explanations or the explanation/verbalization 
combination maintained a superior performance level on subsequent unaided trials. 	
Biran and Cotton (2017) 
Provide an up-to-date review of explanation in AI, machine learning, neural network systems, 
and related fields. 
Distinguishes between machine-interpretable models and human-interpretable models.  
Distinguish between explanation and justification. 
Review approaches to active exploration and challenges to explaining various kinds of AI 
systems. 
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Blokpoel, et al. (2012) 
Experimental demonstration of how human-human cooperative communication depends on a 
mutual perspective-taking capacity. 	
Boy (1991), Greenbaum and Kyng (1991) 
Concept of "cooperative design," in which users play a role in the creation of the AI systems.  	
Brézillon (1994), Brezillon and Pomerol (1997), Karsenty and Brézillon (1995)	
Discusses context and goals in explanation. 
Explaining is conceived as cooperative problem solving.		
Chakraborty, et al. (2017) 
Argue that interpretability is multidimensional, and identify some of the dimensions, 
including: interpretability, explainability, accountability, fairness, transparency, functionality. 
They also consider the need to rationalize, justify, and understand systems, and users’ 
confidence in their results. 	
Clancey (1981) 
Argued that the user needs a mental model of the rule base of expert systems. Proposed that 
the key weakness of explainability in expert systems could only be solved if the system has a 
human-interpretable model of the procedural rule base, distinguishing the domain model (e.g., 
taxonomic and causal relations), reasoning strategy, and justification for inferences. Mycin's 
rules were written in a formal, object-attribute-value LISP notation that is not human-
interpretable. However, Mycin’s explanation system could generate English forms that are 
readily understood, that is, a human-interpretable form or representation of the rule base. 
GUIDON and Mycin’s explanation systems interpreted the rule bases directly. For examples, 
see Figure 8.5 in Clancey (1987) and the Appendix in Daliwhal and Benbasat, 1996. 			
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Clarke and Smyth (1993) 
Demonstration of human-computer cooperation in problem solving. The AI system relied on a 
goal hierarchy, a shared set of definitions of domain concepts, and a mechanism to declare and 
share goals and sub-goals, and a mechanism to generate and negotiate alternative solutions to 
problems. Although not focused on explanation per se, the work illustrates how the 
computational instantiation of the a model of the user can lead to improved performance of the 
human-machine system by improving the user’s understanding of problems. 	
Darlington (2013) 
Good and succinct review of explanation systems, types of explanations and how various 
intelligent systems (including expert systems) were architected so as to provide explanations. 
Argues that symbolic systems are better suited to the task of providing explanations than non-
symbolic systems. 	
Dhaliwal and Benbasat (1996) 
Proposed an framework for evaluating knowledge-based systems that provided explanations. 
Based on cognitive theories, the argued that explanations need to be evaluated in terms of the 
extent to which they facilitate learning and decision making by relying on a model of 
explanation strategies. They argued that explanation capabilities need to take into account the 
user's level of expertise. They asserted that evaluation must address three high-level questions: 
(1) To what extent are the explanations generated by expert systems relied upon in decision 
making, (2) What factors influence the use of the explanations? and (3) In what ways do 
explanations empower users? They also listed a number of specific scalar measures, such as 
satisfaction, confidence, usefulness, trust, and a number of performance measures, such as 
decision efficiency and accuracy. 	
Degani (2003) 
Useful and interesting examples of what controls and interfaces of electro-mechanical and 
software systems reveal about their operations.  	
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Dodge, et al. (2018; see also Kim, et al., 2016).  
The researchers focused on the elicitation of mental models of experts. The research was 
contextualized in the development of explanations of the AI competition bots in Starcraft 
competitions. At Starcraft tournaments, shoutcasters provide running commentary on games, 
which is synched with a video of the game play. The researchers systematically studied audio-
video transcripts of shoutcast tournaments. The research is a good example of a methodology 
for eliciting mental models. 	
Doshi-Velez and Kim (2017) 
Distinguish explanation from formal interpretability. 
Describe some desiderata of XAI: fairness, privacy, reliability, robustness, causality, usability, 
and trust. 
Propose three different types of taxonomies of evaluation approaches for interpretability: 
application grounded, human-grounded, and functionally grounded.  
Hypothesize some task-related and method-related latent dimensions of interpretability so that 
work across different systems/applications can be compared to help create a more cumulative 
science. 	
Feltovich, Coulson, and Spiro (2001) 
Discuss the “dimensions of difficulty” in understanding complex systems, dimensions that lead 
to reductive explanations and knowledge shields.  	
Ford, et al. (1993) 
Discuss explanation in expert systems as a participatory or “co-constructive” process. 	
Goguen, et al. (1983); see also Clancey (1984b), Weiner (1980). See also Johnson and 
Lewis, (2018) 
Across the late 1970s-1980s there was an emphasis on “dialogue management” and “discourse 
processes" in the design of intelligent tutoring systems. The explanation system requires 
“subject knowledge” and “teaching knowledge.” Most Intelligent Tutoring Systems (ITS) 
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research emphasized that the system needed a method/model for how to interact with the 
learner. Explanations produce by the expert system should correspond to the ways in which 
humans communicate explanations. 
Explanation is described as the justification of assertions about reasons for decisions or 
choices, examples, alternatives that are eliminated, or counterfactuals. 
Used a tree representation in which internal nodes are embedded and ordered, and mapped 
onto task goal structure. 	
Goodman and Flaxman (2016) 
European Union regulations express the "right to explanation." 
The importance of XAI success is brought into sharp relief. 	
Hoffman (2017) 
Presents a taxonomy that distinguishes a variety of ways in which human can trust, mistrust, 
and distrust computational systems. Regardss trusting as a process that emerges in exploration-
during-use.  	
Kass and Finin (1988) 
Review explanation systems from the 1970-80s. Reviews philosophy of science literature to 
define and distinguish between explanation, explaining, justification, and understanding.  
Propose a way of characterizing GOOD explanations, which includes knowledge about the 
user’s goals and knowledge. 
Argue for the need for user models in XAI systems. 
Demonstrate how user models can be developed and used. 
"Individualized user models are not only important, it is practical to obtain them. A method for 
acquiring a model of the user's beliefs implicitly by "eavesdropping" on the interaction 
between user and system is presented, along with examples of how this information can be 
used to tailor an explanation" (p.1) 		
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Keil, 2006 
Review of studies on the benefits of explanation, in research with laypersons, college students, 
and children as participants. 1. The focus is on self-assessment of one’s own gradually 
accumulating knowledge, especially with respect to the illusion of explanatory depth. 
Some studies focus on self-rating, but others focus on participant rating of explanations given 
by Expert explanations are evaluated in some experiments via a final self-rating of current 
knowledge which occurs after the participant has read the explanation. The effectiveness of 
explanations is based on these ratings, which demonstrate the degree to which a lay-person 
could gain understanding from the explanation. 	
Klein and Hoffman (2008) 
Discuss a wide variety of methods and measures for studying mental models. 	
Kulesza, Burnett, et al., 2011	
Created an explanation system that relied on a domain-specific ontology and a generative 
grammar to restrict the set of possible user queries, and thence compile appropriate explanations. 
Their restricted set of nine queries (of the why and why not forms) are resonant to the notion that 
there is a limited set of "triggers" that motivate users to seek explanations. See Hoffman, et al. 
(2018).		
Kulesza, et al (2015). See also Kulesza, et al, 2010; Kulesza, Stumpf, et al, 2011, 2012, 2013 
Advocate the notion that explanation is a process that continues in the use context. 
Machine learning is enhanced by allowing the user to offer corrections. Corrections could be 
implemented by adjusting the Bayesian weights or using the user's reclassification as a new data 
point for the classifier. 
Provide a taxonomy of the goodness features of explanations. 
Their system generates explanations to answer to “why” questions (to satisfy a soundness 
criterion). 
Offer a number of guidelines for “explanatory debugging”: The ML system must make it 
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apparent how it can be useful; changes in how the ML system operates must be made 
immediately apparent to the user; changes must be reversible if they lead to worse performance. 
Conducted human subjects studies that illustrate how user mental models can be evaluated and 
how explanations impact mental models. Mental models were evaluated by giving instances and 
having participants judge how the machine would classify them and then express their reasons 
for their judgment. The reasons were scored to reveal features of the users’ mental models.		
Lacave and Diez (2002)	
The distinction between Structure (domain), Strategy (reasoning), and Support (evidence) as 
elements of AI system architectures dates to the earliest days of expert systems (see Clancey, 
1987). In the same vein, Lacave and Diez (2002) distinguished explanations of the AI's model of 
the domain from explanations of the AI system's reasoning, and from explanations that reference 
the evidence for particular determinations. 
Provide account of explanation in Bayesian reasoning systems 
Propose a set of properties by which to understand and taxonomize explanations.		
Lim and Dey (2009, 2010); and Lim, Dey, and Avrahami (2009). 
Identified the types of information end users want applications to provide when explaining 
their current context, to increase both trust in and understanding of the system. this includes 
information about the features a classifier uses, information about how the classifier works, and 
information about how certain the classifier is its classifications. 
Describe a toolkit for applications to generate explanations for popular machine learning 
systems. Emphasis is on providing answers to "why-not" questions as well as to "why" 
questions. 	
Lipton (2016)	
Discusses and questions the goal of interpretable models and model explanations. Distinguishes 
between interpretable, and post-hoc model explanations. Discusses interpretability in terms of 
transparency, simulatability, and decomposability. Describes some types of post-hoc 
explanations, including text, visualization, local explanations, and explanation by example.	
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Lombrozo (2006); Lombrozo et al. (2008); Lombrozo (2016) 
Describe research and psychological theory on explanation with a focus on cognitive 
development. 
Incorporate perspectives from development, philosophy, and cognitive science. 
Argue that explanation involves causal reasoning and abduction.		
Miller (2017); see also Miller, Howe, and Sonenberg (2017)	
Lament that XAI systems are built for developers, not users. 
Discuss lack of assessment of systems via studies of human performance. 
Propose methods for assessing XAI. 
Provides a comprehensive review of the philosophical, cognitive, and social foundations in 
regards to ‘everyday’ explanation. 
Argues that users are pragmatic in their evaluations of XAI. The most important factor of XAI is 
not necessarily the validity of the causal cue but rather simplicity, generality, and coherence.		
Moore and Swartout (1988) 
Review XAI literature and suggests that previous approaches had been limited. The limitations 
fall under five categories: narrow, inflexible, insensitive, unresponsive, or inextensible. 
Limitations are caused from two main system weaknesses: limited knowledge base, lack of a 
general model of explanation, and inadequate text planning and generation strategies.  
Propose a new reactive approach framework to XAI which takes advantage of user feedback and 
mirrors more natural language strategies. The Explainable Expert System (EES) provides a 
conversational explanation to the user based on the user’s feedback and its knowledge of the user model.		
Mueller and Klein (2011) 
Present a methodology for creating instructional materials explaining AI systems to users. 					
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Overton (2013); Miller (2017) 
Overton provides an excellent review of theories of explanation in the Philosophy of Science. 
Miller presents an integration of philosophical considerations and an excellent capsule view of 
Overton’s general model of (scientific) explanation. 	
Ribiero, et al. (2016a, b) 
Describe a system for creating interpretable models for classifiers (both text and image) and 
presents users with explanations of particular examples (key features used by a classifier). 
Explanations present selected features with the highest positive weights with the goal of 
"giving an intuition" as to why the classifier would think that a class is present. For image 
classification, the selected features are used to generate cropped versions of the images that 
illustrate the identified class or classes (e.g., parts of the image that have the highest weights 
for the class "dog"). 
Present an experiment in which human users are tasked with (1) choosing which of two 
classifiers performs better, based on a comparison of the explanations that are provided about 
how the classifiers work, (2) and identify classifier anomalies based on the provided 
explanations, and (3) explain the spurious correlations that led to the misclassifications. 	
Ritter and Feurzig (1988) 
Describe an intelligent tutoring system for teaching tactical radar operation. The trainee 
interacts with a simulated fighter pilot and the tutor system sends alerts to the trainee based on 
its ability to detect trends (e.g., the potential loss of a radar track, immanent loss of a speed 
advantage). A simulated “expert” explains its decisions and actions. An event replay with 
expert narratives provides explanations of where the trainee made errors. 							
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Schaffernicht and Groesser (2010); see also Besnard, Greathead and Baxter (2004) and 
Doyle, et al. (2008) 
Review methods for coding and comparing user mental models. Although their review focuses 
on dynamical systems in which the coded propositions refer to feedback loops (both closed 
and interacting), analysis in terms of entities and feedback loops can be understood generally 
as the analysis of variables and functions expressed as directed graphs. Mental models are 
compared in terms of the number of shared concepts, number of shared relations, and number 
of shared propositions. 
Mathematical schemes for the comparison process are presented. 	
Schank (1989) 
Presents many examples of how people explain various everyday things and events. Presents 
models of the explanation processes (ninety “explanation patterns”). 
Discusses SWALE, a program that generated explanations by: (1) detecting anomalies, (2) 
searching for an explanation pattern that best matches the goals and needs of the recipient of 
the explanation, then (3) creating a new explanation from archived instances of the selected 
explanation pattern.  	
Sheh and Monteath (2018) 
Argue why the requirements for explanations depend on both the application and the nature of 
the machine learning technique employed by the AI.  
Present a taxonomy of explanation types in terms of what they are useful for (e.g., 
"rationalization" explanations are useful for fault detection tasks). 	
Sørmo (2005) 
Presents a comprehensive review of philosophical and cognitive accounts on explanation in 
intelligent systems. 
Reviews five important goals for XAI systems: transparency, justification, relevance, 
conceptualization, and learning. 
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Evaluates the different Case Based Reasoning (CBR) methods of explanation according to the 
five identified goals.  
Argues for the value of CBR type explanations. 
Provides detailed discussion of past attempts to taxonomize explanations. 	
Southwick (1991) 
A good review of the development of explanation capabilities in first and second generation 
systems (knowledge-based systems; see Section 5 of this Report). He pointed to the 
psychological literature on human discourse and explanation (i.e., abductive inference) to 
highlight issues that he predicted would become important, such as user-centered analysis and 
user model-based customization of explanations.  
He distinguished between explanations about the content and structure of a knowledge base, 
explanations of the strategy used by the problem solver, and justifications of the system in 
terms of its underlying causal model.  
"While reasoning trace explanations rely only on the formulation of knowledge that comprises the 
knowledge base, the other two explanation types require additional knowledge. A system that can give 
strategic explanations must be able to reason about its own activity, which may require knowledge 
about the ordering of problem solving tasks, for example. Deep explanations obviously require a great 
deal of information in the form of a causal model of the domain" (p. 3).  
"An explanation system that has access to a deep model can provide explanations that are intuitively 
more satisfying, since they relate to the deeper concepts that underlie the domain model" (p. 6). (See 
also Clancey, 1983; Boy, 1991.) 	
Swartout (1981) 
Pioneering attempt to enable expert systems to generate human-understandable (local) 
explanations, by modeling the procedural rule hierarchy as a set of abstract goals and 
reasoning strategies and using that to generate an "audit trail" of expert reasoning. 			
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Swartout and Moore (1993) 
Retrospective account of explanation in expert systems from 70s-80s. 
Review key differences between first and second generation XAI systems. 
Include desiderata for explanations in intelligent systems. 
Distinguished between justification and explanation. 
Distinguished between first-generation systems that provided direct explanations of 
rules/concepts, and systems that place actions in context and engage in an interactive dialog 
with the user 	
Tullio, et al. (2007) 
Illustrate a method for eliciting user mental models (structured interviews), scoring the 
protocols for data analysis (frequency counts), and tracking changes in mental models across 
practice. 	
Wick and Thompson (1992), see also Clancey (19864a, 1986a) 
Presented a taxonomy of explanation that combines goals, audience, and focus (global-local). 
Argued that the existing explanation systems provide descriptions of the system’s problem 
solving that are justifications appropriate for knowledge engineers rather than explanations for 
users.  
Argued that explanation must be a collaborative problem solving process, a process utilizing 
procedural rules (“decoupled reasoning graphs”), which is distinct from the reasoning process. 
Proposed the inclusion of a knowledge-based explanation system separate from the 
knowledge-based problem solving system. “Explanation is not an add-on to the expert 
system’s reasoning, but a problem solving activity in its own right” (p. 37). Their primary 
goal, like that of Mycin, was to create a system that can tell explanatory stories that organize 
information in a coherent flow from data to conclusion. 				
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Walton (2004, 2007, 2011) 
Argues that explanation systems in AI need to be founded on the dialectical concept, that is, 
explanation is a process of dialog to achieve shared understanding.  
Advocates for the use of speech act theory to develop formal explainable systems. 	  
43	DARPA	XAI	Literature	Review		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 p.			
5. Explanation in Artificial Intelligence: An Historical Perspective 
 
Much of the contemporary moment's enthusiasm for and commercial interest in 
artificial intelligence, specifically machine learning, are prefigured in the 
experience of the artificial intelligence community concerned with expert systems 
in the 1970s and 1980s. ... artificial intelligence communities today have much to 
learn from the way that earlier communities grappled with the issues... (Brock, 
2018, p. 3). 
 
Introduction 
 
A number of computer science reports and review articles examine explainability in AI, and 
propose what are believed to be good or useful explanation types and formats. It is generally held 
that explanations must present easy-to-understand “coherent stories” in order to ensure good use 
of the AI or good performance of the Human+AI work system.   
 
(Biran and Cotton, 2017; Brézillon, 1994; Brézillon and Pomerol, 1997; Buchanan and 
Shortliffe, 1984a; Clancey, 1986a; Core et al., 2006; Craven and Shavlik, 1996; Doshi-Velez and 
Kim, 2017; Doyle, Tsymbal, and Cunningham, 2003; Ellis, 1989; Fox, Long, and Magazzeni, 
2017; Goguen, Weiner, and Linde, 1983; Hoffman and Klein, 2017; Hoffman, Mueller, and 
Klein, 2017; Kass and Finin, 1988; Lacave and Díez, 2002; Miller, 2017; Miller, Howe, and 
Sonenberg, 2017; Miller et al., 2017; Moore and Swartout, 1988; Moulin, Irandoust, Bélanger, 
and Desbordes, 2002; Mueller and Klein, 2011; Sørmo, Cassens, and Aamodt, 2005; Swartout 
and Moore, 1993; Weston et al., 2015; Wick and Thompson, 1992). 
 
There were three distinct generations of what might be collectively or broadly called Explantion 
Systems. The original wave of expert systems that emerged in the 1970s involved representations 
of knowledge using rules and networks of relationship—sometimes probabilistically. The 
44	DARPA	XAI	Literature	Review		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 p.			
systems included a logic to ask the user questions (e.g., the result of blood tests), and would 
make a recommendations, predictions, or diagnoses based on the data and the rules.  
 
One use of expert systems that was discovered very early is that in addition to being with being a 
decision aid, expert systems might help novices understand the knowledge, and with small 
variations could serve as tutors, digital mentors, or digital assistants. 
 
First Generation Systems: Expert Systems 
 
The first and second generations of Explainable AI systems were called expert systems. 
Applications included decision aiding and diagnosis. These began as systems that expressed their 
internal states, and grew to be systems that were more interactive, context-aware, flexible, and 
had some ability to offer explanations and justifications that the users wanted and would accept. 
Research showed that explanations of how computer systems work can convince users to adopt 
the system recommendations, but also that users will not necessarily be satisfied with their 
decisions (see Bilgic and Mooney, 2005). Research on how expert systems could explain their 
analyses and decisions also clarified the distinction between explanation of how a system works 
that makes sense to users versus the justification of a system architecture or process that one AI 
researcher would present to another (see for instance, Chandrasekaran, Tanner and Josephson, 
1989). These are referred to, respectively, as global explanation versus local justification.  
 
In this First Generation era, there was substantial research attempting to show that expert 
systems that provided and explanations had greater impact on reasoning (cf. Dhaliwal and 
Benbasat, 1996; Eining and Door, 1991; Murphy, 1990), with the effect depending on the skill 
level of the users (Lamberti and Wallace, 1990). But many of the first generation expert systems 
failed to have the hoped-for benefits. In work on medical expert systems, researchers recognized 
that physicians would ignore advice from an expert system unless a rationale (a justification) for 
why the advice is being given were provided. Initial explanation systems attempted to provide 
this rationale by describing the underlying goals and steps used to make the diagnosis. This 
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approach, which Swartout and Moore (1988) called the “Recap as explanation myth,” was also 
inadequate, and this led to a rethinking of the approaches, goals and purposes of XAI systems. 
This first-generation began in the late 1970s (e.g., Shortliffe, 1976), and continued for about a 
decade.  
 
 (Buchanan and Shortliffe, 1984a, 1984b; Chandrasekaran and Swartout, 1991; Chandrasekaran, 
Tanner, and Josephson, 1989; Clancey, 1983, 1984a, 1986a, 1992, 1993; Druzdzel, 1990; 
Druzdzel and Henrion, 1990; Ford et al., 1992; Gautier and Gruber, 1993; Goguen et al., 1983; 
Greer, Falk, Greer, and Bentham, 1994; Gruber, 1991, 1991; Hasling, Clancey, and Rennels, 
1984; Hayes-Roth, Waterman, and Lenat, 1984; Henrion and Druzdzel, 1990a, 1990b; Kass and 
Finin, 1988; Langlotz and Shortliffe, 1989; McKeown and Swartout, 1987; Merrill, 1987; Moore 
and Swartout, 1988, 1990, 1991, Neches, Swartout, and Moore, 1985a, 1985b; Scott, Clancey, 
Davis, and Shortliffe, 1977; Scott, Clancey, Davis, and Shortliffe, 1984; Shortliffe, 1976; 
Silverman, 1992; Southwick, 1988, 1988, Swartout, 1977, 1981, 1983, 1985; Swartout and 
Moore, 1993; Swartout, Paris, and Moore, 1991; Wallis and Shortliffe, 1981, 1984; Weiner, 
1980; Wick and Slagle, 1989; Wick and Thompson, 1992; Wood, 1986). 
 
The inadequacies of the first generation of expert systems gave birth to the first generation of 
explanation systems, including Mycin and its related systems (see Clancey, 1986a, for a detailed 
history), the Digitalis Therapy Advisor (Swartout, 1977); BLAH (Wiener, 1980), and other 
special-purpose explanation systems. Although they employed a variety of methods, these 
systems often would work by creating expressions of the logical and probabilistic rules used to 
make a diagnosis or answer a question. In general, because knowledge and expertise was framed 
in terms of rules, those rules could have natural-language descriptions that could be derived from 
their logical form, or written as ‘canned’ text by experts. A simple explanation would express the 
rules used to make a decision. Such explanations were typically written in readable English, but 
often they were simple translations from underlying if-then production rules in LISP to text 
descriptions. 
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Such systems would typically operate in question-answering mode, where the data about the 
current case would be entered based on queries of the system. Explanations could be generated 
both during data entry and as a post-diagnostic analysis. As an example of explanation during 
data entry, consider the operation of XPLAIN (a successor to the Digitalis Advisor) described by 
Swartout (1985). This system might ask the user to enter the results of a particular blood test 
(What is the level of Serum Calcium?). Upon seeing the question, the user could ask “Why?” In 
response, the system would give a justification for why the information is needed, which might 
be helpful (“My goal is to begin therapy. One step in doing that is to check sensitivities. I am 
now trying to check sensitivity due to calcium”). This illustrates how these explaining systems 
explained what they were doing—providing an explanation, but also playing the role of a tutor 
for less experienced users. 
  
In fact, the clarity provided by these systems was sometimes discussed as an asset for system 
developers and knowledge engineers, and not just users (e.g., Wick and Thompson, 1992). 
Consequently, many of these systems, which were developed to fill a need of end-users, may 
have ended up being of greater value to developers. (Perhaps also related to the fact that they 
were mostly research vehicles that were not put into practical use.)  
 
Swartout and Moore (1993) described the first generation systems as ones that created 
explanations by paraphrasing the rules that were used to come to a decision. As a whole, the first 
generation expert systems and explanation systems were focused on expressing machine-internal 
states, goals, and plans. This was sometimes fairly straightforward—because the rules 
themselves were formalizations (from verbal protocols) of the rules used by experts themselves. 
Thus, translating back to natural language could be relatively straightforward. Sometimes, 
however, the language descriptions would bear scant resemblance to human explanation, or 
natural language at all. First, they depended on the if-then format of logical and causal rules, 
rather than providing an explanation at a higher-level reasoning strategy (e.g., gathering basic 
information about the patient, casting a net for alternative explanations, trying to support a 
specific hypothesis). Second, some of the rules were logically required needed to make the 
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system work and might not necessarily make sense to users or even be pertinent to a user's "why" 
question. Third, domain knowledge was sometimes ‘compiled out’ (e.g., causal relations 
between symptoms and diagnoses), and so it was not included in an explanation.  
 
Several researchers (e.g. Teach and Shortliffe, 1981; Clancey, 1983; Moore and Swartout, 1988; 
Sørmo, et al., 2005) noted that initial attempts to develop expert systems failed at adoption 
because the expert users did not understand the reasoning used to make the recommendation or 
diagnosis. For Mycin the main issues in 1975-1980 were that: 1) there were no patient databases 
at the time, so data had to be entered manually; 2) there were no computer terminals in the 
clinics or on the wards; 3) the consultation dialogue took 20 minutes, which was too long. These 
systems had the main goal of being accurate and replacing or augmenting the experts such as 
physicians, but this goal may have been unrealistic, and was perhaps misguided. Moore and 
Swartout (1988) noted that of 15 desired abilities of such medical diagnostic systems, ‘never 
make an incorrect diagnosis’ was ranked 14th most important, but ‘explain their ...decisions to 
physician users’ was the most important. These systems were designed to solve the problem of 
diagnosis, but this is not the problem that physicians needed help with (cf. Yates, Veinott, and 
Patalono, 2003). The main justification for Mycin design was that MDs were prescribing 
antibiotics without making a diagnosis first, particularly without a culture. They wanted help 
justifying and explaining why the diagnosis was made, or at least required explanation if they 
were to trust the diagnosis. The idea was to force them to think through the symptoms and likely 
bacteria. Hence they prescribed broad-spectrum drugs that were feared would lead to resistant 
bacteria. 
 
One limitation of first generation systems was that they could not justify inferences—why in a 
certain situation a particular interpretation (e.g., relation of symptom and disease) or action (e.g., 
taking an antibiotic for two weeks) was correct. Although rule-based systems could present the 
current goal (e.g., to determine the type of infection) and conditions of a rule in an explanation, 
why the rule was correct was not represented. As a clear example, consider the Mycin rule, “If 
the patient has an infection and lives in the San Joaquin Valley, the type of infection may be 
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fungal.” How living in the San Joaquin Valley causes an infection is not included in Mycin’s 
model of diseases and therapies. Furthermore, the clauses in the “if” part were often ordered; for 
example, in the above rule, the second clause tests for evidence of a subtype of the disease 
category (is it fungal?) established by the first clause (there is evidence of an infection).  
 
When Mycin was originally developed, the inability to explain the implicit design of rules and 
their justifications was not deemed a deficiency because producing any explanations at all in a 
readable form from a recorded trace of the program’s reasoning was already challenging and a 
substantial advance in AI capability. Furthermore, such associational models were “rules of 
thumb,” based on demographics and physiology that would be generally familiar to the users, 
who it was thought would simply follow the program’s advice once it had been tested and 
certified by experts. However, when attempting to extend or refine these rule-sets in “knowledge 
acquisition,” or to use them for teaching, the inability to explain these high-level associations 
became of concern.  
 
Contemporaneous with Mycin, other researchers developed medical expert systems using 
different formalisms, such as probability models and semantic networks. For example, the OWL 
semantic network framework was used to explicitly represent a disease hierarchy and symptom-
disease causality; these relations could then be presented in the “trace” of the program’s 
reasoning. Nevertheless, it is not possible to include in the model why every heuristic association 
is correct (i.e., why it works in practice)—causal relations may be poorly understood (e.g., how 
experimental cancer treatment drugs affect the body) or involve a great deal of scientific detail 
(e.g., how an antibiotic affects a living cell). Both Swartout and Clancey analyzed the limitations 
of the original expert system explanation systems very clearly in their 1979 dissertations, and 
Swartout reiterated it in 1985.  
 
Moore and Swartout (1988) went further, presenting explanation as a problem-solving process 
that involves text planning and natural language discourse, not merely playing back chains of 
reasoning that relate data and interpretations. Rather than just reading out what happened inside 
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the program, explanation is viewed as a structured interaction that takes into account the user’s 
objectives, background, and the context: 
Explainers of the future must have strategies that are based on those observed in 
naturally-occurring text. These strategies must be flexible so that explanations can be 
tailored to the needs of individual users and specific dialogue settings. Explainers must 
have alternative strategies for producing responses so that they may provide elaboration 
or clarification when users are not satisfied with the first explanation given. Furthermore, 
the system must be able to interpret follow- up questions about misunderstood 
explanations or requests for elaboration in the context of the dialogue that has already 
occurred, and not as independent questions. (p. 3) 
As researchers began pondering the inadequacies of the systems, a ‘second generation’ began to 
emerge (Swartout and Moore, 1993).  
 
Second Generation: From Expert Systems to Knowledge-Based Tutors 
 
By the mid-1980s, the limitations of the first generation of explanation systems were being 
confronted (e.g., Moore and Swartout's [1988] Recap-as-explanation Myth). The realization was 
that it was not enough to simply summarize the inner working of the system; this did not make 
for a sufficient explanation or justification. The text produced might be true/valid; it just isn't 
necessarily what the user wanted to know, or (worse) was not comprehensible. 
 
Second generation systems frequently blurred the line between a consultation program (cf. 
Clancey, 1986a), a tutor (cf. Clancey, 1986b), a recommender (Sinha and Swearingen, 2002), 
and a data entry system (cf. Gruber, 1991), but researchers had the goal of going beyond the 
methods that had failed to improve understanding or adoption of the expert systems. A primary 
driver of second generation systems was the need to develop more abstract frameworks that 
would promote reusability and ease of development. NEOMYCIN did that in providing a 
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diagnostic procedure (tasks/metarules) and associated language of “dysfunction” taxonomic and 
causal relations (Clancey, 1984, 1986a).  
 
It was recognized early during the development of explainable expert systems that the same 
knowledge base, rules, and explanations could be used to develop intelligent tutors. The 
distinguishing characteristic of intelligent tutoring systems is that they inferred each student’s 
mental model of the domain (their “knowledge base”) from the student's behavior. These 
systems were first collectively called “Intelligent CAI,” to distinguish intelligent tutors from the 
simple teaching machines of the 1960s (and pursued by the “AI in Education” community 
particularly in the 1980s and early 1990s).  
 
For example, in GUIDON (related to English “guide”), the student’s request for patient data and 
his stated hypotheses were used to work backwards through MYCIN's rule network (or whatever 
EMYCIN network was being used) to determine what rules were not being considered. The 
explanation was a network of inferences and sometimes included uncertainties (e.g., evidence for 
a student knowing a rule based on prior interactions had to be distinguished from applying it in a 
particular case). This is why the systems were sometimes called “knowledge-based tutors,” 
contrasting them with the teaching machines of the 1960s. The main ideas were that the domain 
knowledge of the expert system (e.g., medical diagnosis rules) was separate from the tutoring 
knowledge base (e.g., dialogue management rules). Also, an interpretative process of “reading 
the domain rules" analogous to explaining the expert system’s behavior from a model (“trace”) 
of its internal processes was used to explain the student’s behavior by constructing a model of 
how the student was reasoning.  
 
Intelligent tutoring systems emerged in parallel with the emergence problem solvers that 
conducted "case-based" reasoning. In a sense these incorporate human explanation (see Doyle, 
Tsymbal, and Cunningham, 2003) and might be considered second generation explanation 
systems. On the other hand, some intelligent tutoring systems would not qualify as second 
generation systems. This is because they relied on "student models" that were not models of 
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users or students at all, but just equations that tracked the kinds of topics and test items that users 
got correct and incorrect in order to select additional material and practice problems. The user 
(student) models contained nothing that was at all like knowledge or meanings, and had no 
process that might be said to instantiate reasoning. The situation was different for knowledge-
based tutoring systems. In fact, what might be seen as the very first intelligent tutoring system, 
Carbonell’s Scholar (Carbonell, 1970), was a Socratic tutor that carried on a meaningful dialogue 
with the learner about the causes of rainfall. The student models were called “process models” 
because they didn’t simply tick off right or wrong problem records, but inferred the argument (or 
procedure) used to derive the student’s answer.  
 
In intelligent tutoring systems generally, the knowledge base is used by a tutorial program to 
solve the problem (e.g., answer a question, diagnose a circuit, make a math calculation) and 
derive the problem with the student’s answer. The modeling process might involve deleting part 
of the expert derivation, or applying some variant of the tutor’s knowledge, such as a faulty 
causal relation.  
 
Gregor and Benbasat (1999) reviewed a myriad of empirical studies on explanations in 
Knowledge Based Systems. They advocate for explanations that conform to Toulmin’s model of 
argumentation (addressing claims, grounds, warrants, backing, qualifiers, and possible rebuttals 
creates strong explanations). Their Appendix A lists numerous studies cited as empirical 
evidence for the conclusions it is synthesizing. 
 
We have identified a number of citations from the very large body of tutoring and training 
research to provide some pointers to XAI-relevant research. 
 
(Aleven and Koedinger, 2002; Anderson, Boyle, Corbett, and Lewis, 1990; Anderson, Corbett, 
Koedinger, and Pelletier, 1996; Bellman, 2001; Bengio, Louradour, Collobert, and Weston, 
2009; Boy, 1991; Burns, Luckhardt, Parlett, and Redfield, 2014; Cao et al., 2013; 
Chandrasekaran and Swartout, 1991; Clancey, 1981, 1984b, 1986b, 1987, 1988; Clancey and 
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Letainger, 1984; Corbett and Anderson, 1991, 2001; Doignon and Falmagne, 1985; Fonseca and 
Chi, 2011; Forbus and Feltovich, 2001; Frederiksen, White, Collins, Allan, and Eggan, 1988; 
Guerlain, 1995; Haddawy, Jacobson, and Kahn, 1997; Katz and Lesgold, 1992; Kehoe, Stasko, 
and Taylor, 2001; Lajoie, 2009; Lane et al., 2005; Lesgold et al., 1988; Loksa et al., 2016; Mark 
and Simpson, 1991; McGuinness and Borgida, 1995; Merrill, 1987; Miller, 1988; Moray, 1987a; 
Mueller and Klein, 2011; Nakatsu, 2006; Nakatsu and Benbasat, 2003; Polson and Richardson, 
1988; Psotka, Massey, and Mutter, 1988; Ritter and Feurzeig, 1988; Silverman, 1992; Sleeman 
and Brown, 1982; Southwick, 1991; Swartout, Paris, and Moore, 1991; Tanner and Keuneke, 
1991; Tintarev, 2007; Woolf, 2007; Woolf, Beck, Eliot, and Stern, 2001) 
 
How Explanations Were Constructed in Second Generation Systems 
 
Chapters in Sleeman and Brown’s (1982) Intelligent Tutoring Systems make it clear how second 
generation systems such as GUIDON constructed arguments, sometimes generating multiple 
explanations, and how the systems accounted for the student’s recent behaviors and claims (e.g., 
SOPHIE by Burton and Brown, 1982). Second generation systems, which often focused on 
making explanations context-sensitive. Here, context included knowledge about the person, 
about the history, about the goals of the user, and about the domain. Some second generation 
systems were also self-improving. Many of the systems were proof-of-concept or research 
systems (with the exception of some of the tutoring systems).  
 
Perhaps the most mature collection of papers on intelligent tutoring systems is the 1988 volume 
edited by Psotka, Massey, and Mutter, ITS: Lessons Learned. Some of these were aimed directly 
at the recap-as-explanation myth, and others helped support explanation and explainability in 
others ways. Some of these ways include: 
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Probabilistic, Bayesian, and Case-Based Reasoning Approaches 
 
Following the evolution of expert systems into intelligent systems in the 1980s, less research was 
conducted on explanation in AI systems. It did find a foothold in several sub-disciplines 
throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, including some work on case-based reasoning, and 
probabilistic/Bayesian approaches., e.g., determining the topics of a paper given a list of 
keywords.  
 
(Chajewska and Halpern, 1997; Chan and Darwiche, 2012; Chang, Gerrish, Wang, Boyd-Graber, 
and Blei, 2009; Doyle et al., 2003; Druzdzel, 1990, 1996a, 1996b; Druzdzel and Henrion, 1990; 
Eaves Jr and Shafto, 2016; Fox, Glasspool, Grecu, Modgil, South, and Patkar, 2007; Freuder, 
Likitvivatanavong, and Wallace, 2001; Haddawy, et al., 1997; Henrion and Druzdzel, 1990a, 
1990b; Herlocker, Konstan, and Riedl, 2000; Khan, Poupart, and Black, 2009; Kisa, Van den 
Broeck, Choi, and Darwiche, 2014; Kofod-Petersen, Cassens, and Aamodt, 2008; Lacave and 
Díez, 2002; Letham, Rudin, McCormick, Madigan, and others, 2015; Liang and Van den Broeck, 
2017; Nugent, Doyle, and Cunningham, 2009; Papadimitiou, Symeonidis and Manolopoulos, 
2012; Pearl, 1988; Suermondt, 1992; Shafto and Goodman, 2008; Shafto, Goodman, and 
Griffiths, 2014; Sinha and Swearingen, 2002; Sørmo et al., 2005; Theis, Oord, and Bethge, 2015; 
Wang, Ruin, Velez-Doshi, Liu, Klampfl, and MacNeille, 2010a,b; Yap, Tan, and Pang, 2008). 
 
Applications with Explanation Capabilities and Context-Aware or Ubiquitous Computing 
 
The area of context-aware and ubiquitous computing made strides in integrating an explanation 
capability into human-facing software systems. Such systems may have only modest intelligence 
(e.g., an auto-pilot), but the human-machine interaction design elements for systems that 
understand the context of the environment and the user certainly overlap with explanation-based 
systems. This area of research has seen important for several decades, but some references that 
appear most relevant to XAI are: Belotti and Edwards (2001); Chalmers and MacColl (2003); 
Lim and Dey (2009, 2010); and Lim, Dey, and Avrahami (2009). 
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Autonomy, Agent-based Systems, and Reinforcement Learning 
 
Another early follow-on to expert explanation systems was agent-based simulations. This area of 
research continues in various forms today, including schemes for the design of agents to provide 
different kinds of explanations (e.g., ontological, mechanistic), agents for human-robot 
interaction (explicability of AI-generated task plans) and transparent agents for strategy game-
play supported by deep networks. 
 
(Biran and Cotton, 2017; Bogomolov, Magazzeni, Minopoli, and Wehrle, 2015; Bogomolov, 
Magazzeni, Podelski, and Wehrle, 2015; Chai, She, Fang, Ottarson, Littley, Liu, and Hanson, 
2014; Chai, Fang, Liu, and She, 2016; Chakraborti, Sreedharan, Zhang, and Kambhampati, 2017; 
Dodge t al., 2018; Fox et al., 2017; Frank, McGuire, Moses, and Stephenson, 2016; Hayes and 
Shaw, 2017; Haynes, Cohen, and Ritter, 2008; Jain, Zamir, Savarese, and Saxena, 2016; 
Johnson, 1994; Kim, Chacha, and Shah, 2013; Lane, Core, Van Lent, Solomon, and Gomboc, 
2005; Langley, Meadows, Sridharan, and Choi, 2017; Lomas et al., 2012; Metoyer et al., 2010; 
Mnih et al., 2015; Moulin et al., 2002; Rosenthal, Selvaraj, and Veloso, 2016; S. Singh, Lewis, 
Barto, and Sorg, 2010; Stubbs, Hinds, and Wettergreen, 2007; Van Lent, Fisher, and Mancuso, 
2004; Zahavy, Ben-Zrihem, and Mannor, 2016; Zhang et al., 2016; Zhou, Khosla, Lapedriza, 
Oliva, and Torralba, 2016) 
 
Movement from Explanation to Justification 
 
The distinction between ‘explanation’ and ‘justification’ seems sharp, although it is possible to 
think about a justification as a type of explanation. Nevertheless, early explanation systems 
focused on making the justification visible to the user, but not the explanation. Swartout’s (1983) 
XPLAIN system was one of the first to make this distinction, especially with respect to justifying 
a recommendation based on background knowledge. It should be noted that justifications can 
also be deceptive, as they may attempt to convince the user to believe a result, rather than justify 
in terms of the background knowledge that fed into a decision. An argument from authority 
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(“This system was generated based on the input of the best physicians in the country”) is a 
justification that may support adoption but may not be genuine. In that sense, justifications may 
sometimes focus on establishing trust or ensuring reliance rather than informing users about the 
both the strengths and limitations of the system, and thereby fail to help the user develop a 
mental model of AI the process. (This was a key point of STEAMER; which was a tool intended 
to help end-users [experts] build their own knowledge bases; see Hollan, Hutchins and 
Weitzman, 1984). 
 
Improved Explanation Language 
 
Systems such as EES (Explainable Expert System; Neches et al., 1986ab), which was the 
successor to XPLAIN, were intended to move past inadequacies of the earlier systems by 
representing more directly the knowledge that went into the decision system in the first place. In 
a sense, both the expert system and the explanation system were generated from the same high-
level knowledge specification. Other systems (e.g., REX; Wick and Thompson, 1992) built 
secondary explanation systems to ‘reconstruct’ an argument that was more understandable. 
Although natural language capabilities have been part of XAI since the early days (McKeown 
and Swartout, 1997; Selfridge, Daniell, and Simmons, 1985; Moore and Swartout, 1991), as 
natural language systems have improved, they have continued to be implemented as means for 
creating explanations and interactions with intelligent systems (e.g., Barzilay, McCullough, 
Rambow, DeCristofaro, Korelsky, and Lavoie, 1998; Chai, Fang, Liu, and She (2016); Dodson, 
Mattei, and Goldsmith, 2011; Henrion and Druzdzel (1990ab), Lazaridou, Peysakhovich, and 
Baroni, 2017; Neihaus and Young, 2014; Pace and Rosner, 2014; Papamichail, and French, 
2003). Furthermore, the apparent ease with which natural language explanations can be created 
using recurrent neural networks (cf. Karpathy 2015) has led to the rise of visual question-
answering systems (e.g., Hendricks et al, 2016), and deep networks whose explanations are 
embedded within the systems, for example, by interpreting feature weights as a measure of 
salience (e.g., Lei, Barzilay, and Jaakkola, 2016; Li, Chen, Hovy and Jurafsky, 2015; and many 
more). 
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User Models  
 
The value of user models is demonstrated in the knowledge-base tutoring systems which have 
achieved noteworthy success in training contexts (e.g., Lesgold, Lajoie, Bunzo, and Eggan, 
1988; see also Chapter 9 in Hoffman, et al., 2014). Gott (1995) conducted a test of the 
effectiveness of SHERLOCK, an intelligent tutor for the debugging of electronic circuits. Senior 
apprentices having three years’ experience received the SHERLOCK training, and on a 
subsequent test they outperformed a group of practitioners having had 10 or more years’ 
experience. Apparently, with SHERLOCK apprentices were able to acquire the strategic 
knowledge of highly proficient technicians. Approximately 25 hours of Sherlock training was the 
equivalent of four years of on-the-job training. Gott attributed the dramatic effect to the 
“situatedness” of the training, the ecological validity of the scenarios and the “learn-by-doing” 
approach. 
 
Systems theorists Conant and Ashby (1970), argued that any good regulator of a system must be 
a model of the system. Here, a regulator is a system that is trying to control another system (such 
as a thermostat). An explanation system is essentially a regulator of the human-AI system; thus it 
must include within itself a model of that human-AI system in order to succeed.  
 
Kulesza, et al. (2013) demonstrated clearly how explanations influence users' mental models of 
software systems. Several researchers have advocated or used ‘user models’ in their explanation 
systems. In their development of the GUMAC system, Kass and Finin (1988) assumed that an 
explanation must be appropriate and understandable for a particular user. They developed a 
means of tailoring explanations based on five principles: appropriateness, economy, 
organization, familiarity, and processing requirements. They argued that a system that 
understands how these might differ across individuals would have a better chance of success. 
They acknowledged that user models may take a variety of forms, and can be models of 
individuals or can be fairly generic.  
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Two versions of user models are ones that consider a user type (e.g., an expert versus a novice), 
and ones that consider the knowledge of an individual—a model of their goals, knowledge, and 
history of interaction with the system. Wallis and Shortliffe (1984) implemented general user 
models that included self-rated expertise and amount of preferred detail, so that explanations 
would be tailored to these levels. Greer et al. (1994), Moore and Swartout (1990), and Sarner and 
Carberry, (1992) described ways of providing tailoring or individualized explanations, and the 
selection of rhetorical strategies, based on user models or other inferences. User models have 
been used to support the "tailoring" of explanations in a number of ways (cf. Carberry, 1990 for a 
discussion of a 1990 workshop; see also Kay, 2000; 2006, Kieras and Polson, 1985; May, 
Barnard, and Blandford, 1993; Maida and Deng, 1989; Weiner, 1989) 
  
User History or Knowledge State 
 
One particular style of user modeling involves inferring the knowledge or goal state of the 
individual user, and tracking it in order to provide better and more tailored explanations. In 
contrast to first generation systems, which simply restated the reasoning rules, a number of 
advantages can come from tracking a particular user and his or her interaction history. First, 
redundant information can be avoided by knowing whether certain information has already been 
given. Also, particular states of knowledge can better be determined, in order to tailor new 
information to the user. Systems with this style of user modeling are akin to many intelligent 
tutoring systems, which involve a student and/or knowledge model that tries to identify the 
current knowledge state and thereby provide learning experiences that moves students to a new 
state. Scott et al. (1984) described one example of user history, and Biran and Cotton (2017) 
examined how personal histories might be useful in making and explaining recommendations. 
 
Context and Goals 
 
Part of the importance of user models and history is to tailor to system to the goal(s) of the user. 
But this requires a specification of the goals. Several possible goals include affording knowledge 
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engineers transparency during development of the system (Wallis and Shortliffe, 1981), and 
verification, duplication, and ratification (Wick and Thompson, 1992) explaining how a system 
reached an answer, justifying why an answer is good clarifying concepts, and teaching a user 
about the domain (Sørmo, 2005). A similar point was made by Brézillon (1994), who advocated 
the need for the understanding of context in explanation systems. Brézillon emphasized that 
explanation is a cooperative problem solving exercise between the user and the system, and that 
each needs to understands the goals of the other to succeed. 
 
Contrastive Explanation, Counterfactual Explanation, Comparative Reasoning, Forgone 
Alternatives 
 
During this second generation, researchers also began proposing that effective explanations 
describe why choices were not made, depict assessments of alternative courses of action, or infer 
that a specified behavior differs from typical and should be described specifically. This involves 
contrastive reasoning, which has been shown to be effective in human learning (see Chin-Parker 
and Cantelon, 2016; Williams and Lombrozo, 2010). Such functions actually appeared in first 
generation systems—the Digitalis Advisor (Swartout, 1977) included means of describing how 
recommendations changed as a result of information; and BLAH (Wiener, 1980) involved logic 
about alternative options in decision making. MYCIN’s explanation system allowed questions of 
the form “Why didn’t you ask about X?” and “Why didn’t you conclude Y?” GUIDON’s therapy 
module allowed the student/MD to enter a drug regimen and have it compared to the expert 
system’s (“critiquing model”).  
 
These explanation modes became more fully explored in the second generation. One example of 
this is described in a series of papers by Druzdzel and Henrion (Druzdzel, 1990; Druzdzel and 
Henrion, 1990; Henrion and Druzdzel, 1990ab), Explanation systems were developed by the use 
of ‘scenarios.’ Scenarios involved describing the likelihood of the best option, but also pointed to 
less-optimal alternative option scenarios. In fact, the importance of contrast cases is so clear that 
later researchers argued that “all why-questions ask for contrastive explanations, even if the foils 
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are not made explicit.” (Miller, 2017). Wachter, Mitelstadt, and Russel (2017) argued that a type 
of contrast, counterfactual reasoning, may form a basis for evaluating the transparency or 
fairness of machine decisions. 
 
Concept Mapping 
 
Many of the new developments of the second generation (improved explanation, context and 
goal relevance, contrastive explanation) were pulled together in NUCES, a project aimed at 
building an expert system for diagnosis of heart function using the then-new method of first-pass 
radionuclide angiography (Ford, et al., 1992, 1996). The method for eliciting expert knowledge 
was Concept Mapping, a process in which the expert articulates their knowledge in the form of 
propositions (triples), which are then composed as a directed graph. The propositions were 
subsequently used to create the inference engine for the expert system. At that point the 
researchers’ insight was that expert system did not need a traditional explanation capability, i.e., 
a means for explaining the rules that were applied in any particular case analysis. Rather, it was 
realized that the concept maps themselves would serve not only as an interface for the user to 
interact with the expert system, but at the same time provide a representation of the expert’s own 
explanations of cases. The Figure below is a screen shot showing one of the Concept Maps and 
some of the digital media that were appended to nodes in the Concept Map. These resources 
included text in which the expert described the diagnosis for different cardiac issues, brief videos 
that enabled the user to “stand on the shoulders” of the expert, and arrays of exemplars showing 
clear cases and marginal cases. 
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Figure 5.1. A screen shot showing one of the Concept Maps in NUCES and some of 
the hyperlinked resources. 
 
 
The Explainability Winter 
 
The decline of expert systems involved its morphing, becoming the general class of “intelligent 
systems.” There were roughly two decades of an ‘Explainability Winter’ in which little new 
research was produced, although some researchers translated the earlier methods to new 
applications. Many of these explanation systems were created for the same reasons that the first 
generation systems were created—to help researchers and stakeholders understand them, and to 
explain and justify behaviors to users and decision makers. Figure 5.2 shows a count of relevant 
publications we have identified regarding explanation in intelligent systems. 
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Figure 5.2. Histogram of the number of publications per year identified in our 
literature review that are relevant to explanation in intelligent systems (AI, 
machine learning, and related fields).  
 
 
From the early 1990s through the early 2010s, research on explainable systems followed the 
waning fortunes of expert systems in general, and a general skepticism about the value of AI in 
making useful tools. Thus, as fewer expert systems found footing, it is not surprising that fewer 
explainable expert systems were produced.  
 
However, during this time, other forms of AI and machine learning became popular, and 
researchers examined some of these domains with respect to explanation. This includes 
probabilistic reasoning approaches that dated back to Druzdzel and Henrion’s research 
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(Druzdzel, 1990; Druzdzel and Henrion, 1990; Henrion and Druzdzel, 1990ab), and later 
investigated in terms of Bayesian reasoning frameworks (Druzdzel, 1996; LaCave and Diez, 
2002). In addition, several research groups have applied many of the explanation approaches of 
the earlier expert systems to agent-based systems (Johnson, 1994; Van Lent et al., 2004). There 
were also several publications devoted to case-based reasoning (Doyle et al., 2003; Sørmo et al., 
2005; Kofod-Petersen et al., 2008), and explainable tutoring systems (Aleven and Kedinger, 
2002; Lane et al., 2005). Although many of these research efforts investigated processes, 
techniques and explanation in systems other than expert systems, they often reached similar 
conclusions or used many of the properties of second-generation explanation systems. 
 
During the period in which second generation intelligent systems were being developed, there 
was nothing like a winter in the area of cognitive systems engineering for software systems 
design. de Greef and Neerincx (1995) among others, advocated for an approach to software 
engineering that regarded the human-computer as a work system, designed around human 
knowledge and reasoning capacities. They asserted that this was to be achieved by designing 
interfaces that provide "cognitive support," that is, the interface is laid out in such a way as to 
convey knowledge that the user is lacking. In an experiment, they found that users with little 
expertise could perform better using a statistics program if the interface was designed on the 
basis of a model of expert reasoning (in the form of a state-transition diagram). This is similar in 
spirit to the use of Concept Maps as an explanatory interface (Ford, et al., 1996), discussed 
above. 
 
Since the mid 2010s, a new generation—which we will call the Third Generation—has emerged.  
 
Third Generation Systems 
 
In the last few years as machine learning and deep net technologies has been expanding in scope 
and application, the need for explanation has arisen reawakened. This has been driven by two 
factors: (1) users and external stakeholders are unclear how decisions and classifications are 
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made (and so may not be able to defend their use), and (2) developers themselves often do not 
understand how their systems work. Large numbers of research papers have focused on 
visualizing, comparing, and understanding the operation of deep learning networks, with an 
audience of other researchers (e.g., Goyal et al., 2016abc; Karpathy et al., 2015; Kim, et al., 
2016; Moeyersoms, et. al., 2016; Sadeghi, et al., 2015; Selvaraju, et al., 2017; Yosinski, et al., 
2015; Zahavy et al., 2016; Zeiler and Fergus, 2014). However, a number of researchers have 
focused more specifically on explanations that might be presented to non-developer users of the 
systems (Hendricks et al., 2016; Kulesza et al, 2012; 2015; Lomas et al., 2012; Park et al., 2016; 
Ribiero et al., 2016; Rosenthal et al., 2016) 
 
This third generation is typified by many of the same approaches as the first generation 
systems—attempts to make clear the inner workings of the system. As was true for the first 
generation efforts, this itself remains a substantial challenge. First generation systems embedded 
expert knowledge in rules often elicited directly from experts, and attempted to craft language 
descriptions from expert’s assessments. These rules were often transformed into natural language 
expressions, and so much of the hard work was embedded within the knowledge representation. 
In third generation systems, this is substantially more difficult, and so we might expect 
challenges even achieving the types of explanations that were deemed inadequate in the early 
1980s. Similarly, critiques of the first-generation system regarding improper levels of detail, 
nonsensical language, and the like may be challenges for third-generation systems. 
 
In contrast to the first generation systems, computer technology in data visualization, animation, 
video, and the like have advanced substantially, so that many new ideas have been proposed as 
potential methods for generating explanations. Although first generation systems had natural 
dialogs and interactivity in question-answering systems, today’s systems can support this in ways 
those systems could not. An example is the enablement of argumentative explanatory human-
machine dialogs to deal with inconsistencies in knowledge bases in the process of software-
assisted knowledge acquisition for expert systems (cf Arioua, Buche and Croitoru, 2017). 
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Explainable Classifiers and Deep Learning Networks 
 
Researchers began to realize that the reasons for their systems' performance were difficult to 
identify. Consequently, a substantial number of researchers have tied to use systematic methods 
to explain system workings to one another or themselves. This might cover almost all current 
research on deep networks, but we have identified a set of more relevant sources that have used 
specific methods or approaches in service of explanation.  
 
There are some techniques that can generally be applied to any classifier, or have been used on 
traditional classifiers such as support vector machines or decision trees (Akata, 2013; Akata, et 
al., 2015; Bilgic and Mooney, 2005; Biran and McKeown, 2014, 2017; Craven and Shavlik, 
1996; Lakkaraju, Kamar, Caruana, and Leskovec, 2017; Lou, Caruana, and Gehrke, 2012; 
Martens, Huysmans, Setiono, Vanthienen, and Baesens, 2008; Martens and Provost, 2014; 
Montavon, Lapuschkin, Binder, Samek, and Müller-(2017). Možina, Demšar, Bratko, and 
Zupan, 2005; Robnik-Šikonja and Kononenko, 2008; Robnik-Šikonja, Likas, Constantinopoulos, 
Kononenko, and Štrumbelj, 2011). 
 
There is also a large and still growing body of research developing explainable deep learning 
networks that rely on specific aspects of those systems. LeCun, Bengio and Hilton (2015) 
provide a review.  
 
(Amos, Xu, and Kolter, 2017; Bach et al., 2015; Baehrens, et al., 2010; Clos, Wiratung, and 
Massie, 2017; Donahue, et al., 2015; Doshi-Velez and Kim, 2017; Elenberg, Dimakis, Feldman, 
and Karbasi, 2017; Erhan, Bengio, Courville, and Vincent, 2009; Féraud and Clérot, 2002; Fukui 
et al., 2016; Gan, Wang, Yang, Yeung, and Hauptmann, 2015; Goyal, et al., 2016a,b,c; 
Hendricks et al., 2016; Hinton, et al., 2015; Jain et al., 2016; Krizhevsky, et al., 2015; Kumar, 
Wong, and Taylor, 2017; Landecker, Thomure, Bettencourt, Mitchell, Kenyon, and Brumby, 
2013; Lei, Barzilay, and Jaakkola, 2016; Li, Chen, Hovy, and Jurafsky, 2015; Li, Yosinski, 
Clune, Lipson, and Hopcroft, 2015; Liu ,et al., 2017; Mahendran and Vedaldi, 2015; 
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Moeyersoms, et al., 2016; Nguyen, Yosinski, and Clune, 2015; Papernot et al., 2017; Rajani and 
Mooney, 2017; Reed, Akata, Lee, and Schiele, 2016; Sadeghi, Kumar Divvala, and Farhadi, 
2015; Samek et al., 2017; Schank, 2013; Schmidhuber, 2015; Shwartz-Ziv and Tishby, 2017; 
Simonyan, Vedaldi, and Zisserman, 2013; Springenberg, Dosovitskiy, Brox, and Riedmiller, 
2014; Sturm, Lapuschkinb, Samek, and Müller, 2016; Sutskever, and Hinton, 2012; Tapaswi et 
al., 2016; Thrun, 1995; Usunier, Synnaeve, Lin, and Chintala, 2016; Xu and Saenko, 2016 
Yosinski, et al., 2015; Zeiler and Fergus, 2014; Zeiler, Taylor and Fergus, 2011; Zhou et al., 
2016). 
 
Computational Models of Explanation 
 
Attempts to generate computational models of human explanation date to the 1980s (i.e., 
Goguen, Weiner and Linde, 1982; Ritter and Feurzeig, 1988; Friedman et al., 2018). 
 
Other Modern AI that Explains or is Explainable 
 
Other modern approaches have sometimes gone beyond attempting to explain the system to other 
researchers, and have embedded logic (often as part of a question-answering system) to explain 
the system to users. The distinction between these systems and the approaches described above 
are sometimes fuzzy, but modern explainable systems tend to work toward interacting with a 
user rather than a developer or researcher. We also list here modern explainable systems that are 
difficult to classify. 
 
 (Assad, Carmichael, Kay, and Kummerfield, 2007; Brinton, 2017; Clos, Wiratunga, and Massie, 
2017; Codella, et al., 2018; Craven and Shavlik, 1996; Fukui et al., 2016; Hu, Andreas, 
Rohrbach, Darrell, and Saenko, 2017; Jha, Raman, Pinto, Sahai, and Francis, 2017; Kim, 2018; 
Kim, Shah, and Doshi-Velez, 2015; Kim Lin Collins, Taylor, and Amer, 2016; Koh and Liang, 
2017; Kononenko, et al., 2013; Kulesza, Burnett, Wong, and Stumpf, 2015; Park et al., 2016; 
Rajani and Mooney, 2017; Ribeiro, Singh, and Guestrin, 2016b, 2016a; Ross, Hughes, and 
66	DARPA	XAI	Literature	Review		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 p.			
Doshi-Velez, 2017; Selvaraju et al., 2016; Sheh, 2017; Symeonidis, Nanopoulos, and 
Manolopoulos, 2009; Tapaswi et al., 2016; Williams et al., 2016). 
 
Progressing Toward a Fourth Generation? 
 
Some of the "explanations" produced in the first generation systems were easy to create in 
comparison to those in the third generation, as they were fairly direct restatements of hand-coded 
rules. The current generation may have a more difficult time producing the simple type of 
explanations produced by the first generation systems. But in some ways, third generation 
systems currently in development have mirrored developments in the first generation systems. 
We anticipate that many of these systems can anticipate similar problems faced by the first 
generation systems, and they might be addressed in ways that the second generation produced.  
 
We might predict that many of the lessons learned in the first generation and implemented in the 
second generation will be learned again by constructing third generation systems (see Brock, 
2018; Johnson and Lester, 2018). For example, Sheh and Monteath (2018) point out that 
explanations in the form of models of the how the AI works "have been largely forgotten in the 
XAI literature" in favor of explanations that present attributes used in a classification (e.g., 
saliency maps). To reiterate some of the lessons with a look toward the future, we might 
consider: 
 
Global versus Local Explanation 
 
An important goal of explanation is to help a user develop a robust and predictive mental model 
of a system. Justifications of why an AI system made a particular determination for a particular 
case (local explanation) does not provide the same information as global explanations regarding 
how the system works generally. Global explanations may serve to help a user understand the 
individual justifications for particular decisions (P. Lipton, 1990; Z. Lipton, 2016; Ribiero, et al., 
2016a,b; Wick and Thompson, 1992). 
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Linguistic Realism 
 
Researchers have recently been demonstrating success at developing language abilities via 
recurrent neural networks (RNNs) to create chatbots and question-answering systems. One 
success is the explanation system described by Hendricks et al. (2016), but for many third 
generation explanation systems, explanation takes the form of expressions in natural language. 
First generation systems had problems when the language mapped onto rules that were foreign to 
humans; by analogy, we might expect that the mapping of language to the true decision 
processes will continue to challenge today’s systems. 
 
User Models and Goals 
 
One striking parallel between fist-generation and second generation systems is that they 
generally ignored the goals, knowledge, abilities, and skills of the user. This means that they may 
not even understand or take into account previous information and explanations, and may not 
understand what an individual knows so to try to provide the best explanation at that point. 
Furthermore, the goals of users, systems, and explanations remained ill-specified. It may be that 
most users want explanations to help them understand the system in the future, but most 
explanations are providing justification for why they are doing something currently. Other goals 
that have been seen in the past include learning about unfamiliar information, gaining trust in the 
system in order to support its adoption, using it for debugging and validation checking, etc. 
Goals and purposes should be clarified so that, even if an explanation only serves one of these 
goals, it is tested in the appropriate context. 
 
Contrastive Explanation 
 
Interestingly, research papers aiming to explain deep nets to other scientists have often taken 
contrastive approaches. These include: (1) occlusion (e.g. Zeiler and Fergus, 2014) which show 
how classifications differ as regions are removed from an image, (2) ablation (e.g., Sadeghi et 
68	DARPA	XAI	Literature	Review		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 p.			
al., 2015) in which layers or functions are removed from the system to compare, and (3) alternate 
training methods (e.g., Goyal et al., 2016) in which the same system is trained on different data 
sets to understand how it is using information; providing counter-examples (e.g., Shafto and 
Goodman, 2008; Shafto, Goodman, and Griffiths, 2014; Nguyen et al., 2015). These types of 
reasoning schemes may help third generation systems go beyond simple descriptions of the 
internal workings, toward crafting genuine explanations that are informative and that resonate 
with users of the systems. 
 
Explanation versus Justification 
 
As has been pointed out above, explanations and justifications each have particular uses or 
contributions, but it is important not to confuse or equate the two. Especially important for XAI 
is the possibility that an “explanation” of a system architecture that justifies it for a computer 
scientist might be mistaken as a genuine explanation, that is, one that helps a user develop a good 
mental model. In the XAI context a considerable number of formalisms have been mentioned as 
being explanations. This includes diagrams of algorithms, diagrams showing chains of reasoning 
modules, decision trees, feature lists or matrices, parameters interpreted as conditional 
probabilities, bar charts, queries mapped onto ontology graphs, proof paths, and-or graphs, and 
others. At the same time, discussions of XAI have recognized that explanations also take the 
form of examples, category exemplars, distinguishing features, counter-cases to knock down 
misconceptions. It is recognized that the human must be able to explore the operation of the XAI. 
It is recognized that explanation in XAI may involve a human-machine dialog in which the XAI 
and the user are co-adaptive. It will be important for XAI to be mindful of the blurry line 
between describing things in the world (classifications of objects or events) versus explaining 
how the AI determined its classifications. 
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Evaluation: Measurement of Explainable AI 
 
Evaluating the performance of an explanation in AI is multi-faceted. It can involve assessing 
anything from competency, to subjective trust, to adoption, to logical analysis of the information 
provided as an explanation. Many researchers have used specific methods for assessing the 
knowledge of the system, and those methods might be generalized for assessment of future 
systems. In addition, several researchers have identified specific taxonomic measurement 
frameworks or recommendations for assessment.  
 
(Doshi-Velez and Kim, 2017; J. Doyle, Radzicki, and Trees, 2008; Freitas, 2014; Groce et al., 
2014; Kulesza et al., 2011; Kulesza, Stumpf, Burnett, and Kwan, 2012; T. Miller, 2017; T. Miller 
et al., 2017; Pacer, Williams, Chen, Lombrozo, and Griffiths, 2013; Sauro and Dumas, 2009; 
Shinsel et al., 2011; Teach and Shortliffe, 1981) 
 
Performance evaluation for AI systems is discussed in more detail on Section 8 of this Report. 
 
Summary 
 
We have reviewed the approaches taken by a number of kinds of "explanation systems," across 
three generations since the 1970s—spanning expert systems, intelligent tutoring systems. and a 
recent renaissance that could be called the third generation. We have described some of the 
approaches currently being explored in this third generation, and pointed out some 
commonalities with the limitations that emerged in the first generation. 	  
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6. Psychological Theories, Hypotheses, and Models 
 
Strictly speaking, there are no comprehensive theories of explanation in psychology, in the sense 
of well-formed theories that make strong predictions. The literature is best described as 
presenting a number of hypotheses. Many if not most of these have been adopted and adapted 
from other disciplines, especially philosophy and computer science. What makes psychology 
stand out is that many of the hypotheses have been demonstrated or verified in experimentation. 
The various hypotheses are typically not at odds with one another, in the sense of making 
different predictions. Rather than presenting the psychological work as a number of alternative 
theories, or even conceptual process models, we instead present the literature for what it is: A 
roster of hypotheses, or empirical assertions about relationships between manipulations and 
outcomes. 
 
With regard to this empirical base, it should be noted that most of the investigations are either: 
(1) studies conducted in the academic laboratory using college students as "subjects" and 
simplified reasoning problems, or (2) studies conducted using school children as participants to 
explore questions about cognitive development. These features entail a need for caution—
researchers often generalize their results to "people," they often generalize from simple 
laboratory tasks to the understanding of complex (computational) systems, and then often 
generalize "years of experience" as a metric for expertise. 
 
The hypotheses proposed in the psychology literature can be placed into these categories: 
• Taxonomics of types of explanation, 
• The relation of explanation to other fundamental reasoning processes, 
• The relation of explanation to learning,  
• The value, utility or uses of explanations, 
• The features of good explanations, 
• The limitations and foibles of explanatory reasoning, 
• Individual differences in explanatory reasoning. 
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After listing the hypotheses found in the literature, we lay out several conceptual models of 
explanation that have appeared in the literature. 
 
Taxonomics 
 
It can be inferred from the literature that explanations can refer to essentially anything that 
people might experience: causal mechanisms, descriptions of the purposes of things, the 
purposes or goals of actions or activities, the causes of phenomena, the purposes of goals of 
human behavior, the features of categories, etc. (Lombrozo, 2009). Across disciplines, there are 
dozens of taxonomies that organize explanation according to type, purpose, property, and other 
organizing principles. The following categories of theories are each linked to potential 
taxonomic organizations of explanations. 
 
Relation of Explanation to Fundamental Cognitive Processes  
 
A number of hypothesis have been proposed relating to how explanation is influenced by or 
influences fundamental cognitive processes. These include: 
 
Hypothesis: The search for explanation is an active, motivated process that guides strategies in 
the search for information (Krull and Anderson, 1997; Pirolli and Card, 1999). 
 
Hypothesis: The search for explanations is a core part of the sensemaking process (Pirolli and 
Card, 1999; Klein, Moon and Hoffman, 2006). 
 
Hypothesis: Explanation is the search for answers to why, how and what-if questions, and as 
such is a form of inference making (Graesser, Baggett and Williams, 1996). 
 
Hypothesis: Explanation is the process of articulating the causes of phenomena or events. In 
other words, explanation and causal reasoning are co-implicative. Instances of explanation often 
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are expressions of the causes of things (Ahn, et al., 1995; Gopnik, 2000; Keil, 2006; Lombrozo, 
2010). 
 
Hypothesis: Explanation can be equated with abductive inference, that is, the empirical 
determination of a best possible explanation (Harman, 1965; Lombrozo, 2012, 2016: Wilkenfeld 
and Lombrozo, 2015). 
 
Hypothesis: Explanation of "why something is what it is" entails an explanation of "why it is not 
something else." In other words, explanation and counterfactual reasoning are co-implicative. 
Instances of explanation often are expressions of counterfactual reasoning (Byrne, 2017). 
 
Hypothesis: Explanation of "why something is what it is" entails a prediction of "what might 
happen next." In other words, explanation and prospection are co-implicative. Instances of 
explanation are often expressions of what will happen in the future (Koehler, 1991; Lombrozo 
and Carey, 2006; Mitchell, Russo and Pennington, 1989).  
 
Hypothesis: Explanation has a heuristic function, of informing the process of discovery 
(Lombrozo, 2011). 
 
Hypothesis: Explanation can be a collaborative process; therefore, a theory of explanation must 
model the contexts of communication, common ground, mentoring, and instruction (see Clark 
and Brennan, 1993). 
 
The Relation of Explanation to Learning 
 
Explanation is clearly linked to teaching, learning and tutoring. 
 
Hypothesis: Explanations “recruit” prior knowledge to enable the formation of mental models 
(Besnard, Greathead and Baxter, 2004; Keil, 2006; Williams and Lombrozo, 2013). 
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Hypothesis: The process of explanation is the construction of causal chains, goal-plan-action 
hierarchies, and justifications (Graesser, Baggett and Williams, 1996). 
 
Hypothesis: Explanation is the process of forming a concept or category. Explanations help 
learners form or refine conceptual categories, or the features of category membership, and 
generalize properties within or across categories (Lombrozo, 2009; Lombrozo and Gwinne, 
2014; Murphy and Medin, 1985; Williams, Lombrozo and Rehder, 2010). 
 
Hypothesis: People have strong intuitions about what constitutes a good explanation (Lombrozo, 
2016). 
 
Hypothesis: Self-explanation has a significant and positive impact on understanding. Deductions 
and generalizations help learners refine their knowledge (Chi and VanLehn, 1991: Chi, et al, 
1989, 1994; Lombrozo, 2016; Rittle-Johnson, 2006). Having learners explain the answers of 
"experts" also enhances the learner's understanding (Calin-Jagerman and Ratner, 2005). The 
inadequacies of understanding are revealed when learners (users) are asked to provide their own 
explanation (Fernbach, et al., 2012). 
 
The Value, Utility or Uses of Explanations 
 
A number of hypotheses relate to the value and purposes of explanations in general. 
 
Hypothesis: Explanations serve to justify, reinforce beliefs and enhance the perceived value of 
beliefs (Brem and Rips. 2000; Krull and Anderson, 1997; Preston and Epley, 2005; Santos, et al., 
2009). 
 
Hypothesis: Explanations enable people to diagnose situations, predict or anticipate the future, 
justify decisions or actions (Keil, 2006; Lombrozo, 2011).  
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Hypothesis: Explanation is the process of discovery and confirmation of hypotheses or mental 
models (Keil, 2006; Lombrozo, 2011).  
 
Hypothesis: Explanation as a process is entailed by the processes of argumentation and 
negotiation (Andriessen, 2002; Galinsky, et al., 2008; Rips, Brem and Nailenson, 1999). 
 
Hypothesis: Explanations enable learners to revise their beliefs, but only if the explanation 
enables them to construct an alternative mental model (Einhorn and Hogarth, 1986; Hilton and 
Erb, 1996). 
 
Hypothesis: Explanations enable people to notice and attempt to resolve apparent inconsistencies 
and restore consistency between their mental model and empirical reality (Khemlani and 
Johnson-Laird, 2010). 
 
Hypothesis: Confidence in one's understanding is enhanced if it is possible to imagine and 
explain a future possibility (Koehler, 1991; Krull and Anderson, 1997). The assumption of truth 
influences anticipation of the future. 
 
The Features of Good Explanations 
 
Many researchers have proposed answers to the question of what makes for a good explanation. 
 
Hypothesis: Explanations are regarded as good if they are relevant to the learner’s context or 
goals, in addition to expressing truths about causal relations (Hilton and Erb, 1996; Keil, 2006). 
 
Hypothesis: Explanations that refer to causation are good if they express the cause-effect 
covariation and temporal contiguity (Einhorn and Hogarth, 1986). 
 
75	DARPA	XAI	Literature	Review		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 p.			
Hypothesis: Explanations tend to be discounted if they refer to multiple alternative possible 
causes that reduce the plausibility, relevance or informativeness of the preferred (Einhorn and 
Hogarth, 1986; Hilton and Erb, 1996; McGill, 1991; Sloman, 1994). 
 
Hypothesis: Explanations are good if they make sense in terms of the context or the enabling 
conditions of cause-effect relations (Einhorn and Hogarth, 1986; Hilton and Erb, 1996). 
 
The Limitations and Foibles of Explanatory Reasoning 
 
Some research has examined the biases, errors, and limitations that can occur during explanation. 
Many of these regard the types of explanations individuals prefer or are influenced by, rather 
than aspects of explanations that are objectively better or worse. 
 
Hypothesis: People prefer explanations that refer to single, necessary, or ”focal” causes and that 
are both simple and yet broadly applicable (Einhorn and Hogarth, 1986; Hilton and Erb, 1996; 
Lombrozo, 2007, 2016; Klein et al., 2014).  
 
Hypothesis: People overestimate the likelihood of events that make simple explanations more 
probable or plausible (Lombrozo, 2007; Lombrozo and Rutstein, 2004).  
 
Hypothesis: People prefer causal explanations that refer to multiple causes when those causes are 
understood as a simple chain (Ahn, 1998; Klein, 2006).  
 
Hypothesis: In order to adopt a complex explanation, people require disproportionately more 
evidence than is required for the acceptance of simple explanations (Lombrozo, 2007; Lombrozo 
and Rutstein, 2004).  
 
Hypothesis: People will believe explanations to be good even when they contain flaws or gaps in 
reasoning (Lombrozo, et al., 2008).  
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Hypothesis: Explanations can impair learning if they do not encourage the learner to discover 
patterns (Williams, Lombrozo and Rehder, 2010). 
 
Hypothesis: The way an invitation to explain is phrased (e.g. Why is x the case?) can bias 
peoples' assumptions about causes. Concepts or categories that are referenced in the question can 
influence how people ascribe causes (Giffin, Wilkenfeld, and Lombrozo, 2017). 
 
Hypothesis: Explanation is a double-edged sword. Explanations can promote over-
generalization. The understanding of broad patterns can impede the appreciation of exceptions. It 
is easier for people to learn patterns than to learn about exceptions. 
 
Hypothesis: The explanations people generate for everyday events and human affairs are often 
biased, in that people’s lack of knowledge and susceptibility to misinformation leads them to 
create, value, and prefer biased or incorrect explanations (Tworke and Cimpian, 2016; van der 
Linden, et al., 2017).  
 
Hypothesis: People often to not consider the strength of evidence in support of a causal 
explanation, and do not distinguish evidence that supports truth claims from the plausibility of a 
proposed explanation (Kuhn, 2001). 
 
Individual Differences in Explanatory Reasoning 
 
Some research has asked whether there are systematic differences—akin to personality traits or 
thinking styles—that predict satisfaction with explanations across people. 
 
Hypothesis: People differ in their satisfaction threshold.  
• Some people are satisfied with simple or superficial explanations that reference fewer 
causes (Lombrozo and Rutstein, 2004). A consequence is the “illusion of explanatory 
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depth,” the overconfident belief that one’s understanding is sufficient (Keil, 2006; 
Rozenblit and Keil, 2002). 
• Some people are not satisfied with simple, superficial explanations and are more 
deliberative and reflective in their explanatory reasoning (Fernbach, et al., 2012). 
• People tend to prefer complex over simple explanations if they can see and compare both 
forms (Klein et al., 2014) 
• There are clear cultural differences in preference for simple versus complex explanations 
(Klein et al., 2014). 
 
Conceptual Models of Explanation 
 
We present the four psychological conceptual models of explanation that have been presented as 
conceptual diagrams. These are noteworthy because these kinds of conceptual models are 
historically been regarded in AI as first-pass architectures. 
 
The Johnson and Johnson Model (1993). These researchers studied the collaborative explanation 
process, in which experts explained to novices the processes of statistical data analysis. 
Transcripts of explainer-learner dialogs were analyzed. A key finding was that the explainer 
would present additional declarative or procedural knowledge at those points in the task tree 
where sub-goals had been achieved. The two Johnson and Johnson models are depicted in Figure 
7.1. 
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Figure 7.1. The Johnson and Johnson Models of the collaborative explanation process. 
 
The Krull and Anderson Model. Anderson, Krull and Weiner (1996) and Krull and Anderson 
(1997) presented a model of self-explanation. This model seems patterned after models in the 
control theory paradigm, that is, the branchings are all "yes or no" decisions. The first step in the 
model, the noticing of an event, is reminiscent of the first step in C.S. Peirce's model of 
abduction (1891, 1903), that is, the observation of something that is interesting. That said, the 
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model sidesteps the crucial aspects of explanation. Specifically, Problem Formulation and 
Problem Resolution is where the hard work of explanation occurs, and the model is not specific 
about what is involved in these steps. The Krull model is presented in Figure 7.2. This Figure 
includes some elements that are not in their published diagram but are referenced in the body of 
the paper. These are highlighted in color. 
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Figure 7.2. The Krull, et al. model. 
 
The Klein et al. Sensemaking model. The Data/Frame model describes what happens as people 
try to understand complex situations, and continually work to refine and improve upon that 
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understanding (Klein, Moon and Hoffman, 2006; Klein et al, 2007). The model is presented in 
Figure 7.3.  
 
 
 
Figure 7.3. The Data/Frame model of sensemaking. 
 
The Pirolli and Card Information Foraging Model. This model emerged from cognitive task 
analysis to reveal the reasoning of intelligence analysts (see Pirolli and Card, 2005). Like the 
Data-Frame model presented above, the Pirolli-Card sensemaking model can be interpreted as a 
model of the explanation process. Pirolli and Card generalized their model as the “information 
foraging” model (Pirolli and Card, 1999). A version of this model is presented in Figure 7.4. This 
version abstracts away from the published model, as the published model was referenced to one 
specific task (i.e., all-source intelligence analysis)  
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Figure 7.4. The Pirolli-Card Sensemaking model. 
 
Conclusions About the Psychological Models 
 
• With the exception of the Data/Frame Model, all of the conceptual models assume clear-
cut beginning and ending points to the explanation process. 
• With the exception of the Johnson and Johnson model, which is explicitly dyadic, all of 
the models seem to reference self-explanation although they can be interpreted as being 
agnostic on this matter. That is, they might be understood as referring to team cognition 
or human-machine cognition. 
• The models refer, variously, to “knowledge structures,” “schemas,” “frames” and other 
primary mental representations, but these are all referencing the same basic idea.
83	XAI	Literature	Review		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 p.			
 
 7. Synopsis of Key XAI Concepts 
 
The following concepts represent the “common ground” for research and development on XAI. 
These concepts are ones that appear across the literatures of AI, psychology, philosophy and the 
other pertinent disciplines. They are concurrence points for researchers and scholars. In this 
section, we offer a glossary in which we provide definition and context regarding many of the 
terms and concepts that appear in the literature. 
 
The Value of Explanation 
 
A considerable number of studies have shown that in the use of decision aids and recommender 
systems of various types, the provision of explanations significantly contributes to user 
acceptance of and reliance upon computer-provide guidance (e.g., Herlocker, et al., 2000). Users 
like to be provided with explanations, even if they are justifications of system operations 
expressed in somewhat formal terms (Biran and Cotton, 2017). On the other hand, Continued 
experience with an AI system, by itself, enables people to discount their initial misconceptions: 
"Participants were able to give lay descriptions of attributing simple machine learning concepts 
to the system despite their lack of technical knowledge" (Tullio, Chalecki, and Fogarty, 2007, p. 
1). 
 
Format and Reference 
 
Various researchers and scholars have proposed taxonomies of kinds of explanations, and 
principles composed from them. Many different kinds of representations are regarded as 
presentations of explanations. Table 6.1 lists the kinds of representations that are regarded as 
explanations. 
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Table 6.1. Format and Reference in explanations. 
 
Format 
(How it is expressed) 
Reference 
(What it is about) 
 
• Visualizations (e.g., Heat maps) 
• Text (Statements, Narratives or Stories, 
Answers to queries, Human-machine dialogs) 
• Formal Expressions (Logical expressions, 
Matrices) 
• Conceptual Process Models (Diagrams) 
• Graphs, Networks 
• Tables 
• Abstractions, generalizations 
• Timelines 
• Hierarchies (Trees) 
• Examples (includes misclassifications, 
counter-examples, outliers, clear cases, close 
competitors) 
• Patterns, Classes, Ontologies 
• Features, Weights, Probabilities, Ranks, 
Parameters 
• Decisions, Strategies, Goals 
• Algorithms, Computational Processes, Proofs 
• Incidents, Events (includes self-explanations or 
stories) 
• Cause-effect relations 
 
 
 
It is noted that an explanation can involve mixed types (e.g., a story with diagrams; an incident 
account including a table, etc.). 
 
Interpretability and Explainability 
 
The notion that AI systems need an explainable model was first noted in the work on intelligent 
tutoring systems and expert systems (see Teach and Shortliffe, 1981; Clancey, 1983; Moore and 
Swartout, 1988; Sørmo, et al., 2005.) The difficulty that was then encountered, however, was 
that the explanations that could be generated were typically straightforward verbalizations of 
rules, and not justifications of the system’s routines or architecture (see Moore and Swartout, 
1988). A formal expression of “Why we did it this way” is a justification, not an explanation.  
 
More recently, evidence has been adduced that explanations in terms of formal aspects of 
systems operations (e.g., formal graphs, etc.) are less satisfying than simple, clear explanations 
(e.g., that a categorization was made because of some particularly strong feature). Nevertheless, 
users want to see explanations of some sort. 
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In computer science, a system is interpretable if the input-output relationship (its decision or 
choice) can be formally determined to be optimal or correct, in either a logical or a statistical 
sense (see Ribiero, et al., 2016a,b). Measures of the accuracy of a formal model are not the same 
as measures of the goodness or explainability of the model from the user's perspective. On this 
meaning, an interpretation does not necessarily carry any explanatory value with reference to 
understanding on the part of humans other than those who are familiar with formal 
computational systems. That is, justification can be provided for systems that are not human-
interpretable. For example, a linear model may be simple in a formal sense, but if it involves 
hundreds of factors and weights, it would be minimally explainable to a human. It is in this sense 
that a formal interpretation is a justification, but a justification that works for a computer scientist 
does not necessarily work as a justification for others. 
 
Explanatory value must be considered with respect to the individual who is regarded as the 
beneficiary of the explanation. 
 
Explanation versus Justification 
 
Many of the early expert systems provided explanations that were simple verbalization of rules. 
This was found to be inadequate, and justifications (an argument about why a particular decision 
was made) began to be developed, and researchers argued that justifications led to better system 
adoption. However, the distinction is not always clear, because the original ‘explanations’ 
offered should not have been called explanations, but rather ‘knowledge verbalization,’ and both 
are types of candidate explanations.  
  
In more recent approaches, the distinction between these types of explanations (and others) has 
remained. However, over-reliance on justification may also be problematic, as it focuses on local 
actions rather than global operations, and can focus on persuasion rather than knowledge-level 
explanation. 
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Candidate Explanations 
 
Material that is offered as an explanation, no matter its medium, format, or reference, is only an 
explanation if it results in good effect, that is, it has explanatory value for particular individuals. 
Technically, the property of “being an explanation” is not a property of text, statements, 
narratives, diagrams, or other forms of material. It is an interaction of: (1) the offered 
explanation, (2) the learner’s knowledge and beliefs, (3) the context or situation and its 
immediate demands, and (4) the learner’s goals or purposes in that context. This explains why it 
is possible that purely descriptive statements, not primarily intended to serve as explanations, can 
nevertheless have explanatory value. 
 
Mental Models 
 
Mental models are a convenient term for a constellation of well-developed knowledge about a 
system. A good mental model will help a user interpret, predict, and mentally simulate the 
operation of a system, as well as to understand the system’s limits and boundary conditions. 
 
A considerable amount of research has been conducted in which user's mental models are elicited 
and evaluated for content and use (see Kass and Finn, 1988; Moray, 1987; Tullio, et al., 2007). 
As users experience work using the AI system and develop their mental model, they imagine 
themselves doing the work as if they were the system, or were inside the system. Instructions, 
explanations and user experiences shape the user’s mental model, which in turn determines 
subsequent performance, subsequent needs for further or deeper explanation, and shapes both 
trust and reliance. Information about a user’s mental models of computational systems is 
typically determined by the use of structured interviews, or a combination of interview-like 
probe-questioning about what participants are thinking as they perform some other task (e.g., 
web-based querying, or "eavesdropping" on user-system interactions (see for example Kass and 
Finn, 1988; Kim, Khanna and Koyejo, 2016; Muramatsu and Pratt, 2001).  
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Anticipation and Prospection 
 
Just as good scientific explanations are ones that enable the scientist to make predictions, a 
successful explanation of an AI system should enable the user to correctly predict what the AI 
system will do for given cases. This can include cases that the AI gets right and also cases it gets 
wrong (e.g., failures, anomalies). 
 
Global and Local Explanations 
 
During initial instruction and practice, users are inclined to need instructions that describe “how 
the system works.” On the other hand, during actual use, users are inclined to need explanations 
of why the system did what it did on particular cases. Local explanation is defined as meaningful 
information about the calculational or logical processes involved in the processing of a particular 
case. The role of global and local explanations in the overall explanation process are described in 
P. Lipton (1990), Z. Lipton (2016), Ribiero, et al., 2016a,b, and Wick and Thompson (1992). 
 
Context Dependence 
 
The goodness of an explanation depends on the use context and goals of the person who is the 
beneficiary of the explanation. Brezillon and Pomerol (1997, p. 3) noted that “System 
capabilities to explain its reasoning to a user is a well-studied issue” but then added, “However, 
few systems are able to provide explanations that are relevant to the user.” The various reasons 
for why a person seeks an explanation (referred to as “triggers”). 
 
Contrastive Reasoning 
 
A number of researchers emphasize that good explanations are contrastive: They explain the 
"Why," the "Why not" and the "What-if" of systems. Answering a contrastive question 
(explaining the difference between two cases) is not only effective in improving understanding 
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(i.e., mental model formation), but is simpler than providing a full causal analysis (Kim, Khanna 
and Koyejo, 2016; Lipton, 2016; Miller, 2017). 
 
Correspondence 
 
Since the 1980s, it has been recognized in AI that the explanations offered by systems (expert 
systems, explanation systems, intelligent assistant systems, etc.) should correspond to the 
explanations that appear in human-human explanatory dialogs. Thus, criteria for what makes a 
computer-generated explanation "good" are the criteria for what makes an explanation "good" 
for humans. 
 
Explanation Goodness and Explanation Satisfaction  
 
An explanation may be satisfying to a user even though it does not satisfy some of the goodness 
criteria. A user may prefer an explanation that is clear but incomplete (a “minimum necessary” 
criterion) (see Miller, 2017; Miller, et al., 2017). Generally speaking, sufficient explanations are 
likely to fall in the sweet spot between detail and comprehensibility. Specifically, they would be 
explanations that invoke just a handful of causal factors and a handful of process steps. A user 
may prefer an explanation that is simple and perhaps even misleading but serves to help the user 
avoid error (an “inoculation” criterion).  
 
Table 6.2 lists the features that are believed to characterize good and satisfying explanations. A 
detailed treatment of the psychometrics for XAI measurement of explanation goodness and 
satisfaction appears as Hoffman, Miller, Klein and Litman (2018).  
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Table 6.2. Explanation "goodness" features. 
 
Soundness  Plausibility, Internal consistency 
Appropriate Detail 
 
Amount of detail and focus points of the detail 
Veridicality Does not in any way contradict the ideal model (although there are times 
when inaccurate explanations work better for some users and some 
purposes) 
Usefulness Fidelity to the designer's or user's goal for system use 
Clarity Understandability 
Completeness Relative to an ideal model 
Observability Explains the system mechanism or process 
Dimensions of Variation Reveals boundary conditions 
 
 
Vasilyeva and Lombrozo (2015) demonstrated that explanations in terms of mechanisms are 
regarded as better than explanations that just state a covariation. Their example involves 
statements to the effect that: (1) people who visit a portrait gallery in a museum are more likely 
to make a donation to the museum versus (2) exposure to faces is known to stimulate pro-social 
feelings. In other words, explanations in terms of covariation does not always convince people 
that there is an underlying mechanism.  
 
What counts as an explanation also depends on what knowledge the Learner/User already has, 
and also on the Learner/User/s goals. The dimension of usefulness can be analyzed in terms of 
the user (or learner's) goals. This leads to a consideration of function and context of the system 
(software, algorithm, tool), that is, why does a given User/Learner need an explanation? In the 
various pertinent literatures, this is expressed in terms of the different kinds of questions that a 
User/Learner might have, or different kinds of explanations provided by software agents 
(Haynes, et al., 2009). These “triggers” for explanation are listed in Table 6.3. 
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Table 6.3. The explainee's "triggers" and goals. 
 
 
TRIGGERS 
 
USER/LEARNER’S GOAL 
 
NEED TO 
UNDERSTAND 
 
NEED TO ACCOMPLISH 
 
How do I use it?  Use  Primary task goals 
How does it work? Mechanism, 
Understandability 
Feeling of Satisfaction 
What did it just do? Mechanism, 
Understandability 
Feeling of Sufficiency 
What does it achieve? Function  Usefulness 
What will it do next? Observability  Trust, Reliance 
How much effort will this take? Usability Primary Task Goals 
What do I do if it gets it wrong? Anticipation Control 
How do I avoid the failure modes? Surprise Adaptation, Work-around 
What would it have done if x was 
different? 
Mechanism, 
Understandability 
Curiosity, Trust, Reliance 
Why didn’t it do z? Anticipation, Surprise Curiosity, Trust, Reliance 
 
 
There are trade-offs between the goals and other goodness criteria (Table 6.1). For example, the 
“completeness” criterion would entail the conclusion that a good explanation would have to 
answer all of the trigger questions. Alternatively, a User may seek an explanation that addresses 
only one or two of the goals. The “appropriate detail” criterion entails a concept of Minimum 
Necessary Information as a potential criterion to resolve this particular trade-off. 
 
Corrective Explanation 
 
 User's mental models may involve reductive understandings or potentially harmful 
simplifications. When faced with information that challenges their understanding, users may 
attempt to preserve their misunderstandings or simplifications. Users need to be inoculated 
against explanations that are both reductive (that is, not complete) and incorrect. Explanations 
must enrich mental models but also correct user misunderstandings.  
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Trust and Reliance 
 
Substantial research has focused on trust in automation in general, and the evaluation measures 
(mostly questionnaires and scales) can be adapted to determine whether explanations and 
justifications improve trust and reliance. It is clear that some of the issues that relate to human 
trust in automation translate to the area of human trust in AI systems and explainable AI systems. 
Trust is an important consideration in the discussion of automation and AI, since affective 
judgments and user trust often have an impact on the motivations and intentions to use the 
systems (Merritt, 2011). 
 
Human factors research has shown that trust in and reliance upon automation are causally 
related, and not just in some simple way. While trust can lead to reliance, it can also lead to 
complacency, that is, the unquestioned reliance on the automation (see for example, Lyons, et al., 
2017). Users can have trust in a model independently of whether they trust individual predictions 
of the model. In complex cognitive work systems, people always develop some admixture of 
justified and unjustified trust and justified and unjustified mistrust in automation. They will trust 
the system to do certain things under certain circumstances and mistrust the system with regard 
to certain functions in certain circumstances. Their admixture of trust states has a significant and 
direct impact on reliance. Classic papers include Moray and Inigaki (1999) and the review article 
by Lee and See (2004). Hoffman (2017) presents a general taxonomy of human-machine trusting 
relations. 
 
Self-Explanation 
 
Self-explanation is the “effort after meaning” motivated by an intrinsic need to understand. 
Psychological research has shown that self-explanation leads to improved learning about the 
operation of complex systems. Furthermore, deliberately prompting individuals to explicitly self-
explain likewise facilitates learning (Chi, et al., 1994). This finding obtains even when one takes 
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into account individual differences in the motivation or need to understand, i.e., curiosity 
(Gopnik, 2000; Litman and Sylvia, 2006). 
 
Active Exploration as a Continuous Process 
 
While the explanation process involves the assimilation of knowledge, it also transforms the 
learner’s knowledge and is thus an accommodative process. Thus, rather than referring to 
"explanations" (and assuming that the property of being an explanation is a property of 
statements), it might be prudent to refer to explaining, and regard explaining an active 
exploration process. Humans are motivated to “understand the goals, intent, contextual 
awareness, task limitations, [and] analytical underpinnings of the system in an attempt to verify 
its trustworthiness” (Lyons, et al., 2017). 
 
One of the consensus points coming from the philosophy of science is that explanations have a 
heuristic function: They guide further inquiry. The delivery of an explanation is not always an 
end point to a process. Indeed, it must be thought of as a continuous process since the XAI 
system that provides explanations must enable the user to develop appropriate trust and reliance 
in the AI system. The user must be able to actively explore the states and behavior of the AI, 
especially when the system is operating close to its boundary conditions, or is making errors (see 
Amerishi, et al., 2015). How can XAI work in concert with the AI to empower learning-while-
using?  
 
Knowing why the aid might err increased trust in the decision aid and increased 
automation reliance, even when the trust was unwarranted... Ideally, training 
should include instruction on how the aid operates and experience using the aid. 
Both can playa role in producing an appropriate level of trust in the aid 
(Dzindolet et al., 2003, pp. 697,715). 
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Exploratory debugging has been shown to result in better mental models and improved user 
performance, especially when the debugging operations can be reverses, thus allowing the user 
to actively explore how the AI system works (see Amrishi, et al., 2015; Kuelsza, et al., 2010, 
2011, 2012; Stumpf, et al., 2007). Another approach to active exploration is "adjustable replay." 
In this approach, the user can instruct the AI to revert to a previous state, and then re-run a 
particular case while one or more features of the case are modified (removing features, changing 
weights, etc.). In yet another approach, the user is able to "clone" the AI system, that is, revert it 
to its pre-training state, and then see how it treats selected cases after being trained on a different 
training set, or having selected features or property ranges. Using such approaches, the user 
could explore the AI system's preferences, tendencies, etc. and see how, when and why the AI 
fails or makes an error. 
 
Active exploration on the part of the user (or learner) may not always be enough, for two 
reasons. First, it is yet to be demonstrated that active exploration of specific cases (local 
explanation) is not always sufficient to instill a global understanding (See P. Lipton, 1990; Z. 
Lipton, 2016; Ribiero, et al., 2016a,b; Wick and Thompson, 1992). Second, the process aspect of 
explanation becomes especially salient, and especially important to XAI, when one considers the 
Moving Target Problem. XAI algorithms and deep net mechanisms continue to learn/adapt once 
they are operational and are benefitting from learning on the basis of more data. This means that 
explaining becomes a moving target since the competence envelope of the AI will always be 
changing. In other words, XAI explanations must not only explain how the AI works, but explain 
how the AI is able to improve and adapt. It is for this reason that exploratory/explanatory 
debugging has perhaps the greatest potential for XAI. (For more details, see Section 8 of this 
Report.) 
 
Is it for these reasons that a consideration of explanation as a collaborative process becomes even 
more crucial. 
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Explaining as a Collaborative or Co-adaptive Process 
 
While explanation might be thought of as a process with clear-cut beginning and end points (the 
delivery of instructional material that the user simply assimilates), the understanding of a 
computer system requires a collaboration or co-adaptive process involving the learner/user and 
the system. “Explanations improve cooperation, cooperation permits the production of relevant 
explanations” (Brezillon and Pomerol, 1997, p. 7). " One of the observations that has emerged 
from the study of natural explanation is that the process of human discourse is essentially a 
cooperative one" (Southwick, 1991, p. 12). This is the concept of “participatory explanation,” 
similar to the notion of “recipient design" in the conversation analysis literature, i.e., that 
messages must be composed so as to be sensitive to what the recipient of the message is 
understanding (Sacks and Schegloff, 1974). An assumption in some of the first generation of AI-
explanation and intelligent tutoring systems was that it is the human who has to learn, or change, 
as a result of explanations offered by the machine. 
 
Based on empirical findings, it is generally recognized that the process of explaining, and 
human-human communication broadly, is a co-adaptive "tuning" process, which requires that the 
explainer and learner have a capacity to take each other's perspective. In turn, this entails that the 
explainer and the learner have mental models of the mental models of each other. Although 
sometimes simple statements may provide a good explanation to a particular user, Swartout 
(1981, p. 315) argued that "A powerful knowledge representation is the secret to better 
explanation, not just better natural language facilities." 
 
Measurement and Evaluation 
 
Speaking to the computer science/AI community, Doshi-Velez and Kim (2017) stated that: "It is 
essential that we as a community respect the time and effort to conduct evaluations." The context 
of this statement is that the computer science community has developed many benchmarks that 
can be relatively easily used to determine whether an algorithm is better than another, but since 
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explanations are intended for human, they need behavioral science concepts to evaluate properly. 
A number of methods are available for evaluating XAI systems, and not all XAI systems have to 
be evaluated in research with human participants (Miller, et al., 2017). That said, evaluation in 
terms of human performance in actual system use is an arbiter of XAI success. Research using 
human participants is resource- and time-intensive. 
 
There are significant methodological or measurement challenges:  
 
• Explanations generated by XAI can be evaluated in terms of the goodness criteria and the 
results correlated to user performance.  
• User comprehension of explanations can be assessed and the results correlated to 
qualities of their mental models and to their performance.  
• User knowledge or mental models can be measured or somehow represented, and the 
results correlated to the change in performance attributable to the explaining process. 
 
A variety of performance measures are conceivable, and many have been utilized in research. 
These present challenges for forming operational definitions, and challenges to experimental 
design. 
• Successful explanations enable the user to efficiently and effectively use the AI in their 
cognitive work, for the purposes that the AI is intended to serve. 
• Successful explanations enable the user to choose the best among a set of alternative 
formal models (e.g., algorithms). 
• Successful explanations enable the user to correctly predict what the AI system will do 
for given cases. This can include cases that the AI gets right and also cases it gets wrong 
(e.g., failures, anomalies). 
• Successful explanations enable the user to explain the cases that the AI gets wrong. 
• Successful explanations enable the users to correctly assess whether a system 
determination is correct, and thereby recalibrate their trust. 
• Successful explanations enable the user to explain how the AI works to other people. 
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• Successful explanations enable the user to judge when and how to rely on the AI even 
while knowing the boundary conditions of the competence of the AI. 
 
A review of measures for XAI is presented in the DARPA XAI Report, "Metrics for Explainable 
AI: Challenges and Prospects" (Hoffman, et al., 2018). 
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8. Evaluation of XAI Systems:  
Performance Evaluation Using Human Participants 
 
Key Empirical Questions 
 
It was not long after the development of second generation expert systems that the notion of 
evaluation became salient. The first generation work has led to the conclusion that expert 
systems (or knowledge based systems, generally), needed to explain their reasoning. It followed 
that there must be means for evaluating the goodness and utility of explanations. Dhaliwal and 
Benbasat (1996) proposed an evaluation framework based on cognitive theories, for assessing 
the extent to which explanations facilitate learning and decision making by relying on a model of 
explanation strategies. They asserted that evaluation must address these high-level questions: (1) 
To what extent are the explanations generated by expert systems relied upon in decision making, 
(2) What factors influence the use of the explanations? and (3) In what ways do explanations 
empower users? They also listed a number of specific scalar measures, such as satisfaction, 
confidence, usefulness, trust, and a number of performance measures, such as decision efficiency 
and accuracy. 
 
 Many additional researchers discussed the challenges of evaluating human-computer systems, 
including explainable AI systems (e.g., Abrams and Treu, 1977; Antunes, Herskovic, Ochoa, and 
Pino, 2012; Kulesza, et al., 2010, 2012, 2011, 2013, 2015; Nataksu, 2004; Ribiero, et al., 
2016a,b; Sheh and Monteath, 2008; Treu, 1998; Wickens, 1994), and the challenges for the 
evaluation of explanation systems (Doshi-Velez and Kim, 2017ab; Gilpin et al., 2018; Feldmann, 
2018; Miller, 2017; Miller, Howe, and Sonenberg, 2017). Much of this literature references the 
evaluation of the software systems or interfaces, rather than the performance of the human-
machine work system. Treu (1998) reviewed measures that had been used to evaluate human-
machine performance (e.g., response time, error rate, ease of use, etc.), but with respect to 
software systems, generally rather than explanation systems, specifically.  
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However, a number of communities have examined different aspects of human-machine 
interaction that may be relevant to evaluating explainable systems. For example, research has 
shown that supporting explanatory human-machine dialog can enhance the process of knowledge 
acquisition for expert systems (e.g., Arioua, Buche and Croitoru, 2017). As another example, 
research has shown that in order to obtain the best results from human-AI interaction, reliance, 
trust, and optimal utilization must be "calibrated" for individual operators via an interaction 
between performance expectations (expected system competence; Muir, 1994), user self-
confidence (Muir and Moray, 1996), user training (Cahour and Forzy, 2009), and prior operator 
experience with AI (Dzindolet, et al., 2003). The recommendations provided hinge on the ability 
of AI to be probed/examined by the human user and to explain faults as they occur. Thus, the 
ongoing development of AI systems capable of explanation will be crucial in the development of 
trust between human users and AI, and appropriate reliance.  
 
(Adams et al., 2003; Bisantz, Llinas, Seong, Finger, and Jian, 2000; Cahour and Forzy, 2009; 
Doshi-Velez and Kim, 2017; Dzindolet, Peterson, Pomranky, Pierce, and Beck, 2003; Dzindolet, 
Pierce, Pomranky, Peterson, and Beck, 2001; Hancock et al., 2011; Hoffman, Klein, and Miller, 
2011; Hoffman, 2017a; Jian, Bisantz, and Drury, 1998, 2000; Johnson, 2007; Koustanai, Mas, 
Cavallo, and Delhomme, 2010; Lee and Moray, 1994; Lee and See, 2004; Llinas, Bisantz, Drury, 
Seong, and Jian, 1998; Lyons et al., 2017; Merritt, 2011; Merritt, Heimbaugh, LaChapell, and 
Lee, 2013; Montague, 2010; Moray and Inigaki, 1999; Muir, 1994; Muir and Moray, 1996; 
Parasuraman, Molloy, and Singh, 1993; Parasuraman and Riley, 1997; Pomranky, Dzindolet, and 
Peterson, 2001; Schaefer, 2013; Singh, Molloy, and Parasuraman, 1993a; Wang, Jamieson, and 
Hollands, 2009; Wickens, 1994).  
 
XAI Measurement Concepts 
 
Figure 8.1 presents the conceptual model used in the DARPA XAI program to show the place 
and role of different classes of measures in the evaluation of the XAI system and the Human-
XAI system performance. 
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Figure 8.1. DARPA’s XAI Evaluation Framework. Explanations should induce better mental 
models and performance, which produce appropriate trust in the system. 
 
Explanation Goodness refers to evaluations about properties of the explanation that are often 
taken as axiomatic assumptions about what constitute good explanations. For example, 
researchers have argued that explanations should be complete, logical, incremental, veridical, 
and the like. This dimension covers properties that might typically be evaluated objectively or 
via coding rubrics, and may not require the explanation to be placed in the context of the 
working system or an expert user. 
 
Mental Model refers to a user's knowledge about the system. This could be assessed in many 
ways (see Adams et al., 2003), but may include specific tests of knowledge, prediction about the 
system, generative exercises (drawing a diagram or explaining how the system works), and the 
like. 
 
Performance refers to measures of whether the system (possibly including the human user) 
operate better or more efficiently with the explanation than without it. Performance constitutes 
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both measures of the AI capability itself (so that if an explainable system were not as capable as 
its non-explainable counterpart, this could be detected), but also the effectiveness of the joint 
system (so that if explanations help the user work with the system or accomplish goals more 
effectively, this could also be measured). This might involve tasks in which the user must decide 
which subtasks the AI is capable or licensed to perform, triaging a large set of tasks between 
different AI or human performers, or overall time or financial costs associated with fielding a 
system. In general, performance could be multidimensional, so that an XAI-enabled drone may 
perform more slowly than its AI-enabled counterpart (because of the need to interact with a 
user), but may be more likely to succeed. 
 
Trust/Reliance measures generally refer to the subjective attitudes of users toward the system. 
Although trust and reliance can be assessed indirectly via usage and performance patterns (using 
the system signals reliance on the system), in general trust measures involve human reflection 
about their reliance, trust in, or the trustworthiness of a system. As discussed by Adams et al. 
(2003), this need not be exclusively Likert-scale assessments, and for example forced-choice 
decisions could be used (e.g., which of two systems would you prefer to use?), or other similar 
assessments. 
 
A detailed presentation on methods for measuring explanation goodness, satisfaction, mental 
models, trust, reliance, and performance appears in another DARPA XAI Report (Hoffman, 
Miller, Klein and Litman, 2018). Consonant with Hoffman, et al., Kim (2018) proposed that 
good explanations must not only be correct and accurate, but must enable the user to answer 
questions about the AI, especially counterfactual questions. 
 
Annotated Review of Papers Relevant to the Evaluation of XAI Systems 
 
A number of computer science reports and review articles examine explainability in AI, and 
propose what are believed to be good or useful explanation types and formats. However, 
frequently these explanations, or the human-machine work system within which whey are 
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embedded , are not subject to any evaluation (see Section 5, above). A number of psychological 
experiments involved assessing the effect of explanations on human performance using software 
systems, but did not involve either AI systems or computer-generated explanations (e.g., Berry & 
Broadbent, 1987). We have identified research reports that have attempted empirical evaluations 
of explanations or system performance, in the context of AI systems. To be included in the 
present analysis, we required (1) the system to have or simulate some non-trivial intelligent 
algorithm, where some aspect of the algorithm that was claimed to be either an explanation or 
explainable, and (2) the system had to have some sort of human-based evaluation of the 
explanation.  
 
For each reference, we considered: 
• Kinds of AI systems; what the AI system was supposed to do. 
• Who the research participants were (e.g.,. college students, Mechanical Turk workers, 
etc.) and how many. 
• The nature of the interface that was presented explanations to users. 
• The form of the explanations that were presented (i.e., diagrams, text, whatever). 
• The nature of the experiment design (any independent variables or different experimental 
conditions). 
• Whether “explanation goodness” was evaluated, and if so, how. 
• Whether user models were evaluated for their soundness (as a result of having received 
explanations), and if so, how. 
• How the human or the human-machine performance was measured. 
• Whether user trust in or reliance on the AI was evaluated and if so, how. 
The last four considerations correspond to the measurement classes described in the DARPA 
XAI Evaluation Framework (Figure 8.1, above). 
 
Not all of the papers that were identified as being of interest to XAI met all of the above criteria, 
or even involved evaluating the AI-Human system performance, but did involve some sort of 
evaluation. For example, Mao, et al. (1996) evaluated a knowledge-based system that provided 
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explanations of its decisions. Their explanations could be either textual or graphical, and 
included domain-relevant definitions, causal descriptions, and problem-solving methods. 
However, because they provided no evaluation of the system, it was not included. Their purpose 
was to evaluate and describe a knowledge-based system that provided explanations, not to 
evaluate the explanations in terms of their contribution to the human-machine performance. 
Consequently, this Section focuses on the methods by which explainable systems have been 
evaluated by humans. 
 
Kinds of AI Systems 
 
Studies have used a variety of AI systems, including rule-based expert systems, case-based 
reasoning systems, machine learning systems, Bayesian classifiers, quantitative models, 
statistical models, and decision trees. The most frequent references are to expert systems and 
machine learning systems. 
 
There is also a considerable variety of applications, such as gesture classification, image 
classification, text classification, decision-making, program debugging, music recommending, 
financial accounting, strategy games, command training, robotic agents, non-player character 
agents, and patient diagnosis. Not all XAI systems that have been evaluated have had mature use 
cases and domains. For many, the systems were research-based systems that explored how 
explanations could be added to the technology, rather than commercial systems in which 
explanations were added to aid users in real settings. 
 
Because of the focus of these papers on the explanation, many offer very little details about the 
nature of the AI systems themselves, saying only that the system is an "intelligent agent," for 
example. Oftentimes, the baseline AI systems have been well documented in earlier papers, or 
they are common enough approaches that their basic working can be inferred. 
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Nature and Number of Research Participants 
 
Many studies relied on Mechanical Turk workers. Many relied on college students as 
participants. A few studies distinguished novices from experts, and at least one study appears to 
be against expert and novice user “profiles,” rather than actual users. Sample sizes ranged from 
small (10 or fewer) to very large (over 600). Most studies used less than 100 participants. Sample 
sizes in studies using college students tended to be in the smaller range of less than 100, typically 
20 or so. 
 
Explanation Forms and Formats 
 
Explanation in AI systems has often been considered a process or general approach toward 
interacting with the user, and so it is sometimes difficult to point to the artifact produced by a 
system that should be considered an explanation. In the papers we reviewed, explanations took 
diverse forms, including text, statistical graphs, decision trees, feature histographs, color 
gradients, feature matrices, rule sets. inference networks or flags of "key events" imposed in a 
mission timeline. Textual explanations could be sets of words or text pieces denoting the features 
that were most important to the classifiers. Only in a few cases were explanations in the form of 
natural language. 
 
In a few studies, the initial instructions provided global information about "how the AI works." 
(Many studies do not report details about the instructions given to the participants.) In most 
cases, the explanations that were provided to participants were local justifications about why an 
action was taken, and the task required self-explanation on the part of the participants. Such 
explanations do not explain how the AI system works directly. Rather, they explain (in some 
way, textual or graphical) the AI system's rationale for each particular decision or classification 
(e.g., the most heavily weighted features). Presumably, after sufficient interaction with these 
justifications, the user develops a clearer mental model of how the system works in general. 
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Kinds of Study Designs or Experimental Comparisons  
 
Studies employed a variety of designs, including single-group, repeat measure designs and 
factorial designs with more than one Independent Variable. A number of studies involved a 
comparison of Explanation versus No Explanation conditions. Many studies presented more than 
one kind of explanation, attempting to evaluate the effects of learning or performance. 
 
Kulesza et al. (2012) is perhaps one of the cleanest example of an "Explanation versus No 
Explanation" comparative evaluation of explanation effectiveness, in terms of both performance 
and mental models The user task was to use a music recommender system. Users could provide 
feedback about particular songs (which they described as "debugging"). Feedback could be with 
respect to such factors as song tempo, song popularity, artist similarity. The interactivity 
capability is suggestive of the notion of explanation as a human-machine dialog (see also 
Kulesza, et al., 2015). Participants who received richer (functional-local and structural-global) 
explanations during the initial instructional phase did not perform better at debugging the 
recommender’s reasoning. Instead, the most effective participants may have learned to debug by 
using the system. This is suggestive of the notion of "explanation as exploration" (see also 
Kulesza, et al., 2015): 
 
Despite the complexity inherent to intelligent agents, With-scaffolding 
participants quickly built sound mental models of how a music recommender 
operates “behind the scenes”—something the Without scaffolding participants 
failed to accomplish over five days. The participants’ mental model 
transformations—from unsound to sound—was predictive of their ultimate 
satisfaction with the intelligent agent’s output. Participants with the largest 
transformations were able to efficiently adjust their recommenders’ reasoning, 
aligning it with their own reasoning better (and faster) than other participants. 
These same participants were also likely to perceive a greater benefit from their 
debugging efforts. Participants presented with structural knowledge of the agent’s 
reasoning were significantly more likely to increase their computer self-efficacy, 
which is known to correlate with reduced computer anxiety and increased 
persistence when tackling complex computer tasks. Participants who were 
presented with structural knowledge showed no evidence of feeling overwhelmed 
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by this additional information and viewed interacting with the intelligent agent in 
a positive light, while participants holding only functional mental models more 
frequently described their debugging experience (Kulesza et al., 2012, p. 9).  
 
See the Appendix for further details. 
 
Ways in which Explanation Goodness was Manipulated 
 
We refer to explanation “goodness” as the set of principles by which guide the development of 
explanations, and through which they can be reasonably evaluated without relying on human 
participants, and typically center on concepts such as correctness, completeness, incrementalism, 
reversibility, and the like. Explanation goodness was not evaluated a priori in most studies, or 
manipulated as an independent variable. (That is, no study involved a control in which 
explanations were manifestly deficient.) Though the researchers assumed that (good) 
explanations had to have certain qualities, such as correctness or completeness. A number of 
studies focused primarily on having users or domain experts complete a questionnaire about the 
features they desired in AI or decision aid systems. 
 
Ways in Which Mental Models were Evaluated 
 
Few studies looked at mental models directly. Those that did utilized self-reports or post-
experiment interviews. Some studies looked at mental models only indirectly (e.g., by applying 
the NASA-TLX scale for rating mental workload); this despite the clear consensus that user 
mental models (that is, their understanding of the AI systems) are crucial. For example, Teach 
and Shortliffe (1982) conducted a survey study in which clinicians responded to a questionnaire 
on attitudes regarding clinical consultation systems, regarding the systems' acceptability, and 
physicians' desirements regarding the performance capabilities of the systems. The study 
provided indirect evidence about mental models and explanation. Some used specific knowledge 
tests as a proxy for eliciting a more complex mental models (e.g., Kulesza et al., 2015).  
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The study by Tullio et al. (2007) is the richest in terms of systematic study of user's mental 
models and the development of mental models across experience. 
 
Kinds of Measures of Task or System Performance 
 
Perhaps the clearest measure of whether an explanation is effective is if the performance of the 
human-XAI work system improves when explanations are involved. This could be a result of a 
better understanding of the AI system (and thus it is used properly), or of more calibrated trust 
(so that cases in which the system will fail are handled or checked by the user, while easy 
decisions are defaulted to the AI). Not all test cases for explainable systems can be easily 
evaluated with performance measures. Especially when the goal is to improve transparency, 
explanation might be meant to teach a user how a decision is made, or to provide a check to 
ensure the AI system is not working unfairly. An explanation of a credit score might lead a user 
to make changes to their financial habits, or a regulator or legislator take action that changes the 
decision process, but these are difficult to assess in an experiment with human participants.. 
 
All of the primary performance measures we examined are task-specific measures of correctness 
or efficiency. Example correctness measures are the number of loan decisions correctly judged to 
be non-compliant, correctness of a diagnosis of some sort, the correctness of a classifier, or the 
number of successful attempts to correct a deficient program. Such measures can be expressed as 
percent correct, but this leaves the result insensitive to context. What counts as "good 
performance" in one domain may be quite different from that for some other domain. What is 
needed in such cases is some sort of baseline where one can anchor the percentage scale by 
assigning ranges of values to one or more categories (e.g., 85% correct is "Satisfactory").  
 
Response time (or time-to-learn) is also used as a primary measure. It can be expressed as a 
conditional, such as time to respond for correct versus incorrect judgments. Response time also 
cannot be understood out of context, since task durations differ widely across task domains (e.g., 
response time to accepting or rejecting a personalized song recommendation versus response 
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time to find a bug in a program). Furthermore, systems with explanations will sometimes require 
the user to take more time to interact with and process,, and so a performance measure would 
have to balance time-cost and cost for erroneous outcomes in order to properly judge cost versus 
benefit. Performance can also be measured via trials-to-criterion, which may represent a training 
cost of a system. Response time can also depend heavily on user knowledge and experience. For 
some explainable systems, a knowledgeable user may no longer need detailed explanations, but 
explanations may reduce the time needed to become knowledgeable. 
 
The study by Fails and Olsen's (2003; see also Kim et al., 2015) had as its primary measures the 
amount of time and the number of training iterations it took for the human-machine system to 
achieve 97.5% agreement with a gold standard non-interactive classifier. 
 
Some studies used "debugging tasks" or "oddball detection" tasks, in which users' corrections 
were used to modify learned programs (e.g., Kulesza et al., 2010). For example, participants 
might have to decide which of a set of words does not belong to a category, decide which topic a 
document pertains to. Some studies also used some sort of "prediction task" in which participants 
had to predict the AI systems' determination for given test cases. These are different ways of 
framing performance, and are useful especially when they can be argued or demonstrated to be 
related to deficiencies of real-world AI systems.  
 
Kinds of Measures of Trust/Reliance 
 
A number of studies had participants rate their satisfaction either with the explanations 
(soundness or completeness) or with their own performance. Many studies pertain to the trust-
reliance relationship indirectly. On the other hand,, the evaluation of trust was actually the 
primary performance measure in a few studies. 
 
Studies used a variety of human judgments (typically, Likert scales), such as confidence in a 
classification or decision, degree of trust in the AI, degree to which they relied on the AI's 
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determinations, or their perceived efficacy at using the AI system to conduct the experiment 
tasks. 
 
It should be recognized that, although XAI trust and reliance measures focus on subjective 
ratings, there are alternative ways in which trust can be measured (see Adams et al., 2003). These 
include pairwise choice methods, performance measures, and the like. 
 
Conclusions About Evaluation 
 
It is recommended that AI/XAI researchers be encouraged to include in their research reports 
fuller details on their empirical or experimental methods, in the fashion of experimental 
psychology research reports: details on Participants, Instructions, Procedures, Tasks, and 
Dependent Variables (operational definitions of the measures and metrics) and Independent 
Variables (conditions) and Control Conditions. 
 
In the set of papers reviewed in this Section (and detailed in the Appendix) one can find 
considerable guidance for procedures in the evaluation of XAI systems. But there are noteworthy 
considerations, such as: 
• Consideration of global-versus local explanations,  
• Consideration of the need to evaluate the performance of the human-machine work 
system (and not just the performance of the AI or the performance of the users). 
• Consideration that the experiment procedures tacitly impose on the user the burden of 
self-explanation.  
Tasks that involve human-AI interactivity and co-adaptation, such as bug or oddity detection, 
seem to hold the promise for XAI evaluation since they conform to the notions of explanation as 
exploration and explanation as a co-adaptive dialog process. Tasks that involve predicting the 
AI's determinations, combined with post-experimental interviews, hold promise for the study of 
mental models in the XAI context. 
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APPENDIX 
Evaluations of XAI System Performance Using Human Participants 
 
 
Authors Bansal et al., 2014 
AI System  The system determines the failure modes for computer vision systems, 
and uses this information to automatically predict failure. It explains the 
causes of different failures in human-understandable language, which 
additionally allows for human-aided failure prediction. 
Research Participants At least 10 Mechanical Turkers. 
Explanation Interface Not specified. 
Explanation Form Explanations are either lists or trees of textual descriptions which 
explain the conditions under which failure may arise. 
Study Design or 
Comparison Made 
All subjects were in the same experimental condition. 
Manipulation of 
Explanation 
Goodness 
Explanations are treated as superior based on the ability of a human user 
to use them to accurately predict system failure. Thus, explanation 
goodness is measured by the percentage of a user’s predictions that were 
correct. 
Evaluation of Mental 
Models 
Not evaluated. 
Performance (Task or 
Evaluation Measure) 
Same as explanation goodness. 
Trust/Reliance 
Measures 
Discussed but not evaluated (increasing user trust in predictive systems 
is a motivation of the work). 
 
 
Authors Berry & Broadbent, 1987 
AI System  AI explanations of a river pollutant search task. 
Research Participants University students. 
Explanation Interface Two forms of explanations:  
1. A single block explanation at the beginning of the task  
2. Multiple “why” explanations which the user may request at-will 
throughout the task 
Explanation Form (L) Textual descriptions advising users on their task 
Study Design or 
Comparison Made Explanation versus No Explanation. 
Manipulation of 
Explanation 
Goodness 
Only the manipulation of explanation type. 
Evaluation of Mental 
Models 
Participants who were required to verbalize their reasoning following 
their receipt of an explanation performed better than participants who 
were required to verbalize but who did not receive an explanation. 
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Performance 
Evaluation 
The role of explanation in the user's actions on a complex river pollutant 
search task. Participants had to decide which of a set of factories was 
responsible for pollution based on computer suggestions about what 
pollutants to test for. Participants who were able to ask "why" questions 
about the computer recommendation performed better at the task.  
Trust/Reliance 
Measures 
Only evaluated in terms of task performance. 
 
 
Authors Chang et al., 2009 
AI System  Text classifier. 
Research Participants Eight Mechanical Turkers. 
Explanation Interface Not described, presumably text. 
Explanation Form Not directly evaluated. 
Study Design or 
Comparison Made 
Single group design. 
Manipulation of 
Explanation 
Goodness 
Not directly evaluated. 
Evaluation of Mental 
Models Not directly evaluated. 
Performance 
Evaluation 
Human judgments of the "interpretability" (understandability) of the 
probabilistic topic models developed by a machine learning system. 
Word Intrusion task—Judgments of whether the machine-derived topics 
correspond to topics developed by humans. Participants are presented 
with six words and have to decide which is off topic. 
Topic Intrusion Task—Participants are shown the title of a document, a 
snippet from the document. and four topics (represented by 
the highest-probability words within that topic). The participant chooses 
the topic that does not belong to the document.  
Trust/Reliance 
Measures 
Not directly evaluated. 
"For three topic models, we demonstrated that traditional metrics do 
not capture whether topics are coherent or not. Traditional metrics are, 
indeed, negatively correlated with the measures of topic quality 
developed in this paper. Our measures enable new forms of model 
selection and suggest that practitioners developing topic models should 
thus focus on evaluations that depend on real-world task performance 
rather than optimizing likelihood-based measures" (p. 8). 
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Authors Dzindolet et al., 2003; see also Dzindolet et al., 2002 
AI System  Simulated decision aid. 
Research Participants 219 University students (in three experiments). 
Explanation Interface Text showing the decisions of the decision aids, and text explaining the 
decision errors that were made by the decision aid (i.e., false alarms, 
such as "Since shading from a tree sometimes take human-like 
forms, mistakes can be made"). 
Explanation Form Decisions (soldier present vs. soldier absent) made by a hypothetical 
"contrast detector" computer system.  
Study Design or 
Comparison Made 
In Experiment 2 there were two conditions: The decisions of the decision 
aid were either presented or not. A bar graph showed the running error 
rate of the decision aid and the participants across trials (continuous 
feedback). Decision aid performed either better (half of the number of 
errors made by participants in Experiment 1) or worse (twice the number 
of errors made by participants in Experiment 1). Some participants saw 
the decision aid's decision after reaching their own decision.  
In Experiment 3, after the first 100 trials participants were shown the 
decision aid's cumulative performance.  
Manipulation of 
Explanation 
Goodness 
Not evaluated. 
Evaluation of Mental 
Models 
Initial instructions provided a global explanation of how the "contrast 
detector" worked, and that is was not always accurate. 
Performance (Task or 
Evaluation Measure) 
Participants viewed 200 slides of terrain and had to decide whether a 
camouflaged soldier was in each photo. Participants rated their 
confidence (in both themselves and the decision aid), trust in the decision 
aid and degree of reliance on the decision aid, both after the instructions 
(but before the test trials) and once again after the test trials. Participants 
were also asked to explain their ratings and justify their decisions. 
Trust/Reliance 
Measures 
Focus of the work was on the relationship among judgments of 
automation reliability and trust, and their relation to reliance.  Reliable 
decision aid was rated as more trustworthy. After observing the 
automated aid make errors, participants distrusted even reliable aids, and 
showed greater self-reliance, unless an explanation was provided 
regarding why the aid might err. Reliance increased if reasons for the 
aid's errors was provided. Reliance can be predicted from trust, but 
reliance and trust depend on whether system errors can be well-
explained. 
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Authors Fails & Olsen, 2003 
AI System  The system, Crayons, creates image classifiers through an interactive 
machine learning process. Its intended audience is UI designers or other 
programmers who may have varying levels of ML experience. 
Research Participants 10 subjects (no further detail provided), 
Explanation Interface Explanations are given via an interactive camera-based interface. 
Explanation Form Visual explanations which describe the current status of the classifier 
(based on user contributions, what pixels in an image are classified as 
belonging to an object or class of objects? Such pixels are visually 
highlighted). 
Study Design or 
Comparison Made 
Subjects divided into two groups based solely on the order they used one 
of the two algorithms (CWSS first then MSSS, vs. MSSS first then 
CWSS). 
Manipulation of 
Explanation 
Goodness 
Not directly evaluated, though it may be seen as a function of human-
machine performance (below) (better performance = better 
explanations). 
Evaluation of Mental 
Models 
Not evaluated. 
Performance (Task or 
Evaluation Measure) 
Human-machine performance was measured based on the amount of 
time and training iterations it took for the system to achieve 97.5% 
agreement with the gold standard non-interactive classifier. 
Trust/Reliance 
Measures 
Not evaluated. 
 
 
Authors Fiebrink et al., 2011 
AI System  Interactive supervised learning system for real-world gesture analysis 
problems. The AI system supports human-computer interaction where 
human users are engaged in tasks such as choosing training algorithms, 
evaluating/comparing models, and supplying training data. 
Users are engaged in tasks such as choosing training algorithms, 
evaluating/comparing models, and supplying training data. 
Research Participants Students and faculty member of music department, professional 
cellist/composer. In the first study (“A”), human subjects were seven 
composers. In the second (“B”), they were 21 undergraduate students 
from a variety of majors and years. In the third (“C”), the subject was a 
single professional cellist/composer. 
Explanation Interface The interface was a GUI, but explanations usually involved purely 
sound-based feedback. Explanations are model outputs 
(textual/visual/aural feedback), used to improve user understanding of 
a machine learning system. 
Explanation Form In studies A and B, explanations were the sonic outputs produced by 
their interactions with the model. In study C, the participant was also 
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able to view textual or graphical visualizations of output. 
Study  Design or 
Comparison Made 
The differences between the three studies involved the number and 
type of participants, and with what goal they interacted with the 
system. In all studies, the same software was used (Wekinator), though 
participants in different studies used this software differently. 
Manipulation of 
Explanation Goodness 
Explanation goodness per se was not evaluated. Researchers examined 
what model criteria are important to users in interactive music 
performance systems. Evaluation criteria were  correctness, cost, 
decision boundary shape, label confidence and posterior shape, and 
complexity and unexpectedness 
Evaluation of Mental 
Models 
User mental models were not evaluated for soundness. 
Performance (Task or 
Evaluation Measure) 
Human-machine performance was measured by the users via direct 
evaluation criteria and subjective evaluation criteria. 
Trust/Reliance 
Measures 
Trust and reliance were not evaluated. 
 
 
Authors Goguen et al., 1983 
AI System  The BLAH explanation system. 
Research Participants Indirectly, via the analysis of transcripts. 
Explanation Interface Tree structures of statements and justifications; 
Three explanation sources (i.e., Watergate transcripts, interview of 
participants' career choice, interview of income tax preparation, 
Explanation Form Linguistic unit whose overt structure consists of statement(s) to be 
justified; 
Tree structure of statements and justifications ("reasons"). 
Study  Design or 
Comparison Made 
Three types of justification: giving a reason, giving examples, and 
eliminating alternatives. Analysis of dialog structures, in the form of a 
transformational grammar. 
Manipulation of 
Explanation Goodness 
Not evaluated. 
Evaluation of Mental 
Models 
Evaluated in the sense of being a naturalistic investigation of argument 
(embeddings) structures and dialogs. 
Performance (Task or 
Evaluation Measure) 
Analysis of three examples of human-to-human explanation to reveal 
the various forms of explanation (e.g., a statement followed by a 
reason, such as "I used the tax short form because I didn't have much 
money"). Emphasis is on assessing explanation as a collaborative 
dialog. 
Trust/Reliance 
Measures 
Not evaluated. 
Purpose is to support the design of expert systems with better artificial 
reasoning and explanation capabilities. 
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Authors de Greef and Neerincx, 1995 
AI System  The statistics program HOMALS and a mock-up of a decision aid. 
Research Participants Twenty novice to apprentice HOMALS users, plus experts (number 
unspecified) to develop the task model. 
Explanation Interface “Aiding” interfaces identify the knowledge a user lacks, and present 
contextually relevant information to fill this gap when/if it is needed. 
What information is provided as aiding is determined via procedural 
task knowledge obtained from human experts. 
Explanation Form Has accompanying statistical scatterplots that show the data being 
statistically analyzed, but these are not key to the explanations. 
Interface includes a text window which displays the aiding information 
in a written form. 
Manipulation of 
Explanation 
Goodness 
Not evaluated, but it is argued that the best way to develop task models 
is to study the performance and reasoning of experts. Interviews were 
conducted to derive the "expert task model." 
Evaluation of Mental 
Models 
Argue that user experience and knowledge must be considered in the 
design of explanation systems. 
Performance (Task or 
Evaluation Measure) 
Using a mock-up of the statistical analysis program, HOMALS, 
participants had to modify the depiction of data sets so as to answer 
questions that were asked of the data. Main measure was correctness of 
the imposed data transformations. Performance of introductory statistics 
students was not affected by the aiding system.  
Partitipants whose knowledge of statistics was somewhat greater than 
introductory level performed better and learned more.  
Trust/Reliance 
Measures 
Broad goal is is to create a comprehensive method for designing 
interfaces. Using experts, one develops the "aiding functions" that 
would make the interface easy to learn and use. Iterate and assess the 
interface redesign and the aiding functions (usability analysis).   
 
 
Authors Groce et al., 2014 
AI System  The system is designed to be able to interactively assist users in the 
detection of faults in machine learning classifiers.  
Research Participants 48 university students with little-to-no background in computer science, 
Explanation Interface Interactive GUI incorporating textual and graphical information, 
Explanation Form Explanations communicate classifier prioritization strategies to users via 
small graphical or numerical icons. 
Study Design or 
Comparison Made 
All participants received four experimental conditions: one control, and 
one for each of the system’s three prioritization methods, 
Manipulation of 
Explanation 
Goodness 
Explanations were evaluated for goodness based on human-machine 
performance (below) relative to the control. 
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Evaluation of Mental 
Models 
Not evaluated. 
Performance (Task or 
Evaluation Measure) 
Human-machine performance evaluated based on 1) the ability of users 
to find classifier faults; 2) the efficiency of user test coverage; and 3) 
subjective user attitudes toward the system. 
Trust/Reliance 
Measures 
Not evaluated. 
 
 
Authors Herlocker et al., 2000 
AI System  The system provides explanatory interfaces to justify the black-box 
decisions made by movie recommendation systems (namely, 
MovieLens). 
Research Participants Experiment 1 used 78 participants selected from the userbase of the 
MovieLens online movie recommendation system; Experiment 2 used 
210 participants from the same pool of users. 
Explanation Interface Explanations delivered to users via the MovieLens website GUI. 
Explanation Form Twenty-one different types (or elements) of explanations, including 
textual, graphical, and numerical information (see Table 1 in the paper 
for more details). 
Study Design or 
Comparison Made 
Experiment 1 was a randomized block design, where blocks were users 
and the treatments were the different forms of explanation; Experiment 
2 divided participants into 7 groups (two controls with no explanations, 
and five others each with different types of explanations). 
Manipulation of 
Explanation 
Goodness 
Evaluated in Experiment 1 by presenting to users different explanations 
for the same movie recommendation and seeing which explanations 
most increased user likelihood to see the movie, 
Evaluation of Mental 
Models 
Discussed but not evaluated. 
Performance (Task or 
Evaluation Measure) 
Human-machine performance was evaluated in Experiment 2 by 
measuring filtering performance (percent of correct decisions made by 
users). 
Trust/Reliance 
Measures 
Not evaluated. 
 
 
Authors Kass & Finin, 1988 
AI System  The system, GUMAC, operates in tandem with interactive advisory 
expert systems to build user models representing the user’s domain 
knowledge. 
Research Participants 2 users cases with varying knowledge of the domain. 
Explanation Interface Not explicated, but likely to be a purely text-based dialogue system. 
Explanation Form No explanations given. 
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Study Design or 
Comparison Made 
No research design presented. The only difference between the two 
users is their level of domain knowledge. 
Manipulation of 
Explanation 
Goodness 
Discussed but not evaluated. 
Evaluation of Mental 
Models 
GUMAC produces representations of user mental models, but the work 
does not empirically evaluate them. 
Performance (Task or 
Evaluation Measure) 
Not evaluated. 
Trust/Reliance 
Measures 
Not evaluated. 
 
 
Authors Kim et al., 2015 
AI System  The system is an inference algorithm that generates plans from the 
conversations of human planners. It specifically caters to deploying 
autonomous systems in time-critical domains (where speech data may 
be scarce and noisy) and makes use of a hybrid probabilistic and 
logical method for plan generation to compensate for the poor data 
quality. 
Research Participants Participants were 46 Mechanical Turkers. They were divided into 
pairs. 
Explanation Interface No explanations (the paper simply describes an algorithm). 
Explanation Form No explanations. 
Study Design or 
Comparison Made 
Three conditions were compared: 1) perfect PDDL (plan validator) 
files; 2) perfect domain file, but problem file has some missing 
information; 3) perfect problem file, but domain file has some missing 
information; and 4) no PDDL files. 
Manipulation of 
Explanation 
Goodness 
Not evaluated. 
Evaluation of Mental 
Models 
Not evaluated. 
Performance (Task or 
Evaluation Measure) 
Participants' task was to validate the performance of the plan with a 
metric of 83% accuracy. The algorithm's performance evaluated in 
terms of: 
1) task allocation accuracy (the system’s ability to infer what aspects 
of the plan are to be retained and what aspects should be rejected);  
2) plan sequencing accuracy (the system’s ability to correctly order 
plan subcomponents); and  
3) overall plan accuracy (arithmetic mean of the two other metrics). 
Trust/Reliance 
Measures 
Not evaluated. 
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Authors Kulesza, et al., 2010 
AI System  The system works to debug machine-learned programs by exchanging 
explanations with its user, such that the explanation the system gives 
describes how the program arrived to an incorrect solution, and the 
user uses this to explain in-turn where the program went wrong. The 
specific domain focus here is in transcript coding (hereafter just called 
“coding”). 
Research Participants Study 1 used nine psychology and HCI students with some experience 
programming, but no experience in machine learning; Study 2 used 74 
local students and nearby residents with neither experience in machine 
learning nor (except one person) programming. 
Explanation Interface Explanations were delivered in Study 1 via paper printouts of a coded 
transcript which had been annotated with explanations. In Study 2, 
explanations were delivered via a GUI prototype. Explanations detail 
program logic (in lieu of source code) and runtime data; user interacts 
with explanations to verify that the system logic is correct. 
Explanation Form Heavy use of graphs and charts to summarize summaries of runtime 
output (via charts).  
Explanations in Study 1 were textual annotations explaining what 
semantic info was most influential in performing a text-categorization 
task. In Study 2, explanations generated by the system were graphical 
summaries of run-time output and visual highlighting of segments or 
words in the transcript. 
Study Design or 
Comparison Made 
Study 1 involved no software, but Study 2 involved the software 
prototype. Study 2 isolated the impact of explanations about logic and 
those about runtime output by having four different versions of the 
prototype software (one control, one with logic explanations, one with 
runtime explanations, and one with logic and runtime explanations) 
and recording how participant performance varied depending on which 
version was used to debug. 
Manipulation of 
Explanation 
Goodness 
Study 1 does not touch on this. In Study 2, the effectiveness of 
explanations was evaluated based on: 1) objective improvement of the 
accuracy of the program (before the system-aided debugging vs. after 
the debugging), and 2) based on participant attitudes towards the 
system (what types of debugging aid they thought were most useful). 
Evaluation of Mental 
Models 
Study 1 explored how users reason about and correct a text-
classification program; how explanations might influence users' 
existing mental model; participant attitudes toward explanatory 
debugging; how user mental models are observed to flexibly 
accommodate new information as it is presented to them via 
explanations, thus becoming more complex as the user internalizes the 
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system’s logical process. Study #2 does not touch on this. 
Performance (Task or 
Evaluation Measure) 
Asked whether explanatory debugging works, exposing a learned 
program's logic to end users and for eliciting user corrections to 
improve the program's predictions and enable end users to debug 
learned programs via a Natural Programming methodology. Human 
performance in Study #1 was measured by the degree by which users’ 
mental models grow to incorporate system logic after explanations. 
Human-machine performance in Study 2 was measured by the degree 
by which system accuracy improves due to the interactive debugging. 
Trust/Reliance 
Measures 
Trust and reliance were not evaluated. 
 
 
Authors Kulesza, Burnett et al., 2011 
AI System  WYSIWYT/ML (What You See Is What You Test for Machine 
Learning). The system (1) advises the user about which predictions to 
test, then (2) contributes more tests “like” the user’s, (3) measures how 
much of the assistant’s reasoning has been tested, and (4) continually 
monitors over time whether previous testing still “covers” new 
behaviors the assistant has learned. 
Research Participants Forty-eight university students. 
Explanation Interface Why-oriented approach: explains system logic/state and provides a 
debugging mechanism which allows an end user to directly influence 
system behavior; examination of barriers to user efficacy in the context 
of such a system. 
Explanation Form Pie chart depicts the Confidence of the intelligent assistant in its 
classifications, aligned with a list of the possible classifications.  
A different window showed “oddball” messages—those least similar to 
the messages that the assistant has learned from (Similarity). A 
numerical widget showed the number of relevant words (0 to 20) to 
explain the reason for the priority assigned to the message (relevance).  
The interface features were designed so as to satisfy the goodness 
criteria (see below). 
Study Design or 
Comparison Made 
Study is essentially a test of method for end users to assess whether and 
when to rely on their intelligent assistants. Primary task of the 
intelligent assistant is to determine the major topic of messages (cars, 
computers, religion), using a support vector mechanism. (trained to 
85% correct performance). In a counterbalanced within-subject design, 
participants worked on message classification (200 messages in total) 
with the interface showing one of three widgets on each trial, either 
confidence, similarity or relevance, or none of these (control condition). 
Manipulation of 
Explanation 
WYSIWYT/ML prioritizes the intelligent assistant’s topic predictions 
that are most likely to be wrong, based on the assistant’s certainty that 
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Goodness the topic it predicted is correct. Researchers relied on "cognitive 
dimensions": The user should not have to manually track or compute 
things. There should not be hidden dependencies. Users should not 
have to make a decision before they have information about the 
decision’s consequences. the interface should allow users to annotate, 
change the screen layout, and communicate informally with themselves 
or with other users.  Users should be able to see how a component 
relates to the whole. "This was initially a problem for our priority 
widget because it had too many roles: a single widget communicated 
the priority of assessing the message, explained why it had that 
priority, and how the message had been assessed—all in one small 
icon. Thus, we changed the prototype so that no widget had more than 
one role." 
Evaluation of Mental 
Models 
User mental models were not evaluated directly. 
Performance (Task 
or Evaluation 
Measure) 
WYSIWYT/ML helped end users find software assistants' mistakes 
significantly more effectively than ad hoc testing (i.e., serendipitous 
discovery or "gut instincts").  
Participants found significantly more incorrect classifcations when they 
could see the Confidence widget. 
Trust/Reliance 
Measures 
Study is essentially a test of method for end users to assess whether and 
when to rely on their intelligent assistants. 
Participants reported greater satisfaction from using the explanation 
widgets.  Using the explanation widgets enabled participants to get 
through more of the 200 test messages. 
 
 
Authors Kulesza, Stumpf et al., 2011; Stumpf et al., 2007 
AI System  Bayesian classification algorithm for text classification. 
Research Participants Twenty-two college students. 
Explanation Interface Text-based with pull-down menu options and histobar figures showing 
feature weights. 
Explanation Form Interactive explanations are intended to serve as a means of supporting 
the debugging of machine-learned logic (intelligent assistants).  
Explanation is regarded as a dialog, in which users can ask why 
questions about machine decisions, receive explanations of the 
machine's logic and execution state (i.e., local explanations), and 
change the explanations by direct manipulation, to see how the 
machine's determinations change. 
A generative grammar was used to generate questions, that operated 
over a restricted ontology (words, messages, files, folders). The range 
of possibilities was reduced to nine: Why was <message> filed to 
<folder>? Why wouldn't the [message] be filed to [folder]? Why does 
181	XAI	Literature	Review		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 p.			
[word] matter to the [folder]?, etc.  Answers were expressed relative to 
the intelligent assistant's logic. 
Histobar diagram shows the importance of features to the given 
classification. 
Study Design or 
Comparison Made 
Think aloud task in which pairs of participants collaborated. in the 
classification of email messages. Protocols were analyzed using a 
particular coding scheme that referenced the sorts of cognitive 
difficulties people encounter while debugging programs (Ko, et al., 
2004). 
Manipulation of 
Explanation 
Goodness 
Not explicitly evaluated, though the work ins premised on notions of 
what counts as a good explanation in this domain. "[Answers to] Why-
questions of statistical machine learning systems to clarify 
the program’s current behavior provide faithful explanations of the 
current logic in terms of representations of the current source code and 
execution state of the program... These answers can help the end user 
debug intelligent assistants" (p. 46). 
Evaluation of Mental 
Models 
Analysis of the protocols focused on the kinds of cognitive barriers 
participants encountered, statements about the information that would 
help them when in a given barrier situation (e.g., "Why didn't it do x?"), 
and the kinds of queries they entered into the system about the system's 
classifications. 
Performance (Task 
or Evaluation 
Measure) 
Participants had to evaluate the categorizations made by the intelligent 
assistant with regard to the folders to which messages were assigned. 
User changes to the displayed  debugging features would cause the 
classifier to recalculate its predictions. 
Trust/Reliance 
Measures 
Results include a thorough listing of the kinds of questions that users 
asked that relate to system usefulness, usability, and trust/reliance.  
Examples are:  Can we do this quicker?,  Can the system handle 
phrases?,  Why are more messages being filed to [folder]? Was our past 
action wrong? 
 
 
Authors Kulesza et al., 2012 
AI System  Music recommender system that emulates an adaptable internet radio 
station hat allows users to create custom "stations" and personalize their 
preferences.  Database of 36,000 songs. 
Research Participants Sixty-two university students; little or no prior computer experience. 
Explanation Interface Users can provide feedback about particular songs ("debugging"). 
Feedback could be with respect to such factors as song tempo and song 
popularity, artist similarity. Interactivity is suggestive of the notion of 
explanation as a human-machine dialog. 
Explanation Form Aural tutorial on the internal functional and structural workings of the 
agent’s reasoning.  Structural information can be considered global 
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whereas the functional information and examples could be considered 
local. 
 
Study Design or 
Comparison Made 
Two groups, received either No Scaffolding or Scaffolding. Scaffolding 
was a 15-minute tutorial on how the recommender worked. It included 
illustrated examples of how the recommender determined artist 
similarity, the types of acoustic features the recommender “knows” 
about, and how it extracts this information from audio files. 
Manipulation of 
Explanation 
Goodness 
Scaffolding versus No Scaffolding conditions. 
Evaluation of Mental 
Models 
The research focus was on the effects of mental model soundness. A 
questionnaire was used to evaluate participant mental models.  It 
includes specific scenarios and required participants to say which 
action they would take (e.g., "How would you align the recommender 
to your preference for the Beatles?"). The questionnaire was 
administered after the initial instructions and after a five day period 
during which participants used the recommender system. The group 
receiving the scaffolding performed significantly better on both 
administrations of the comprehension test.  On Day 1, the group not 
receiving the scaffolding was less certain that they understood how the 
system recommended songs. Neither group showed much change in 
mental models comparing Day 1 and Day 5. Therefore, a good initial 
instruction during the instructional phase of the study can be sufficient 
to engender good mental models. Comparing mental model soundness 
to debugging performance, participants whose mental models improved 
the most reported that the effort of debugging was significantly more 
worthwhile than participants whose mental models improved less, or 
not at all. 
Performance (Task 
or Evaluation 
Measure) 
Performance on the test scenarios presented in the comprehension 
questionnaire (number of correct actions chosen).  
Counts of the number of debugging interactions, interaction time, and 
cost/benefit (judgments of the effort required to debug the 
recommender). 
Trust/Reliance 
Measures 
Participants were asked about their satisfaction with the system, on Day 
5.  Participants whose mental model soundness increased comparing 
Day 1 to Day 5 showed greater satisfaction with the recommender 
system.  Conversely, Participants whose mental model soundness 
decreased comparing Day 1 to Day 5 showed the least satisfaction. 
“The idea is great to be able to ‘set my preferences’, but if the 
computer continues to play what I would call BAD musical choices—
I’d prefer the predictability of using Pandora.” 
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Authors Kulesza et al., 2013 
AI System  Intelligent agent was developed to make personalized song 
recommendations, complete with explanations describing why each 
song is recommended. 
Research Participants The participants were 17 individuals (ages 19-34) sourced from the 
local community, none of whom had a background in computer 
science. 
Explanation Interface Explanations which seek to aid a user in debugging a machine learning 
recommendation system. Emphasis was on soundness vs. completeness 
of explanations 
Explanation Form Explanations were presented to users via paper handouts bearing 
textual statements of system logic. 
Explanations contained graphical, textual, and tabular data.  Heavy use 
of graphs and charts. 
Study Design or 
Comparison Made 
Four different treatment conditions were presented to participants in a 
between-subjects design: 1) high-soundness high-completeness, 2) 
high-soundness 3) low-completeness, medium-soundness medium-
completeness, and 4) low-soundness high-completeness. 
Manipulation of 
Explanation 
Goodness 
Explanation goodness was evaluated on the criterion that, if an 
explanation is superior, then it would  positively impact a user’s mental 
model. Goodness was described in terms of soundness and 
completeness. 
Evaluation of Mental 
Models 
Mental models were evaluated for soundness through a scoring method, 
such that each participant’s mental model score was the number of 
correct minus the number of incorrect statements they made about the 
system during the study and on a post-study questionnaire. 
Performance (Task 
or Evaluation 
Measure) 
Measured time-to-learn and overall accuracy based on the 
aforementioned mental model scores. 
Trust/Reliance 
Measures 
Trust in the AI was evaluated by questioning participants on their 
opinions of the soundness and completeness of the system’s 
explanations, and using the results to create trust scores that could be 
associated with each treatment.  HH (high-soundness, high-
completeness) participants trusted their explanations more than 
participants in other treatment conditions. 
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Authors Kulesza et al., 2015; see also Kulesza et al., 2010; Kulesza, Stumpf  
et al., 2011. 
AI System  Test classification system using Bayesian methods. 
Research Participants Seventy-seven participants, university students and individuals from 
the general population.  All reported little or no prior experience in 
software debugging or machine learning. 
Explanation Interface Histobar graph interface shows the user which text features were most 
important to the classification and a pie chart showing the probability 
that the classifier's classification is correct. 
Explanation Form In explanatory debugging the participants could correct the learning 
system and observe the results.  This is suggestive of the notion of 
explanation as exploration. "To enable an iterative cycle of 
explanations between the system and the user, in Explanatory 
Debugging the machine-to-user explanation should also serve as the 
user-to-machine explanation" (p. 128).  An aspect of explanatory 
debugging is reversibility,  through which the user can engage in 
"self-directed tinkering." 
Study Design or 
Comparison Made 
Explanation versus No Explanation conditions.  the initial instructions 
did not explain how the classifier made predictions. 
Manipulation of 
Explanation 
Goodness 
Good explanations are assumed to be iterative (that is, learned), 
truthful,  complete (but not overwhelming), and actionable. 
Evaluation of Mental 
Models 
The researchers emphasize the relation of explanation goodness to the 
formation of valid, rich and useful mental models. After the 
debugging task, participants were presented a set of messages and 
were asked to predict how the classifier would classify each of them, 
and explain why. The test messages were designed such that only one 
feature was important to the classification, such as an obvious feature 
or a subtle feature. Participants shown the explanations (during the 
debugging task) identified more of the subtle features that the 
classifier would use to make its classifications (in the mental models 
task). 
Performance (Task or 
Evaluation Measure) 
Participants could add features to the classification scheme, remove 
features or adjust features' importance. Participants in the Explanation 
condition understood how the classifier operated about 50% better 
than control participants. Participants in the Explanation condition 
made fewer changes to the feature system but the changes they did 
make were more effective (greater improvements in the classifer's 
performance; 10% improvement overall). "... many control 
participants’ requested explanations similar to those the treatment 
participants saw suggests the need for machine learning systems to 
be able to explain their reasoning" (p. 135).  Explanatory debugging 
is more effective than simply being shown the features that a 
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classifier uses to classify instances.  
Trust/Reliance 
Measures 
Nor directly evaluated. 
 
 
Authors Lamberti and Wallace, 1990 
AI System  Expert system designed to assist programmers in performing their job-
related diagnostic duties in resolving technical issues in hardware or 
software. 
Research Participants Ninety novice to expert (practicing professional) diagnostic 
programmers.  
Explanation Interface Declarative vs. procedural textual explanations. Participants could view 
problems at a high/abstract level and then subsequently refine to see 
finer detail. 
Explanation Form Declarative explanation/summary of the problem and procedural/rule-
based explanation of how to fix it. 
Study Design or 
Comparison Made 
Independent variables were task uncertainty, user expertise, knowledge 
presentation format (declarative vs. procedural), knowledge 
organization (do problems require abstract vs. concrete knowledge?), 
and decision-making procedures. 
Goals of the study were to (1) examine employee satisfaction with the 
system interface, functions, and capabilities; 
(2) assess the knowledge presentation formats (e.g., procedural vs. 
declarative) in diagnostic expert systems used for diagnostic problem 
solving; (3) examine the effect of task uncertainty on problem-solving 
and decision-making (speed and accuracy). 
Manipulation of 
Explanation 
Goodness 
Performance differences in the two types of explanations (procedural, 
declarative) are evaluated based on question-answering time, query 
time, and accuracy. The relationship between explanation goodness and 
user skill level and task uncertainty was also evaluated. 
Evaluation of Mental 
Models 
Self-report questionnaire to assess knowledge required for answering 
abstract vs. concrete questions, knowledge presentation format, and 
task uncertainty (high vs. low). It is argued that the user performance 
and confidence dependent variables may be indicative of stronger 
internalization of the system’s processes.  
Performance 
Evaluation 
Human performance was measured in terms of participant scores for 
time (subcategories: problem-solving, question-answering, and 
decision-making time) and accuracy. 
Trust/Reliance 
Measures 
Trust in the AI was evaluated using participant ratings of their 
confidence in the accuracy of the system’s recommendations, 
satisfaction with the system recommendations, lines of reasoning, and 
action plan decisions. 
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Authors Lerch et al., 1997 
AI System  Does not present an AI system.  
Research Participants Experiment 1 had 92; Experiment 2 had 44; Experiment 3 67; 
Experiment 4 had 63; all participants were Carnegie Mellon 
undergraduates, and no participant took part in more than one of these 
experiments 
Explanation Interface PC program which displayed problems, advice, and sometimes advice 
rationale, and also allowed the user to provide ratings  
Explanation Form Experiment 3: Explanations were textual in either prose or rule-based 
format. No other experiment involved explanations. 
Study Design or 
Comparison Made 
Experiment 1: Each participant (randomly) assigned to one of three 
treatments (recommendations attributed to an expert system, human 
expert, or human novice); Experiment 2: Same as Experiment 1, 
except no human novice treatment group; Experiment 3: Each 
participant assigned to one of three treatments (ES-attributed advice 
with no explanations, prose explanations, or rule explanations); 
Experiment 4: Each participant assigned to one of two treatments 
(knowledge-linked vs. performance-linked descriptions of the ES-
attributed advice). 
Manipulation of 
Explanation 
Goodness 
Experiment 3 was the only experiment touching on this. It evaluated 
explanations based on 1) user agreement with the ES-attributed advice 
given the different explanatory modes, and 2) user confidence in ES-
attributed advice. 
Evaluation of Mental 
Models 
Not evaluated. 
Performance (Task or 
Evaluation Measure) 
Not evaluated. 
Trust/Reliance 
Measures 
Trust was measured subjectively and quantitatively with 1) user 
agreement (source “predictability”); 2) user confidence (source 
“dependability”); and 3) by examining the causal effects users 
attributed to the advice given by the source (such as ability, effort, 
task difficulty, and luck). 
 
 
Authors Lim  & Dey, 2009; Lim et al., 2009 
AI System  The AI is a decision aid used for the task of Intensive Care Unit 
patient diagnosis. It was primarily implemented to provide empirical 
support for the novel framework presented in this paper, i.e., Context-
aware intelligent systems. Makes use of four context-aware 
applications which function via environmental triggers: 1) an instant 
messenger plugin which predicts user response time; 2) a program 
capable of inferring the current status of remote elderly family 
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members; 3) a program which gives reminders; and 4) a program 
which gives users (tourism) attraction recommendations. 
Research Participants Different age groups with education levels ranged from high school to 
post-graduate degree. Experiment 1 used 250 people from Mechanical 
Turk; Experiment 2 used 610 people from Mechanical Turk. The 
participants included the “co-designers”-- 14 clinicians employed at a 
local hospital.  
Explanation Interface The interface was a GUI that allows users to view a myriad of 
statistics about patients as well as the system’s diagnosis and the 
explanations thereof. The applications do not give explanations. In 
Experiment 2, researchers produced questions and corresponding 
explanations for each application. It is likely that the interface for this 
was web-based GUI. Experiment 1 provides no explanations. 
Explanation Form Explanations came in textual, graphical, and tabular forms. 
Study Design or 
Comparison Made 
Experiment 1 divided participants into four groups based on which AI 
system they would be working with. Experiment 2 divided participants 
into 12 groups: 1 control (no question/explanation) and 11 conditions 
which each presented questions/explanations of a different type. 
Manipulation of 
Explanation 
Goodness 
Evaluated in Experiment 2 through measuring the effect of 
explanations on user-reported attitudes about satisfaction with the 
program and usefulness of explanation. Explanations were not 
quantitatively evaluated, but qualitative reports from participants were 
used to evaluate explanation strategies to limit user biases and 
moderate user trust. 
Evaluation of Mental 
Models 
Mental models were not evaluated. 
Performance (Task or 
Evaluation Measure) 
Human performance was not directly assessed. 
Trust/Reliance 
Measures 
Discussed by not evaluated. 
 
 
Authors Murphy, 1990 
AI System  Production copy of an expert system based on financial accounting 
standards, designed to help accounting firms evaluate the compliance 
of loan providers.   
The expert system was likely rule-based. 
Research Participants Sixty-four students in a level accounting course (juniors and seniors).  
Explanation Interface Not described. 
Explanation Form Presumably text but how it was generated and displayed are not 
described in the report. 
Study Design or 
Comparison Made 
Three treatment groups: expert system with explanations, expert system 
without explanations, and a non-automated practice aid as a control 
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group.  
The non-automated practice aid was a text-based and abbreviated 
procedural guide, also based on the compliance standards.  
Study looked at the effect of expert system use on the ability of novices 
to classify a client-proposed accounting treatment, and transfer their 
knowledge to a new situation. 
Manipulation of 
Explanation 
Goodness 
Not evaluated in this study. 
Evaluation of Mental 
Models 
Measure of the development of knowledge ("semantic memory") of the 
accounting standards, based on a post-test and performance on a test 
case after completing the experimental (learning) trials, in which 
participants had to either agree or disagree with a decision made about 
the loan, which itself could be correct or incorrect. 
Performance (Task 
or Evaluation 
Measure) 
Participants had to evaluate the compliance of loans with accounting 
standards.  
The expert system led the participant through the evidence-gathering 
process and presented its determination for each loan transaction. 
There was also an assessment of learning transfer, involving the 
analysis of a lease transaction. 
Performance on the post test (knowledge test) was actually greater for 
the participants in the non-automated practice aid than participants in 
the expert system groups, including the group that saw the 
explanations.  
Performance on the transfer test as greater for the expert systems 
groups. 
The researchers conclude that expert systems created for commercial 
use may not be viable pedagogical tools in hat they may not impart 
knowledge or reasoning strategies. 
Trust/Reliance 
Measures 
Not evaluated in this study. 
 
 
Authors Narayana et al., 2018 
AI System  Artificial task and a simple decision model. 
Research Participants 600 Mechanical Turkers. 
Explanation Interface Explanations were human-generated but "could have been machine 
generated" given their form. 
  Decision sets:  
In one experiment, rules for when the "alien" is happy or sad given 
various combinations of setting and meal ingredients. 
In another experiment rules for when one or another drug is appropriate 
for an "alien" given the alien's symptoms. 
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Example 
1. Alien is checking the news or is coughing implies the weather is 
windy. 
2. Snowing or humid and weekend implies alien prefers spices or 
vegetables and grains. 
Study Design or 
Comparison Made 
Six experiments in total. 
The independent variables all involved the complexity of a set of 
decision rules: 
Explanation size - the number of terms and rules in the decision sets, 
Presence/absence of new decision chunks - concepts that added to a 
decision set (e.g., "windy weather," alien is "coughing"), 
Repeated or not repeated terms in a decision set. 
Manipulation of 
Explanation 
Goodness 
Explanation goodness was not evaluated but participants gave ratings 
of their satisfaction with each decision set. The ratings task is in some 
places called "explanation quality" and in some places called 
"satisfaction." 
Evaluation of Mental 
Models Mental models were not directly evaluated. 
Performance (Task 
or Evaluation 
Measure) 
In one experiment, participants were presented with case information 
consisting of setting (weather), the alien's meal preferences (list of 
ingredients) as provided by a machine learning system.  Participants' 
task was to predict whether an alien would be happy or sad with a meal, 
given the list of ingredients and the setting conditions. 
In a second experiment, user task was to judge whether a given drug 
was appropriate for the alien given the symptoms, i.e., "is the alien 
happy with the prescription." 
Response time and accuracy were the primary measures. "Accuracy" 
was whether the response was consistent with the input and the 
explanation. 
Overall results were increased explanation length resulted in lower 
accuracy, longer response time, and lower ratings of explanation 
quality. 
Trust/Reliance 
Measures 
Trust/reliance were not directly evaluated. The rating of explanation 
quality is also sometimes referred to as "subjective satisfaction." 
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Authors Pacer et al. 2013 
AI System  The paper describes four Bayesian network methods for 
computationally modelling explanation: Most Probable Explanation 
(MPE), Most Relevant Explanation (MRE), Explanatory Tree (ET), 
and CET (Causal Explanatory Tree). These methods were evaluated by 
human users. 
Research Participants Experiment 1 recruited 188 participants from Mechanical Turk (though 
only 109 participants were used in analysis), and most of these 
participants were male. Experiment 2 recruited 245 participants from 
Mechanical Turk (but only 165 were retained), and most of these 
participants were male. 
Explanation Interface In Experiment 1, participants provided explanations for an observed 
effect. These explanations were then coded. In Experiment 2, 
participants received explanations via an interface that allowed them to 
manipulate a slider whose value corresponded to their rating of the 
value of the explanation. 
Explanation Form In both experiments, explanations were textual in nature, and their 
content focused on providing the “single best explanation” (which may 
include multiple causal factors) for an observed effect. 
Study Design or 
Comparison Made 
Both experiments had two crossed conditions to which participants 
were randomly assigned.  Conditions were Pearl versus Circuit types of 
Bayesian networks, and two different topical scenarios (novel diseases 
vs. lake ecology).  
Manipulation of 
Explanation 
Goodness 
Though explanations were evaluated in this experiment, the primary 
purpose of the research was to evaluate the effectiveness of the four 
Bayesian models enumerated above. See Performance for more details. 
Evaluation of Mental 
Models 
Not evaluated. 
Performance (Task or 
Evaluation Measure) 
Experiment 1 evaluated the explanation quality of participant-
generated explanations. These explanations were evaluated for each of 
the four Bayesian models. Those models that ranked highest were said 
to be more effective models. 
Experiment 2 allowed participants to evaluate explanations on a 
continuous scale (from “very bad” to “very good”). The four models 
were then evaluated based on a metric of how many of each model’s 
top-k explanations match the top-k explanation rankings of the average 
participant. 
Trust/Reliance 
Measures 
Not evaluated. 
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Authors Poursabzi-Sangdeh et al. (2018) 
AI System  Weighted model for predicting the prices of rental apartments. 
Research Participants 1250 Mechanical Turkers. 
Explanation Interface Explanations per se were not provided.  Rather , the models were made 
more or less "transparent" by providing data on fewer or more 
apartment features, and indications of which features were most 
important in the models' analyses. 
Explanation Form Data tables showing such things as number of rooms days on the 
market, square footage. 
Presenting more data (data "transparency") hampered participants' 
ability to notice apartment anomalous features and correct a model's 
inaccurate predictions. 
Study Design or 
Comparison Made 
Four models shown in a within-subjects design: Number of features (2 
versus 8 features) and feature visibility (feature weights shown or not 
shown), all versus No Model baseline condition. 
Manipulation of 
Explanation 
Goodness 
Not evaluated. 
Evaluation of Mental 
Models 
Evaluation confidence judgments. 
Performance (Task 
or Evaluation 
Measure) 
Guess of the model's predictions and subject's prediction of the prices 
of apartments. 
Drawing attention to the apartment's anomalous features resulted in 
predictions better enabled the participants to correct the models' 
mistakes by adjusting their own predictions.  
Trust/Reliance 
Measures 
Some trials portrayed apartments with anomalously high numbers of 
rooms; visibility of the feature weights had no impact.  Result was 
counterintuitive. 
In a separate experiment, participants were told that the predictions 
came from a human expert. There were no significant differences. 
 
 
Authors Ribiero et al. 2016 
AI System  The system, LIME, works alongside existing classifiers to provide 
explanations for the classifiers’ predictions in a way that is: 1) model-
agnostic (the type of classifier does not matter); 2) locally faithful 
(explains local—but not necessarily global—classifier behaviors); and 
3) interpretable (relates inputs and outputs in a way humans can 
understand). Two versions of LIME were explored: random pick (RP) 
and submodular pick (SP), each of which alter the method used to 
select instances to show to the user. 
Research Participants The paper includes several simulated-user studies that of course involve 
no human participants. In the three human-subjects experimental 
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settings, there are at least 100, at least 15, and exactly 27 participants 
respectively from Mechanical Turk. In the last setting, subjects were 
graduate students who have taken at least one graduate course in 
machine learning; in the other two settings, participants are 
inexperienced with machine learning. 
Explanation Interface For the first two human-subjects experimental settings, explanations are 
presented alongside the classifier’s prediction and the supporting raw 
data from the classified document. In the first setting, the user may 
interact with this interface by selecting the best algorithm out of 
several. In the second, the user is shown only one algorithm, and 
interacts with the system by selecting words to delete from the 
classifier. In the final setting, the exact interface is not clear but it 
allows for the display of classifier predictions—with or without side-
by-side explanations—and modules for the user to answer questions. 
Explanation Form For the first two human-subjects experimental settings, explanations 
were bar charts that indicated the relative importance of words (present 
in the classified text) in terms of their contribution to the classifier’s 
prediction. These explanations occurred alongside the source text in 
which these words are present to give context. In the second setting, 
explanations are graphical, and indicate which pixels of an image the 
classifier used as evidence for its decision. 
Study Design or 
Comparison Made 
The human-subjects experiment involves three settings, each designed 
to answer a specific research question. These questions are: 1) Can 
LIME’s explanations help users decide which classifier generalizes 
better? 2) Can users improve untrustworthy classifiers through feature 
engineering using LIME? and 3) Can LIME’s explanations assist in the 
identification of the presence of undesirable correlations in a classifier 
(and thus measure the degree to which the model should actually be 
trusted)?  
Manipulation of 
Explanation 
Goodness 
With regard to whether LIME’s explanations could help users decide 
which classifier generalizes better, the evaluation was based on the 
number of times users correctly chose the more generalizable classifier 
(more correct means better explanations). With regard to whether users 
could improve untrustworthy classifiers through feature engineering, 
participants took turns removing words from the classifier, and after 
each such interaction the classifier was retrained and applied to data to 
detrmine its accuracy. The more the classifier improved over the course 
of the interactions, the better the explanations. With regard to whether 
LIME’s explanations could asssist in the identification of the presence 
of undesirable correlations in a classifier  the researchers evaluated the 
ability of users to correctly identify features in the classifier that were 
biased/untrustworthy before and after receiving explanations. 
Evaluation of Mental Not evaluated. 
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Models 
Performance (Task or 
Evaluation Measure) 
Not evaluated. 
Trust/Reliance 
Measures 
Measured in the third human-subjects setting (before and after exposure 
to explanations, but always after viewing classifier predictions) by 
asking each participant if they trusted the model (yes/no implied). 
Participants had to decide whether to trust a prediction, choose between 
models, improve an untrustworthy classifier, identify a trustworthy 
classifier. 
 
Authors Rook & Donnell, 1993 
AI System  An expert system designed specifically as a testbed to: 1) instill a 
certain mental model in its users; 2) independently solve diagnostic 
problems afflicting a hypothetical, simulated space station; and 3) 
provide its user with explanations for how it arrived to its solutions.  
Task context was reactor process control and the evaluation of the 
likelihood of subsystem failures (e.g., in the emergency core cooling 
system of the  control drive hydraulic system). 
Research Participants The participants were 30 undergraduate students with similar 
math/computer science backgrounds. 
Explanation Interface Explanations of the system’s underlying rule-based process were 
encapsulated in an overarching inference network containing nodes that 
could be expanded by the user into specific rules and decisions. Why 
and why-not explanations vs. how-to or what-if explanations were 
shown on a PC, in the task context of explaining a system that 
employed a decision tree algorithm. 
Explanation Form Explanations could be either textual (tracing ES “if…then” logic) or 
graphical (illustrating the relationship between nodes in the ES 
network).Text described the internal logic of the decision tree to explain 
the system in four different ways (Why? Why not? How to? What if?) 
Study Design or 
Comparison Made 
There were six different experimental conditions, observing the 
interaction between the independent variables: user mental models 
(good graphical model, good textual model, poor mental model [the 
control]) and type of ES explanations (textual or graphical, described 
above). 
Manipulation of 
Explanation 
Goodness 
The effectiveness of textual vs. graphical explanations was evaluated 
for understandability and usefulness based on user performance (the 
greater the performance, the more effective the explanations).  
Researchers sought to explore the intelligibility of context-aware 
intelligent systems: what, why, why not, what if, and how to 
Evaluation of Mental 
Models 
Mental models were not evaluated after explanations were given. 
Performance (Task or Human performance was assessed using: 1) a measure of the number of 
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Evaluation Measure) key problem-solving nodes identified successfully; 2) a subjective 
measure indicating subject attitudes towards the ES; and 3) a measure 
of participants’ trajectories through the ES in solving each problem. 
The hypothesis was that explanations would lead to improved user 
understanding, trust, perception, and performance more than having no 
explanations. 
Trust/Reliance 
Measures 
A survey asked users to report their perceptions of the explanations and 
system in terms of understandability, trust and usefulness. 
 
Authors Shafto & Goodman, 2008 
AI System  The system was a computational model of pedagogical reasoning that 
assumed that teachers and learners are rational, and that therefore 
teachers would choose examples that should promote belief in the 
correct hypothesis (i.e., examples are pedagogically sampled). The 
experimental scenario used to test this model is called the rectangle 
game, in which teachers teach learners the shape of an unseen rectangle. 
Research Participants Experiment 1 used 18 participants, and Experiment 2 used 29 
participants. All were University of Louisville undergraduates. 
Explanation Interface The interface for both experiments was run using MATLAB. Teachers 
used the interface to provide explanations by marking them on a grid, 
and learners use it to view explanations and draw inferences about the 
true shape of the rectangle the teacher is trying to describe to them. 
Explanation Form Explanations were participant-generated in Experiment 1. In both 
experiments, explanations consist of marks on a grid. These marks could 
either be labelled as inside the rectangle (“positive”), outside the 
rectangle (“negative”), or (in Experiment 2) unspecified. 
Study Design or 
Comparison Made 
The procedure for Experiment 1 had two steps: The teaching step (in 
which participants trief to explain the shape of a rectangle to a learner by 
indicating only 1-3 points on the screen) and the learning step (in which 
participants attempted to draw the rectangle using teacher explanations). 
Experiment 2 also had two steps. The participants first viewed all 
possible rectangles, then a learning step in which they were shown a set 
of examples and were then to select a subset of the examples to be 
labelled as either inside or outside the rectangle. The participants would 
then draw the rectangle on the screen to indicate its predicted position. 
Manipulation of 
Explanation 
Goodness 
Explanation quality was observed but not evaluated. Teachers tended to 
try to label rectangle points in such a way that would maximize the 
amount of knowledge they could transfer to the learner about the nature 
of the rectangle. Learners behaved differently when they knew the 
information they received is pedagogically oriented. 
Evaluation of Mental 
Models 
Mental models were indirectly evaluated, in the sense that this is a 
pedagogical model which reveals insight into how people learn, teach, 
and reason. The rectangle game was used to compare participants' 
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inferences to statistical, qualitative model predictions and demonstrate 
the important effects of pedagogical situations on learning and reasoning 
Performance (Task or 
Evaluation Measure) 
In Experiment 1, the work is trying to measure how the empirical data 
conforms to the pedagogical model it postulates. For teachers, the 
distribution of positive and negative labels were compared to model 
predictions using Pearson’s r. Learners were evaluated by using chi-
squared to show that inferred rectangles were not randomly positioned, 
and using maximum a posteriori model predictions to measure 
consistency with the pedagogical model. In Experiment 2, the study 
aims to ensure that learners are able to make stronger inferences when 
they know they are receiving pedagogical information; performance 
here is measured using chi-squared and Pearson’s r to show that the 
learners in Experiment 2 chose examples at random and had little 
correlation with model predictions. 
Trust/Reliance 
Measures 
Not evaluated. 
 
 
Authors Shafto et al. 2014 
AI System  Expands on Shafto and Goodman (2008), with additional experiments. 
The system is a computational model of rational pedagogical reasoning. 
Perhaps the most important concept covered is the effects of 
pedagogical vs. non-pedagogical sampling of explanations. Each 
experiment involved a different pedagogical scenario. 
Research Participants Experiment 1 involved 73 undergraduates from the University of 
Louisville; Experiment 2 involved 28 undergraduates from UC Berkeley 
and 84 members of the community around UC Berkeley. Experiment 3 
involved 86 undergraduates from the University of Louisville. 
Explanation Interface The interface for the rectangle game used in Experiment 1 was run using 
MATLAB. Teachers used the interface to provide explanations by 
marking them on a grid, and learners use it to view explanations and 
draw inferences about the true shape of the rectangle the teacher is 
trying to describe to them. 
Experiment 2 employed 27 physical cards to present geometrical 
stimuli, and the participants would assume a teaching role and produce 
explanations. therefore the explanations devised by participants in a 
teaching role.  
In Experiment 3, “teacher” participants produced explanations using a 
GUI that graphically illustrated causal relationships between 
(nonsensical) variables. Participants could interact with this system by 
turning variables on or off and observing the effects the manipulation 
might have on other variables. 
Explanation Form In Experiment 1 explanations were generated by teachers and consisted 
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of marks on a grid. These marks could either be labelled as inside the 
rectangle (“positive”), outside the rectangle (“negative”), or (in 
Experiment 2) unspecified. 
 
In Experiment 2 the explanations generated by the teachers would 
ideally convey the distribution of lines on the full set of 27 cards to a 
learner who could only see three cards. 
 
In Experiment 3 explanations were generated by teachers. Teachers 
selected two variable configurations (“interventions”) to teach learners 
who would only be able to see the causal relationships the interventions 
include. 
Study Design or 
Comparison Made 
Experiment 1 had participants play the rectangle game, in one of three 
conditions: 1) Teaching-Pedagogical Learning (teaching and learning 
from a teacher), Pedagogical Learning (observing model hypotheses and 
learning from a teacher), and Non-Pedagogical Learning (observing 
model hypotheses and learning without a teacher). 
Experiment 2 divided participants into teachers and learners. It then 
assigned learners into one of four conditions: 1) explanations sampled 
randomly and learners told as such; 2) explanations sampled 
pedagogically and learners told as such; 3) explanations sampled 
randomly but learners told they were sampled pedagogically; and 4) 
explanations sampled pedagogically but learners told they were sampled 
randomly.  
Experiment 3 had two stages (a teaching or explanation stage, followed 
by a learning stage), and divided participants into three conditions: 1) 
Teaching-Pedagogical Learning (select interventions for teaching; learn 
pedagogically); 2) Pedagogical Learning (select interventions to explore 
the system; learn pedagogically); and 3) Non-Pedagogical Learning 
(select interventions to explore the system; learn non-pedagogically). Of 
interest, Experiment 3 explored pedagogy with regard to causal 
reasoning and probabilistic events. 
Manipulation of 
Explanation 
Goodness 
Explanation quality was observed but not evaluated. 
Evaluation of Mental 
Models 
Mental models were indirectly evaluated in the sense that the 
experiment would reveal into how people learn, teach, and reason. 
Performance (Task or 
Evaluation Measure) 
Teaching and learning performance were measured based on the extent 
to which the human data correlated with model predictions. 
Teaching performance was quantified by comparing how the human 
data fit to pedagogical and non-pedagogical models using a likelihood 
ratio test.  
Teaching performance was also quantified by observing the frequencies 
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of intervention pairs chosen by teachers, and the correlating them to the 
model predictions. Teachers were also evaluated for how their teaching 
experience affected their ability to learn.  
Trust/Reliance 
Measures 
Not evaluated. 
 
 
Authors Shinsel et al.,2011.  See also Kulesza et al., 2011. 
AI System  Intelligent assistant based on machine learning, for classifying messages 
from public newsgroup postings into one of four categories: computers, 
religion, cars, or motorcycles.   
User's classifications are used as training data for the ML system. For 
each message that is to be classified, the system infers the user's 
judgments on similar messages. 
Research Participants Forty-eight university students. 
Explanation Interface Display components showed the message to be classified, the text pieces 
within the message that supported the classification, the decision of the 
classifier, the classifier's confidence it its classification, the decisions 
already made by the mini-crowd, and the Ml systems inference 
concerning the user's classification for similar messages. 
Explanation Form The text pieces within the message that supported the classification, 
Graphical elements such as icons, colors, widgets, and charts to 
communicate explanations; e.g., pie charts to explain confidence and 
uniqueness of system predictions. 
Study Design or 
Comparison Made 
Sizes of the "mini-crowds" that evaluated the systems: 1, 2, 6, or 11 
people.  This was a within variable. 
Manipulation of 
Explanation 
Goodness 
Not evaluated. 
Evaluation of Mental 
Models 
NASA-TLX was applied to measure mental workload. Working in a 
larger crowd resulted in lowered frustration ratings. 
Performance (Task or 
Evaluation Measure) 
Participant judgments of whether the classifier's classification was 
"right, maybe right, maybe wrong or wrong." Ability of users to identify 
system errors (misclassifications) (The system was calibrated to 85%-
88% accuracy.) 
Cost/benefit of smaller versus larger mini-crowds. 
Trust/Reliance 
Measures 
The development of trust is a primary focus of this study. 
There was a cost-benefit trade-off in that larger crowds found more 
errors, but more of the same errors. (Larger crowds were able to cover 
more messages in the time-limited task.)  Participants paid attention to 
the crowd's error-finding successes and its failures. 
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Authors Swinney, 1995 
AI System  The AI system is an externally developed expert system that is used in 
the auditing industry to evaluate the amount of reserve required for loans 
and to explain the reasoning behind its evaluation. 
Research Participants 41 professional auditors having various levels of experience. 
Explanation Interface The interface of the expert system was not described, as participants did 
not interact with it. Participants were given information about a 
hypothetical audit, the expert system's conclusions and explanations.  
Explanation Form Participants received printouts expressing the conclusions and 
explanations of the expert system. 
Study  Design or 
Comparison Made 
It should be noted that it was the experimenters—not the participants—
who were the ones who actually used the expert system. The purpose 
was to study the effect of machine-generated versus participant-
generated explanations of the expert system's output (positive or 
negative with regard to adequacy of the reserve amount of a loan) on the 
user's agreement (or disagreement) with the expert system's outputs. 
Manipulation of 
Explanation 
Goodness 
Explanation goodness was not evaluated.  Focus was on the notion that a 
positive evaluation would limit the effectiveness of an audit by reducing 
the auditor's skepticism. 
Evaluation of Mental 
Models 
Participant mental models were not evaluated. 
Performance (Task or 
Evaluation Measure) 
Comparison of the expert system's explanations and the participant-
written explanations in a hypothetical audit case; to what degree were 
participants’ judgments swayed by the inclusion of an explanatory 
element? 
Trust/Reliance 
Measures 
Trust and reliance were not evaluated. 
 
 
Authors Teach and Shortliffe, 1981 
AI System  Clinical consultation systems 
Research Participants Eighty-five physicians who were attending a course on medical 
information systems. 
Sixty-one medical school faculty members, who were not taking the 
course on medical information systems.  
Explanation Interface Indicates a desire for non-dogmatic explanations which function 
similarly to a human consultant. 
Explanation Form Questionnaire on attitudes regarding clinical consultation systems, 
especially acceptability, expectations on how the systems were likely to 
affect medical practice, and physician's desires regarding the 
performance capabilities of the systems. 
Study Design or 
Comparison Made 
The questionnaire was administered prior to the course. 
Primary comparison was of the tutorial and non-tutorial groups of 
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participants. Comparison was also made across the participant's 
specializations (e.g., surgeons, researchers, etc.) and across those with 
and those without computing experience. 
Manipulation of 
Explanation 
Goodness 
Not applicable. 
Evaluation of Mental 
Models 
Indirectly reflected in the ratings of acceptability across applications.  
Systems for medical records, hospital information systems, patient 
monitoring, and consultation ere rated as acceptable (97% - 81%) 
whereas systems for physical and licensing were rated as far less 
acceptable (52%-36%.  Systems intended as physician substituted were 
rated the least acceptable (32%). 
Indirectly reflected in the ratings on expectations of how the systems 
would affect medical practice.  Physicians expressed concern that the 
systems would lead to increased government control, shift the blame for 
poor decisions.  On the other hand, physicians did not think that the 
systems would lead to decreased efficiency, force the physicians to 
adapt their reasoning ("think like a computer"), or lead to job insecurity 
or loss of prestige. 
 
Performance (Task or 
Evaluation Measure) 
Physicians expressed a strong desire for systems to explain their advice, 
and also tailor their explanations to the needs and characteristics of the 
physician-user (e.g., level of background knowledge). 
It was preferred for systems to engage in "reasonable problem solving" 
and parallel the physician's reasoning as much as possible. 
It was preferred for systems to be easily learned. 
It was preferred that the interface be based on natural language, in a 
dialog form. 
Trust/Reliance 
Measures 
It was not seen necessary for the systems to be perfectly accurate or lead 
to perfect treatment plans.  Physicians would not accept a consultation 
system as a standard for medical practice. Nor would they recommend 
reducing the knowledge requirements of physicians because a medical 
information system (knowledge base) was available. 
 
 
Authors Tullio, et al. 2007 
AI System  Intelligent system to estimate the interruptibility of managers in an 
office setting. Based on a statistical model using data on manager hourly 
self-reports of interruptibility over a three month period. 
Research Participants Four managers and eight non-technical workers in a human resources 
department, having no previous knowledge of programming, or machine 
learning. 
Explanation Interface Color gradient display outside managers' offices, showing degrees of 
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interruptibility based on the statistical model. 
Explanation Form Explanations designed to shift a user’s mental model to be in line with 
how the AI system actually works, so as to increase user trust and 
efficacy. The AI system was itself not actually explained.  Rather, 
participants had to try and figure that out.   
Study Design or 
Comparison Made 
Six-week field deployment. Two worker groups shown different 
gradient displays. One was the gradient display alone, the other showed 
data from "sensors," such as whether the manager's keyboard was in use, 
whether there was audio activity, etc. 
Manipulation of 
Explanation 
Goodness 
Not specifically evaluated, though explanation complexity was (see 
above). 
Evaluation of Mental 
Models 
The primary focus of the study was the valuation of mental models of an 
intelligent system and their development.  Of particular concern was 
whether user's misconceptions of how the AI system works were 
corrected across experience, as the flaws or contradictory evidence were 
pointed out. 
Primary data were from a series of structured interviews and a series of 
surveys consisting of a few questions that workers answered at the 
managers' doors.  Workers reported on which sensors (data types) they 
used and which they did not. 
Workers were asked to describe the reasoning they used in deciding 
whether a manager was interruptible (open door, sound of talking, door 
tags signaling availability, etc.). Workers were asked to describe the 
intelligent constructs that they ascribed to the AI. 
Simple feedback was not sufficient to correct user's mental models. 
Misconceptions persisted (e.g., that the manager actually controlled the 
display, that the system relined on simple rules, something like a 
decision tree, etc.). Only three participants came to believe that the AI 
system was based on a statistical model. 
Performance (Task or 
Evaluation Measure) 
Workers have to estimate their own interruptibility and that of their 
supervisors. 
Trust/Reliance 
Measures 
Trust was also a focus of the study, based on the premise that 
recommender systems are trusted more if their recommendations are 
explained. Results showed that users relied more on the system if they 
trusted it, but nonetheless relied more on their own estimates.   
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Authors van Lent, Fisher & Mancuso, 2004; see also Core, et al. 2006 
AI System  US Army system for command training. Considered a form of serious 
game.  Includes software agents that control the actions of non-player 
characters, including simulated subordinate units (platoons) and the 
opposing forces. 
Coined the term "Explainable AI" (XAI) 
Research Participants Soldiers in training at the Infantry Captain's Career Course. 
Explanation Interface One display presents an aerial perspective on theater of operations with 
side menus populated with tasks for each of the platoons. Another 
display shows a terrestrial perspective, for event playback and after-
action review. The player can move through the landscape as the event 
is replayed, can pause, and can fast-forward. 
Explanation Form Key events, based on the mission plan, are depicted as flags on a 
mission timeline (presented at the bottom of the event playback 
window). Player can scroll the timeline and jump to the time of 
subevents or command decisions.  Explanations are based upon the task 
decomposition, and for each subtask the statistics on weapon used, unit 
involved, task status, etc. The explanations are essentially a record of the 
log files, presented as a explanation of the platoon behavior.  The XAI 
would provide records in response to these questions: What is the 
platoon's mission? What is the mission status? How is the task 
organized, and What is the platoon's ammunition status.  Thus, the 
explanations are about the task, not about how the AI works. 
Study Design or 
Comparison Made 
No manipulated Independent variables. 
Manipulation of 
Explanation 
Goodness 
Explanation goodness was evaluated indirectly by a review of post-
course comments and feedback. Sixty percent of trainees rated the 
training system as having high fidelity and training value. 
Evaluation of Mental 
Models 
Mental models were not evaluated. 
Performance (Task or 
Evaluation Measure) 
Not applicable. The authors note that "The fundamental limitation of the 
XAI is the depth of the explanations it can provide. The current XAI 
system is limited to explaining how the pre-existing task knowledge was 
applied... it doesn’t include any deeper knowledge about why each task 
should be approached" (p. 907). 
Trust/Reliance 
Measures 
Trust/reliance were not specifically evaluated. 
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Authors Williams, et al. 2016 
AI System  The AI (Adaptive eXplanation Improvement System) was designed to 
crowdsource explanations and ratings of explanations (of math 
problems) from learners (users) and to use machine learning to sift 
through the crowdsourced information to identify which explanations 
are most useful to learners such that they may be integrated into the 
system’s explanation pool and presented to future users.  
Research Participants The case study,  participants were 150 US residents sourced from 
Mechanical Turk. For the randomized experiment, the participants were 
524 people who were also recruited with Mechanical Turk. 
Explanation Interface The interface was a GUI that integrates modules for question-answering, 
explanation-reading, explanation-rating, and explanation-writing user 
tasks. Through the GUI, the AI interacts with a community of learners to 
provide problem explanations which are effective to other learners, even 
in the complete absence of instructor resources. 
Explanation Form Textual explanations given by previous learners who used the system. 
Study Design or 
Comparison Made 
The purpose of the case study was mainly to seed the AI with user-
generated explanations. The evaluation occurred in the randomized 
experiment, which distinguished four conditions (explanations from the 
pool after 75 learners, explanations from the pool after 150 learners, 
explanations rejected by the AI, and explanations written by instructors) 
and a control (no explanation provided) with respect to the nature of the 
explanation received by users for each question. 
Manipulation of 
Explanation 
Goodness 
Goodness was not evaluated per se.   
Evaluation of Mental 
Models 
Mental models were not evaluated per se. Though not argued explicitly, 
it is possible that measurement of learning, is a surrogate, since it takes 
into account a participant’s ability to generalize what they have learned 
from explanations to similar—but novel—problems. 
Performance (Task or 
Evaluation Measure) 
Human performance was measured by self-reported ratings of perceived 
skill and by quantifying the degree by which participants’ accuracy 
improved over the course of the experiment (i.e., a measure of learning), 
comparing the AI-generated explanations to the default practice without 
explanations. Results showed that the AI system elicits and identifies 
explanations that are helpful to users. 
Trust/Reliance 
Measures 
Trust or reliance were not evaluated. 
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Authors Ye and Johnson, 1995 
AI System  Simulation of an an expert system's  auditing diagnosis of a hypothetical 
medical products company. 
Research Participants Professional auditors and accountants, all having more than six years of 
experience. 
Explanation Interface Text output of the expert's system's determination (written by the 
experimenters), accompanied by text versions of the three types of 
explanation. 
Explanation Form Based on the early research on expert systems with explanation 
capabilities (i.e., Clancey, 1983; Swartout, 1983), the researchers used 
three types of explanations: Trace (the inferential steps taken by the 
expert system, Justification (the causal argument or rationale for each of 
the inferential steps), and Strategy (high level goal structure that 
determined how the expert system used its knowledge base). 
Study Design or 
Comparison Made 
Fully within, single group, repeat measure design. 
For each of a series of auditing decisions made by the expert system, 
participants could opt to see one of the three types of explanations. (The 
initial instructions included a practice case, for which the participants 
could see all three of the types of explanations.) 
Manipulation of 
Explanation 
Goodness 
Not explicitly evaluated, except for the manipulation of Type of 
Explanation. 
Evaluation of Mental 
Models 
Attempted to show whether explanations influence user confidence in an 
expert system (a medical diagnosis recommender system). Previous 
research had focused primarily on the problem of generating 
explanations. 
Performance (Task or 
Evaluation Measure) 
Participants rated their belief in the six conclusions of the expert system 
(Likert scale), both before and after seeing one of the types of 
explanation.   
Trust/Reliance 
Measures 
By implication, explanations have a positive impact on on user 
acceptance of an expert system; explanations increased participant's 
belief in the system recommendations.  Participants preferred, and spent 
more time reviewing, the Trace-type and Justification-type explanations. 
 
 
Authors Zhang et al. 2016 
AI System  Robotic agent for robot task planning, using a "blocks world" type 
domain. 
Research Participants Thirteen university students evaluated 23 tower-building plans generated 
by the robot. 
Explanation Interface Robot plans are portrayed in photographs showing the series of robot 
actions. 
Explanation Form Explanations were manifest implicitly in the actions of robotic 
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machines, as they employed more human-like methods to achieving 
goals (non-linguistic, non-graphical). 
Study Design or 
Comparison Made 
Participants evaluated 23 tower-building plans generated by the robot. 
Manipulation of 
Explanation 
Goodness 
Not evaluated. 
Evaluation of Mental 
Models 
Not evaluated. 
Performance (Task or 
Evaluation Measure) 
Explicability (Ability to associate labels for tasks in a plan). 
Predictability (predict next action) 
After labeling each plan, participants rated the plan comprehensibility 
Trust/Reliance 
Measures 
Indirectly evaluated: The researchers conclude that their measure of 
"explicability" captures human human interpretation of plans. 
 
 
